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THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 101 OF THE TREATY OF LISBON TO 
FORMS OF HORIZONTAL COLLABORATION IN THE FINANCIAL 
SERVICES SECTOR 
 
By Andrea Lista 
 
 
Since the dawn of the European Union, insurance and banking undertakings claimed 
to be subject to a special status vis-à-vis the application of EU competition law, due 
to the quasi social nature of the services they provide.  
 
Within the financial services industry, anti-trust concerns do arise in relation to 
mergers and acquisitions, possible abuses of dominant position and state aid; 
however Art. 101 TFEU and the regulation of forms of co-operation arguably 
represent the paramount and most intricate aspects of the application of the EU 
competition rules to the financial services sector. This is due to the fact that the 
insurance and banking industries historically have been characterised by intense 
forms of horizontal co-operation between undertakings deemed necessary for the 
correct functioning of the financial services industry. 
 
On a general level, any agreement establishing a homogeneous pricing structure vis-
à-vis consumers represents a blatant violation of Art. 101 TFEU giving rise to 
serious anti-trust concerns. Nevertheless, as will be explored in this thesis, in the 
financial services sector the Commission has often allowed what the doctrine has 
correctly defined as “forms of horizontal agreements concerning a relevant cost 
element making up the final price vis-à-vis customers”1 through its decisions relating 
                                                 
1
 See Faull & Nikpay, “The EC Law of Competition” OUP 2007, p. 636. 
  3 
to interbank fees in payment systems and through the enactment of a block exemption 
for the insurance industry. Art. 101 thus seems to manifest a common element for 
these two industries, presenting interesting and intricate teleological quandaries. 
This thesis endeavours to break the impasse down into questions to which an answer 
may be provided: Ought Art. 101 to apply to the financial services sector at all? If 
so, to what extent? Is there any justification for a block exemption in the insurance 
sector? Indeed, should the banking sector too benefit from a block exemption? 
 
This thesis endeavours to answer the above questions and thereby to contribute to 
the identification of an ideal regulatory framework for forms of horizontal co-
operation in the financial services sector.  
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INTRODUCTION
 
 
 
 
Aims and Objectives 
 
Competition law is a constantly evolving legal field; although characterised by an 
idiosyncratic and technical nature, competition law has an inestimable influence on 
numerous areas of law and on rules of politics and economic policy. Its principal 
function is to safeguard and preserve a free market system, promote and facilitate the 
competitive process within the economic market, endeavouring to achieve an 
optimum allocation of resources and the maximisation of consumer welfare.  
In a market without any form of control, undertakings would be prone to 
adhere to collusive forms of behaviours with the aim of fixing prices, those in a 
dominant position would misuse their market strength, and an excessive number of 
mergers would lead to high concentrations of economic power. Such practices would 
invariably obstruct or inhibit the competitive process within a specific market.  
The primary purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the scope of application of 
Art. 101 of the Treaty of Lisbon
2
 within the sphere of the financial services sector 
(banking and insurance). During the last few years, the financial services sector has 
witnessed events and legal developments of the utmost importance, the first of which 
took place five years ago, when  the Commission launched a sector enquiry into the 
financial sector
3
. The attention of the Commission focused on the financial services 
                                                 
2
 Art. 101 of the Treaty of Lisbon (hereafter “the Treaty”), former Art. 81 EC. 
3
 The European Commission launched inquiries into competition in financial services in June 2005, 
pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. The financial services sector enquiry focused on 
payments cards and business insurance. See the Commission “Inquiry into the European business 
insurance sector pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003”, January 2007, available at: 
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as a sector providing  key inputs into a range of other commercial activities, the aim 
of the enquiry being the identification of possible idiosyncrasies in the insurance and 
banking sectors giving rise to possible competition concerns.  
The years 2006 and 2007 were years of the utmost importance for the  
financial services sector, with the publication of the Reports on business insurance in 
2006 and the Reports on the banking sector and card payment systems in 2007. More 
recently, a deep financial crisis reverberated through the global economy, and a new 
insurance block exemption regulatory framework was enacted in March 2010. 
In light of these recent developments, the aim of this thesis is to critically 
consider the controversial issues surrounding the application of Art.101 of the Treaty 
to the financial sector, in order to assess its effectiveness and to ultimately propose 
possible alternatives at a time when the situation characterising the internal market 
appears mature for the introduction of important reforms.  
 
● The thesis will take into account in the first place the development of the EU 
competition policy from the outset of the Community in order to introduce a general 
overview of the complex issues characterising this area of law, and will prove the 
existence of  a common thread linking the insurance and banking sectors. 
 
● The thesis will  focus on the current block exemption regulatory framework of the 
insurance industry in order to identify its scope of application in light of previous 
Commission decisions, and to critically evaluate the main controversial issues and 
the concrete impact of the block exemption on the insurance sector. 
                                                                                                                                          
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/financial_services/inquiries/interim_report_24012007.pdf. See 
also  the Commission “Inquiry into the European Retail banking sector”, April 2006, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/financial_services/inquiries/interim_report_1.pdf. Accessed on 
3 July 2011. 
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● The thesis will reflect on the US insurance antitrust approach in order to introduce 
a comparative evaluation of the European regulatory framework. Together with a 
detailed analysis of the reasons pro et contra a block exemption in the insurance 
industry, this comparative evaluation is intended as a basis for the elaboration of 
possible regulatory alternatives. 
 
● The thesis will consider the current EU regulatory approach of the banking sector. 
Emphasis will be devoted to competition concerns arising in relation to card payment 
systems. Both price and non-price competition issues will be taken into account with 
a specific reference to Multilateral Interchange Fees, No Discrimination Rules, 
Exclusion Rules and Exclusivity Rules. Yet again, a comparative element (the US 
approach) will be taken into account with the intention of exploring possible 
alternative regulatory scenarios.  
 
●  The thesis shall draw parallels with the Application of Art. 101 to other sectors of 
the economy.  Due to structural similarities, the attention will focus on the 
telecommunications and energy sectors. As it will be readily appreciated, this 
comparative analysis will provide some interesting ‘outward looking’ elements of 
considerations on the basis of which the conclusions reached on the application of 
Art. 101 to the financial services sector will be counter balanced. 
 
 
● Finally,  the thesis shall endeavour to consider whether the regulatory approach 
related to the application of Art.101 TFEU to the financial services sector should be 
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consistent for both insurance and banking industries, or whether a divergent 
regulatory frameworks would be justified. 
 
Structure and Methodology 
The thesis is divided in five parts preceded by a chapter outlining the common 
features of insurance and banking industries. Part I will set the scene considering the 
common features of the insurance and banking sectors, and the importance of the 
application of Art. 101 to this area of law. Part II will deal with the application of 
Art. 101  to the insurance sector. Part III will reflect on the evaluation of the 
application of the EU antitrust regulatory framework stemming out of Art. 101 to the 
banking industry. Part IV will consider comparative elements arising from the 
application of Art. 101 to the energy and telecommunication sectors. Part V will 
illustrate the possible way forward. Part VI will provide some concluding remarks. 
More specifically, Part I shall identify the questions to be addressed by this 
thesis, drawing a parallel on the similarities between the banking and insurance 
industries, and emphasising the raison d'être for the choice to focus the analysis 
solely on the application of Art. 101. 
In Part II, the theme of research is to investigate the essence of the current 
regulatory framework of the insurance industry stemming out the application of Art. 
101 and its concrete impact on the internal market.  
The chapters relating to this part will comprise an introduction of the main 
issues relating to the application of EU competition law to the insurance industry in 
conjunction to the evolution of the impact of Art. 101 TFEU. The evaluation of the 
EU and US antitrust regulatory approaches in relation to the insurance industry will 
then be considered, together with the critical  assessment of the concrete impact of 
  15 
the current EUinsurance block exemption on the internal market, and the suggestion 
of possible avenues to its reform. 
The underlying thread connecting the chapters of the first part is the quest  for 
possible regulatory alternatives and reforms of the EU antitrust regulatory regime of 
the insurance industry. In doing so, the evaluation of the concrete impact of the 
insurance block exemption regulation on the internal market will play a crucial role; 
alternatives and possible reforms will be in fact carefully assessed not only against 
theoretical arguments, but also in light of their possible impact on the internal 
market, with a specific reference to consumer welfare.  
In Part III, the theme of the aim is to investigate the current EU antitrust 
regulatory framework relating to the banking industry. Emphasis will be on the 
controversial competition issues arising from the retail banking systems. Both price 
competition and non-price competition issues will be object of analysis.  
The attention will be devoted first to price competition issues arising from the 
use of Multilateral Interchange Fees and Discriminatory Rules by card payment 
networks. The main Commission decisions and ECJ
4
 judgments will be taken into 
consideration, together with the analysis of the US approach. Similarly, a critical 
analysis of the non-price competition issues arising from the controversial exclusion 
and exclusivity rules adopted by card payment systems will then be carried out 
taking into account the US perspective.  
Yet again, the underlying link of the second part will be the attempt to 
identify and explore possible avenues to reform the current EU antitrust regulatory 
                                                 
4
 With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, a new nomenclature has been introduced in 
relation to the European Courts. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is now formally the Court of 
Justice, and the formerly Court of First Instance is now the General Court. Notwithstanding the new 
nomenclature, in this thesis reference is still made to the ECJ and the Court of First Instance. 
  16 
framework of the banking sector. Similarly to Part I, the analysis of the US approach 
will reveal itself as an invaluable instrument of debate.  
In Part IV, the attention will be turned to the application of Art. 101 to the 
energy and telecommunication sectors in the quest for the identification of possible 
rebuttals or confirmations of the modifications of the legal framework revolving 
around Art. 101 suggested in the previous parts of the thesis for the insurance and 
banking sectors. 
This thesis will identify the most complex issues arising from the application 
of Art. 101 TFEU to the financial services sector. It will be established that forms of 
co-operation capable of being caught by Art. 101 are extensively present both in the 
insurance industry and in the banking sector. 
It will be emphasised how these forms of co-operation have traditionally been 
justified by a  sui generis nature of the banking and insurance services, underpinning 
tolerance of a block exemption in the insurance industry, and a relaxed application of 
Art. 101 to the banking sector. We shall critically consider the rationale and real 
impact of these forms of co-operation on the market, suggesting in each case a 
different regulatory regime.  
In Part IV, we shall proceed above and beyond the ‘internal’ line of reasoning 
pertaining to the financial services industry and draw a comparison between the 
application of Art. 101 in this area and different segments of the market. All this in 
the quest for the identification of possible rebuttals or confirmations of the findings 
of previous parts of the thesis, with a view to setting the scene for the last part of the 
conceptual journey of this “literary vessel”.  
It is opinion of the author that for the purpose of this thesis it is worthwhile to 
channel the attention to the telecommunications and energy sectors. The rationale for 
  17 
this choice lies with the similarities which characterise these two sectors if compared 
to the financial services industry. In the first place, both the telecommunications and 
the energy industries provide, just like insurance and banking undertakings, services 
rather than ‘material goods’. 
Secondly, similarly to the provision of banking and insurance services, 
telecommunications and energy can be defined as essential facilities denoting a 
quasi-social nature which is somehow difficult to be reconciled with competition 
law. As with the financial services sector, the provision of telecommunications and 
energy services traditionally used to be a state prerogative, and the two sectors were 
also subject to a process of liberalisation and integration similar to the ones which 
characterised the financial services sector
5
. Herein lies a key element of connection 
                                                 
5
 The EU process of liberalization and integration of the energy markets started in the early nineties 
with the adoption of Directive 90/377 (Council Directive 90/377/EEC of 29 June 1990 concerning a 
Community procedure to improve the transparency of gas and electricity prices charged to industrial 
end-users [ 1990] OJ L176/1). Directive 90/377 was followed by a first wave of liberalization for the 
electricity and gas markets  which comprised Directive 90/547 (Council Directive 90/547/EEC of 29 
October 1990 on the transit of electricity through transmission grids [1991] OJL313/30, and Directive 
91/296 (Council Directive 91/296/EEC of 31 May 1991 on the transit of natural gas through grids 
[1991] OJL147/37). The process of integration in the energy sector was subsequently integrated at the 
beginning of the new millennium through the enactment of a further series of directives which 
included Directive 2003/54 (Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity [2003] OJ176/37), and 
Directive  2003/55 (Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas [2003] OJ176/57). As for the 
telecommunication sector, the lion share of the process of integration of the European markets was 
enacted in the early 2000, with the adoption of a series of Directive whose aim was the harmonisation 
of the conditions of access, interconnection and provision of telecommunication services across the 
internal market. The most important directives are Directive 2002/19 (Directive 2002/19/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, 
electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive) [2002] OJL 108/7, 
Directive 2002/21  (Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 
2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services 
(Framework Directive)[2002] OJ L 108/33); Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users' rights relating to electronic 
communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive), [2002] OJ L 108/51; Directive 
2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of 
electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive)OJ L 108/37; Directive 
2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing 
of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on 
privacy and electronic communications) [2002]OJ L 201/35; Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of 16 
September 2002 on competition in the markets for electronic communications networks and 
services[2002]OJ L/21. Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of 16 September 2002 on competition in 
the markets for electronic communications networks and services [2002]OJ L 249/21. The current 
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between these areas of the market; although one may claim that the economies of 
scale of the financial services market and the energy and telecommunication 
industries are radically different and at odds with one another, calling for a different 
solution in terms of market failure
6
, it is opinion of this author that despite such 
differences, some structural similarities render the comparison between these areas of 
the market valuable for the purpose of this thesis. 
These structural similarities emerge from the nature of the services provided 
in these industries and their atavistic monopolistic nature. Just as with significant 
elements of the financial services sector, the energy and telecommunications 
industries were from the outset state prerogatives, and although the monopolistic 
aspects of the energy and telecommunication are admittedly more accentuated 
compared to the banking and insurance industries calling into question a different 
market failure problematic, similarities between these areas of the market do exist. 
                                                                                                                                          
point of reference for the telecommunications sector is represented by Directive 2009/140/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a 
common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on 
access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, and 
2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services [2009]OJ L 
337/37. 
6
  It is undeniable that the economics underpinnings of competition law in the energy and 
telecommunication sectors are under many aspects different from the financial services market. From 
an economic and regulatory perspective, when it comes to the energy and telecommunication sectors 
the market failure dilemma assumes a nature more linked to monopolistic issues , rather than 
information asymmetries which are more likely to arise in the financial services sector. Nevertheless, 
as emphasised in the above, monopolistic issues indeed arose also in relation to the financial services 
sector (at least in continental Europe), and similarities in terms of ‘network structures’ do exist 
between these different areas of the economy. Issues related to sector specific regulation, and the EU 
process of liberalisation also contribute to the built of a theoretical bridge which, going beyond the 
economic and market failure discrepancies, could prove to be a valuable tools for the analysis 
conducted in this thesis. On this point, see K. Talus; P. Kuoppamäki; "Relationship Between General 
Competition Laws and Sector Specific Energy Regulation"OGEL 1 (2010), available at: www.ogel.org.  
Talus and Kuoppamäki point out that the sector specific regulation and the process of liberalisation of 
the energy sector are factors to be taken into account when it comes to competiton regulation. This 
line of reasoning can be arguably equally apply  to the telecommunication and financial services 
sectors rendering the comparison between those sector worthwhile for the purpose of this thesis.  
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The monopolistic nature of the financial services industry has been 
acknowledged by the doctrine
7
; the tendency of insurers to co-operate has been 
considered, thus, as one of the several aspects which render business insurance a 
“naturally monopolistic” activity.8 
Moreover, in light of the recent global financial crisis the monopolistic nature 
of financial services was brought into the light again through the recent debate 
revolving around the concept “too big to fail.”9 The underlying idea of this debate 
would be that large financial services conglomerates become of such utmost 
economic/social importance, and that their collapse would have disastrous 
consequences for society as a whole. The UK state intervention in Northern Rock, 
RBS and other banks appears to corroborate the idea of the financial services sector 
as a sector characterised by a monopolistic inclination, backed by the state as single 
ultimate service provider of last resort.  
Similarities do arise also from the progressive process of liberalisation which 
in the last two decades has characterised the financial, telecommunication and energy 
sectors in an analogous fashion. In all the industries at stake, this process of 
liberalisation has been characterised by a dichotomy arising from the need to enact 
an effective regulatory regime that enables the development of full competition, 
                                                 
7
 See, inter alia, M. Faure, “Insurance and competition law: balancing the conflicts”, above, p. 9. See 
also J. Finsinger, “European Integration of Insurance Markets. Preliminary but novel perspectives”, 
Working Paper Universitat Luneburg Nr. 75, 1989, pp 70-72.  The tendency of insurers to co-operate 
has  been considered one of the several aspects which render business insurance a “naturally 
monopolistic”.  
8
 Ibid., p.9. It is interesting to note that, till not long ago, in several Member States (e.g. Italy), the 
insurance industry was actually a State Monopoly.  
9
 For a detailed overview of the “Too big to fail” debate see, inter alia, Andrew Ross Sorkin “Too Big 
to Fail: Inside the Battle to Save Wall Street” Allen Lane 2009,   Gary H. Stern, Ron J. Feldman 
“Too big to fail: the hazards of bank bailouts”, Brookings publishing 2004, and Douglas Darrell 
Evanoff, George G. Kaufman, “Systemic financial crises”, Kaufman 2004. 
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whilst effectively protecting other public interests
10
. The need to ensure effective 
competition was indeed developed pari-passu with the idea of granting a certain 
level of consumer protection. 
Let us now consider this aspect as, in the author’s opinion, it is extremely 
important in order to establish a theoretical linkage between the financial services 
sector and the energy and telecommunication industries. The wave of liberalisation 
of the financial services industry can be indeed compared with the  process of 
privatisation of the telecommunication and energy sectors.  
With the exception of the UK market where insurance and banking services 
were driven since the outset by private economic and entrepreneurial interests, in 
continental Europe the provision of financial services was initially subject to the 
monopolistic longa manus of governments just like what happened with the energy 
and telecommunication services. The advent of the European Community (now 
European Union) ignited a process of privatisation of these sectors which was 
characterised by the need to ensure full competition between undertakings operating 
in the market.  
The need to ensure competition somehow clashed with the ‘naturally 
monopolistic’ nature of the financial, energy and telecommunication services. 
Nevertheless,  this clash has lead to a different regulatory approach of the sectors 
considered worthy of exploration for the purpose of this thesis. 
The rationale for this lies with the fact that, as it will be appreciated in due 
course, the main controversial issues arising from the application of Art. 101 to the 
energy and telecommunication sector relate to the management and access to 
                                                 
10
 OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform, Regulatory Reform of the Telecommunications Sector, 
available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/35/32482712.pdf 
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network systems capable of being characterised as essential facilities. This is 
arguably the foremost similarity between the energy, telecommunications and the 
financial services sector.  
The aforementioned process of liberalisation of the telecommunication and 
energy sector left open the need to reconcile the application of competition law with 
the presence of infrastructures to which access was restricted, built in order to 
provide services, similarly to what happened in the financial services industry. 
Strong similarities do exist between the energy, telecommunications  and financial 
industries in the way that the creation of infrastructure networks is needed for the 
provision of services.  
As will be unraveled in the course of this thesis, the similarities between 
network infrastructures in the telecommunication energy and banking sectors are 
very evident if the card payment systems are considered. Exactly as for the provision 
of gas/electricity and, for instance, telephone services, we shall discover that the 
provision of card payments is the outcome of the creation of a network infrastructure 
without which the provision of the service is virtually impossible
11
.  
Far from being confined to the banking sector, the similarities arguably 
extend also to the insurance sector. As will be established in the first part of this 
thesis, the provision of insurance services is based on the exchange of information on 
statistical data between large insurance associations. This system could indeed be 
defined as a network infrastructure not too dissimilar from the ones characterising 
the other industries taken into account
12
.The existence of a sort of network 
infrastructure in the insurance industry appears to have been implicitly 
                                                 
11
 On this point see OECD, “Competition and Regulation in Retail Banking” (2006), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/18/39753683.pdf. 
12
 See Chapter  3. 
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acknowledged by the Commission through the enactment of a block exemption for 
the exchange of information between insurance undertakings.  
We shall promptly discover that the raison d'être for the block exemption in 
this area is the acknowledgment of the need for cooperation between insurance 
undertakings, which individually could not be in the position to create or have access 
to large statistical data necessary to determine premiums and face uncertainty.
13
 This 
arguably creates a network infrastructure which gives rise to the same competition 
concerns as those arising in the banking, energy and telecommunication sectors. 
We are therefore dealing with different sectors of the market characterised by 
network structures which ignite similar antitrust anxieties in relation to the 
application of Art. 101. Above all, the monopolistic nature of these industries, the 
provision of ‘quasi social services’ of essential nature, the process of liberalisation 
which has characterised them in the last three decades, in conjunction with the idea 
of the creation of networks and infrastructures necessary to provide their services, 
create a theoretical linkage between the financial services industry and the 
telecommunication and energy sectors. 
Despite we are dealing with different market failure issues,  similar 
structures, and similar competition concerns, as it will be readily appreciated, do 
arise from the comparison between these areas of the market. It is opinion of this 
author that these elements of connection will render the parallel with the energy and 
telecommunication industries an invaluable tools to assess and corroborate the 
conclusions that will be reached in relation to the financial services sector.  
 
                                                 
13
 See Chapter  3. 
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Part V, shall endeavour to consider whether the regulatory approach related 
to the application of Art.101 TFEU to the financial services sector should be 
consistent for both insurance and banking industries, or whether a diversified 
regulatory framework is justified. 
Part VI will provide concluding remarks. 
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1 The Application of the EU Competition law to the 
financial services sector: general issues 
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The Application of EU
14
 
 Competition law to the financial services sector: general 
issues 
 
 
 
1.1 Banking and insurance services: two faces of the same coin? 
 
Banking and insurance undertakings perform almost identical economic functions; 
both can be defined as financial intermediaries which receive money from private 
                                                 
14
 With the  entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, the EC has formally ceased 
to exist. Nevertheless, since this thesis was  elaborated and largely refers to a period  preceding the 
Treaty of Lisbon, reference is sometime made to “EC”, or “Community” , or to “EC” or “Community 
measures.” 
  26 
individuals or companies in the form of deposits or premiums, and lend money to 
customers wishing to borrow.
15
   
The literature has identified the nature of  customers’ claims as the real 
unique difference between the banks and insurance industry. If a bank depositor has 
the unconditional right to claim his money back either after a pre-set deadline or 
simply on demand, the same does not apply to a policyholder
16
. The claim of the 
latter is, indeed, conditional and can be exercised only when (and if) the event object 
of the insurance actually occurs
17
. This difference is anyway very subtle when it 
comes to life insurance where the demarking line between insurance and banking 
services seems to fade away, with the exemption of  term insurance; life insurance 
policies provide, indeed, for both savings and credit mechanisms
18
. 
Apart from similarities related to the nature and the function of the services 
provided, recent years have witnessed a closer linkage between insurance and 
banking industries, due to an evolutionary process triggered by financial innovations 
and the financial liberalisation of the internal market. More specifically, economic 
doctrine has identified four main phenomena that arguably consolidatethe already 
                                                 
15
 Economists have widely acknowledged the similarities in terms of economic functions between 
insurance and banking undertakings. See inter alia, T.F. Huertas and J.L. Silverman, “The Banking 
and Insurance holidays of 1933”, Citicorp publications, available at: http://www.h-
net.org/~business/bhcweb/publications Accessed on 3 July 2011.        
See also NAIC, “A Comparison of the Insurance and Banking Regulatory Frameworks for Identifying 
and Supervising Companies in Weakened Financial Condition”, Report of April 19, 2005, available 
at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/staffreports/naicfrs/naicfrs.pdf. Accessed on 3 July 2011. 
T.F. Huertas and J.L. Silverman have identified the solely difference between the banks and insurance 
industry in the nature of the customers’ claims, and they point out that "a life insurance company 
performs some of the functions of a savings bank and, to a smaller degree, of a commercial bank.” 
(“The Banking and Insurance holidays of 1933”, above p.106). 
16
 See, T.F. Huertas and J.L. Silverman, “The Banking and Insurance holidays of 1933”, above, p101.  
17
 Ibid. 
18
  See T.F. Huertas and J.L. Silverman, above, p.108. In their comparative analysis, Huertas and J.L. 
Silverman  point out that "a life insurance company performs some of the functions of a savings bank 
and, to a smaller degree, of a commercial bank.” 
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existing  synergies between  insurance and banking businesses.
19
 In primis, it has 
been claimed that  the “desegmentation” of finance which took place through the 
expansion of information technology has led to the availability of a larger number of 
insurance and banking products compared to the past, and to the creation of an 
unprecedented wave of competition between the insurance and banking industries. 
20
  
Secondly, in the last few years a gradual process of “marketisation” of 
finance has seen financial markets thriving as vehicles for the provision of securities 
and derivatives
21
.  Thirdly, the “globalisation” of finance has ignited a new growing 
trend of cross-border activities and mergers in the financial services sector.
22
 
Finally, the financial services market has also recently witnessed the 
phenomenon of so-called “institutional repositioning” of finance, whereby growing 
synergies saw the entry into the market of new multitasking players such as financial 
supermarkets (e.g. bankassurance). 
23
  
Although the above phenomena have admittedly created a closer point of 
encounter between the banking and insurance industries,  it has been argued that their 
impact on the  banking sector was deeper compared to the insurance industry
24
.  This 
is due to the fact that except for reinsurance, the insurance industry is arguably 
                                                 
19
 A detailed economic analysis of the factors which determined the amalgamation of the  banking and 
insurance sectors has been carried by M. D. Knight in “Meeting worlds? Insurance and banking”, 
available at: http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp050602.htm. (Accessed 1 July 2011). The considerations 
that follows in this paragraph are based on the economic studies of M. D. Knight .  
20
 See M. D. Knight in “Meeting worlds? Insurance and banking”, above, at p. 4.  
21
 Ibid. The marketisation of finance has, nevertheless,  been recently contrived by the global financial 
crisis. 
22
 It is interesting to note that the globalization of the financial services industry did not nevertheless 
result into an increment of cross border provision of services (on this point see the Commission 
“Report on the retail banking sector inquiry”, sector inquiry under Art 17 of Regulation 1/2003 on 
retail banking (Final Report) [COM(2007) 33 final] at p. 45).  
23
 See M. D. Knight in “Meeting worlds? Insurance and banking”, above, at p. 4. 
24
 Ibid. 
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characterised by a less international or global dimension compared to  banking 
industry.
25
  
Notwithstanding these differences, it is opinion of the author that similarities 
and growing areas of overlap between the insurance and banking sector arguably 
remain considerably more significant. The “financial” element of insurance products 
has indeed dramatically increased during the last few years
26
.  In this regard, 
economic studies have emphasised that the recent establishment of banking-
insurance conglomerates was specifically devoted to “exploiting synergies in the 
battle for the retail asset holder”27 through the exploitation of the insurance 
companies competitive edge in the “production” of insurance products in conjunction 
with the banks extensive retail networks.
28
  
 Competition between the  banking and insurance industries has also been 
dramatically intensified in the course of the last few years, especially as far as asset 
management and life insurance segments are concerned. Recently, the two industries 
have, indeed, intensively endeavored to attract the attention of new customers  at  a 
time characterised by a general  lack of guarantees offered by  national pension  
systems
29
. 
                                                 
25
 See  NAIC, “A Comparison of the Insurance and Banking Regulatory Frameworks for Identifying 
and Supervising Companies in Weakened Financial Condition”, above, p. 14. Some also claim that in 
respect to banks, the insurance industry is also distinguished by way of a more heterogeneous nature , 
with life and non-life segments belonging to two rather distinct types of business (on this point see M. 
D. Knight in “Meeting worlds? Insurance and banking”, above, at p. 4). 
26
 Ibid. M. D. Knight provides the example  of single premium unit-linked insurance policies, which, 
according to him,  “compete directly with other financial products as resting places for household 
assets”. 
27
 See M. D. Knight in “Meeting worlds? Insurance and banking”, above, at p. 4. 
28
 Ibid. M. D. Knight points out that “as investors in and suppliers of guarantees, insurers have also 
become increasingly active in credit derivatives and structured finance products”. 
29
 See M. D. Knight in “Meeting worlds? Insurance and banking”, above, at p. 6. 
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1.2 Competition law and the Financial Services Sector 
 
Traditionally, and especially in continental Europe, the financial services sector used 
to be a state prerogative. Due to the quasi-social nature of financial services, in many 
Member States insurance services were subject to a state monopoly, and the banking 
system was heavily controlled by governments.
30
 
With the advent of the European Community (now after the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Union) the situation changed dramatically 
through the introduction of radical reforms of the financial services industry in 
several Member States. As a result, the previous government monopolistic approach 
was left behind in favour of heavy private sector involvement, which invariably 
enhanced competition  igniting, at the same time, serious competition concerns.  
Despite these radical changes, due to the recent global financial crisis the 
quasi-social nature of financial services was brought into the light again through the 
recent debate rotating around the concept “too big to fail.”31  The underlying idea of 
this debate would be that large financial services conglomerates become of such 
utmost economic importance, and that their collapse would have disastrous 
consequences for the society as a whole.  
For the same reason, it has been traditionally claimed that the undertakings 
facing market complexities  stemming out the financial services sector should be 
exempt from the application of competition law. This thesis, as it will be discovered 
                                                 
30
 Inter alia,  Italy and France. 
31
 For a detailed overview of the “Too big to fail” debate see, inter alia, Andrew Ross Sorkin “Too 
Big to Fail: Inside the Battle to Save Wall Street” Allen Lane 2009,   Gary H. Stern, Ron J. Feldman 
“Too big to fail: the hazards of bank bailouts”, Brookings publishing 2004, and Douglas Darrell 
Evanoff, George G. Kaufman, “Systemic financial crises”, Kaufman 2004. 
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in due course, strongly rebuts this line of reasoning, and advocates for a full exposure 
of the financial services sector to the application of Art 101.  Nevertheless, far from 
being straightforward, the route to that conclusion will be long, winding and 
impervious.  
Considered from an anti-trust perspective, the financial services sector gives 
rise, as a matter of fact, to many complexities. One of the main features of this 
industry is characterised by the fact that market members can assume the form of 
retailers, wholesalers, customers and suppliers, with the wholesale market capable of 
affecting retail customers indirectly.
32
   
Authors have correctly pointed out that insurers, banks and pension funds 
widely operate in the stock exchange or other securities markets, incurring trading 
costs which may be transferred to customers in terms of increments of products 
cost
33
. Banks for their part operate through payment systems that they themselves 
created, and consequently need insurance, in the same way as insurance undertakings 
cannot detach themselves from banking services. Further, as previously mentioned, 
the dramatic increment of financial conglomerates lead to a scenario where different 
departments of the same undertaking can provide both insurance and banking 
services. 
All this needs to be read in conjunction with the extremely complex inter-
relationships between undertakings operating in the financial services industry. 
Especially if the worldwide scope of the field of wholesale financial services markets 
is considered, the high degree of sophistication of synergies among participants 
caused the financial services sector to be characterised by a very heterogeneous 
                                                 
32
 See Faull and Nickpay, “The EC Law of Competition” OUP 2007, p. 636.  
33
 See M. D. Knight in “Meeting worlds? Insurance and banking”, above, at p. 6. 
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nature. The global financial industry is thus very difficult to decode and to be clearly 
partitioned into banking and insurance services.    
Above all, the role played by the financial services sector within  the 
economy, is, to say the least, enormous.  We are dealing with a sector of the market 
so important and complex, that it  invariably needs to be subject to competition law 
in order to avoid market deficiencies and to ensure that an adequate framework of 
consumer protection is in place and fully functional.  
      That is the reason why,  since the dawn of the European Community the 
Commission claimed that Articles 101 and 102 (former Articles 81 and 82) found 
full application to the financial services sector
34
. Nevertheless, we had to wait until 
the early eighties to have the first confirmation of this; firstly in the Zuchner
35
 case, 
the European Court of Justice dismissed  any claims related to the idea of the 
banking sector falling outside the scope of  application of Articles 101 and 102.  
Subsequently, the Commission issued the very first two decisions relating to 
the insurance sector: Nuovo CEGAM
36
 and Fire Insurance
37
. The latter decision was 
appealed before the ECJ in the case Verband der Sachversicherer
38
. In rejecting the 
applicant’s (an association of insurers) claims that unrestrained competition in the 
insurance sector would enhance the risk of insolvency to the detriment of consumers, 
the Court emphasised that in the absence of distinctive rules, Articles 85 and 86 EC 
(now Articles 101 and 102TFEU)  found full application also to the insurance 
industry. 
                                                 
34
 See, inter alia, the “Commission Report on Competition Policy”, 1972 (Vol. II) points 51-57. 
35
 Case C-172/80 Zuchner v Bayerische Vereinsbamk AG [1981] ECR 2021, 2030. 
36
 Nuovo CEGAM [1984] OJ L99/29. 
37
 Fire Insurance [1985] OJ L35/20. 
38
 Case C-45/68 Verband der Sacheversicherer [1987] ECR 405, 449-452. 
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1.3 Features of banking and insurance arrangements: the importance of Art 
101 
 
 
The complexities arising from the application of the EU anti-trust rules to the 
financial services industry are, it will be readily appreciated, many. Different factors 
contribute to cast doubts on the methods of enforcement of competition rules in the 
banking and insurance industry.  
In the first place, the entire financial services industry is characterised by 
atavistic features which appears to be, prima facie, incompatible with anti-trust 
regulatory frameworks.   Horizontal agreements, for instance, represent a 
fundamental feature of both insurance and banking sectors; whilst it is allegedly 
essential for banks to co-operate in order to provide payment systems, for insurance 
firms horizontal agreements are deemed necessary in order to spread risks and face 
insolvency risks. 
The anti-trust sensitivity of the forms of co-operation between undertakings in 
the financial services sector has been considerably exacerbated by the process of 
convergence between the insurance and banking industries ignited, as established 
before, by t information technology developments and by the creation of new bank-
insurance conglomerates. 
A further point of general relevance for the application of EU competition 
rules to the financial services sector is represented by the process of financial 
integration still on-going at European level. Various banking, insurance and 
investment services  Directives have been implemented with the aim of creating a 
‘single passport’ system aiming at facilitating the integration process of the 
community financial markets through the promotion of cross-border activities and 
the increase of competition. Despite Community efforts to establish a single market 
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for all financial services, both banking and insurance services are still mainly 
provided within the domestic sphere of individual Member States and cross-border 
competition is still very limited.
39
     
This scenario has been the object of scrutiny by the Commission, which 
already in the past pointed out that the close relationship characterising the financial 
services industry and the end consumers translates itself into very little cross-border 
integration, rendering it difficult to pass on the benefits of financial integration to 
consumers.
40
  
Further anti-trust issues are consequently ignited by the European Union ’s 
desire to ensure a high degree of consumer protection.  In applying the EU 
competition rules to the financial services sector, the Commission has, indeed, 
always placed particular emphasis on consumer protection concerns. Consumer 
protection is indeed  one of the foremost  teleological aspects of competition law,  
and a single market entails the need for a deeper protection of consumers in order to 
increase their confidence in the financial services sector
41
.  
Despite the fact that anti-trust issues may indeed arise in relation to  mergers 
and acquisitions, possible abuses of dominant position and state aid,  it is opinion of 
the author that Art. 101 TFEU and the regulation of forms of horizontal co-
operations represent the paramount and most intricate aspect of the application of the 
EU competition rules to the financial services sector
42
.  
                                                 
39
 See the Commission “Inquiry into the European business insurance sector pursuant to Article 17 of 
Regulation 1/2003”, above, p. 39. See also the Commission “Inquiry into the European Retail 
banking sector”, above, p. 87. 
40
 See the Commission’s Financial Integration Monitor, Commission press release IP/04/601. 
41
 See, inter alia, Commission Communication “Financial services: enhancing consumer confidence” 
COM(97) 309 final, 26 June 1997.  
42
 This thesis has been conceptually conceived  in a period pre-financial crisis. Although issues related 
to state aid have been undoubtedly exacerbated by the recent crisis in the financial services sector, 
they fall outside the scope of analysis of this work which focuses its attention solely on Art. 101 
TFEU. 
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As established in the above, both bank and insurance industries have been , as 
a matter of fact, historically characterised by intense forms of co-operation between 
undertakings, deemed to be necessary for the correct functioning of the financial 
services. On a general level, any agreement establishing homogeneous prices vis-à-
vis consumers represents a blatant violation of Art. 101 giving rise to serious anti-
trust concerns.  
Nevertheless, as will be explored in this thesis, in the financial services sector 
the Commission has often allowed what the doctrine has correctly defined as forms 
of “horizontal agreements concerning a relevant cost element making up the final 
price c vis-à-vis customers”43 through its decisions relating to interbank fees in 
payment systems and through the enactment of the block exemption for the insurance 
industry. Especially in consideration to the similarities between the nature of  
banking and insurance services,  Art. 101 seems thus to represent a common thread 
between these two industries, posing at the same time interesting and rather intricate 
theological dilemmas which this thesis shall endeavour to answer: ought Art. 101 to 
apply to the financial services sector at all? If so, to what extent? Is there any 
justification for a block exemption in the insurance sector? Should the banking sector 
too benefit from a block exemption?   This thesis shall endeavour to answer these 
questions in the quest for the identification of an ideal regulatory framework for 
forms of horizontal  co-operation in the financial services sector. 
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 See Faull & Nikpay, “The EC Law of Competition” OUP 2007, p. 636. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter aims at providing an analysis of the evolution of the application of EU 
competition law to the insurance sector. 
Firstly, the general issues relating to the application of the EU competition 
rules to the insurance sector will be considered in conjunction with the evolution of 
the internal market for insurance undertakings. Subsequently, the analysis will shift 
on to the case law leading to the adoption of the various  EU block exemption 
Regulations.  
The current insurance block exemption regulatory framework will then be 
taken into account with a view to emphasising the main controversial issues arising 
from this piece of legislation (i.e. the need for a block exemption in the field of joint 
calculations or studies of risks and common coverage of specific risks). In particular, 
an attempt will be made to identify possible alternatives on the basis of arguments  to 
be further unravelled  in the course of this thesis. 
 Lastly, we shall endeavour to identify valid policy reasons for exposing the 
insurance industry to effective competition. This will be done with a view to 
theorising possible alternative forms of regulation, taking into account the concrete 
impact of the block exemption on the internal market in conjunction with 
comparative elements arising from the US scenario.  
2.2 The evolution of the internal market for the insurance industry 
 
 
The creation of an internal market for insurance undertakings has had quite a severe  
impact on the antitrust regulatory framework of the insurance industry. Any 
considerations related to the problematic application of Art. 101 to the insurance 
industry need, thus, to be considered in the context of the European Union efforts to 
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progressively harmonise the conditions for the provision of insurance services across 
Europe.   
 Authors have correctly acknowledged that the European harmonisation of 
insurance services (as well as the banking industry) has traditionally been an 
extremely arduous goal to achieve
44
. A part from complexities arising from the 
atavistic differences between legal systems of different Member States,   it has been 
indeed pointed out that the main difficulties arise from the necessity of going beyond 
the mere idea of facilitating the supply of services
45
. This is due to the heavy 
regulatory framework which disciplines this area of the market, and which initially 
differed quite considerably between different Member States. In this regard, it has 
emphasised  that in absence of a full harmonisation of the financial services sector,  
regulatory provisions such as solvency requirements may indeed have a severe 
impact on the cost of services, ultimately creating competition idiosyncrasies
46
.   
The biggest steps towards the harmonisation of the provision of insurance 
services were made in the early nineties, through the adoption of  Council Directives 
92/49/EEC
47
 and 92/96/EEC.
48
 These two Directives were adopted in order to 
promote the establishment of a single market in the insurance sector, and  aimed at 
enacting a system for the authorisation and financial supervision of insurance 
                                                 
44
 See the considerations made on this point by R. Greaves, “EC Competition Law, Banking and 
Insurance Services”, Chancery Law Publishing, London 1991, p. 11. 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Council Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to direct insurance other than life assurance and amending 
Directives 73/239/EEC and 88/357/EEC (third non-life insurance Directive), OJ L 228, 11.8.1992, p. 
1–23. For a detailed overview of the early stages of the process of harmonisation of the insurance 
market, see R. Greaves, “EC Competition Law, Banking and Insurance Services”, above, pp. 41-60. 
48
 Council Directive 92/96/EEC of 10 November 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance and amending Directives 79/267/EEC and 
90/619/EEC (third life assurance Directive) OJ L 360, 9.12.1992, p. 1–27. Partially repealed by 
Directive 2002/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 November 2002 concerning 
life assurance OJ L 345, 19.12.2002, p. 1–51. 
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undertakings across the internal market. Under the regulatory framework established 
by the Directives, such authorisation is issued by the home Member State of the 
insurance  undertaking concerned,  enabling it to provide insurance services across 
the European Community; in order to provide insurance services in another Member 
State, the insurance undertaking must comply with the conditions for the insurance 
business laid down by the host Member State
49
.  
In  spite of these efforts, the interpretation of the scope of the Treaty rules and 
of the provisions of the Insurance Directives was still surrounded by uncertainty, and  
these differences of interpretation seriously undermined the workings of the 
apparatus set up by the Third Directives.  This scenario was thus likely to deter 
insurance undertakings from exercising the freedoms created by the Treaty which the 
Third Directives set out to promote.  
             In order to address such discrepancies, a series of new Directives
50
  were 
enacted, among which, Directive 2002/83/EC concerning life assurance
51
, and 
Directive 2000/31/EC
52
 are of the utmost importance. Directive 2000/31/EC aimed at 
granting freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services with regard to the 
development of communication technology and its use in the insurance business; the 
development of electronic commerce in the insurance and financial business is 
                                                 
49
 See the Commission Interpretative Communication “Freedom to provide services and the general 
good in the insurance sector”, OJ 2000/C 43/03, p.3. 
50
 E.g. Directive 2000/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 May 2000 on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect 
of the use of motor vehicles and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC and 88/357/EEC (Fourth 
motor insurance Directive) OJ L 181/65. , and; Directive 2000/64/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 7 November 2000 amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 
92/96/EEC and 93/22/EEC as regards exchange of information with third countries OJ L 290/27. 
51
Directive 2002/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 November 2002 
concerning life assurance OJ L 345, 19.12.2002, p. 1–51, as further specified by two Adaptation 
Notices regarding the adaptation in line with inflation of certain amounts laid down in the Life and 
Non-Life Insurance Directives: a) Adaptation Notice 2006/C 194/07, and: b) Adaptation Notice 
2009/C 41/01.  
52
 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain 
legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market 
('Directive on electronic commerce') O J L 178/1 , 17.07.2000.  
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nowadays becoming more and more important and should eventually change the 
machinery for distributing insurance products in the European Union
53
.  
Far from being over, the process of integration of the European Union 
insurance markets is still ongoing and very much a work in progress. Despite the 
efforts and years of Directives, cross border provision of insurance services in the 
EU is virtually inexistent, especially in the field of mass insurance.
54
 The uncertainty 
related to differing legal frameworks characterising individual Member States and 
the need for sales and claim settlement networks render easier for insurers to enter 
into another market through the acquisition of local existing insurers. This means that 
despite the presence of large insurance groups across the internal market, a full 
integration is yet to be achieved.
55
  
The incomplete process of harmonisation of the European Union insurance 
markets lays behind the decision of the Commission to launch a global  investigation 
into the insurance sector in 2005
56
.  The aim of the investigation was to produce an 
overall assessment of the conditions of the insurance market, with specific reference 
to the mechanisms for market entry and distribution of insurance, and various forms 
of co-operation within the framework of insurance associations and in the context of 
coinsurance arrangements.  The outcomes of the investigation were then published in 
September 2007
57
, and a new Block Exemption Regulation in March 2010.
58
  
                                                 
53
 Despite the enactment of Directive 2000/31/EC, the current legal framework for the single market 
in insurance is based on an apparatus within which  consideration has not been given to the use of new 
technology for carrying out insurance business in the single market, and further work may possibly 
have to be carried out in this area. 
54
 See the Commission “Inquiry into the European business insurance sector pursuant to Article 17 of 
Regulation 1/2003”, above, p. 45. 
55
 Ibid. The situation is different when it comes to industrial and commercial insurance charaterised 
by a higher degree of integration. 
56
 See the Commission Decision for opening an  “Inquiry into the European business insurance sector 
pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003”,I P/05/719, of 13 June 2005. 
57
 See the Commission “Inquiry into the European business insurance sector pursuant to Article 17 of 
Regulation 1/2003”, above. 
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As will be appreciated, the Report casts serious doubts related to the current 
EU regulatory framework and will represent a platform for discussion of paramount 
importance for the deliberations enshrined in this thesis. 
2.3 The application of Article 101 to the insurance industry: general issues 
and background 
 
Economic doctrine generally distinguishes the insurance industry from other sectors 
on the basis of the idea that the insurance business is primarily to be considered as an 
instrument of risk management.
59
  It has been correctly noted that  the peculiarity of 
the insurance industry indeed “lies in uncertainty”60. In order to foresee the future 
cost of claims and thus to be in the position  to determine the premium
61
, insurers 
need to rely on  meaningful statistics concerning the “probability of realisation of the 
insured event and the foreseeable extent of the loss.”62  
Co-operation would therefore seem a natural and essential component of the 
insurance industry, and would play a paramount role in the  provision and access to 
                                                                                                                                          
58
 Commission Regulation (EU) No 267/2010 of 24 March 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of agreements, decisions 
and concerted practices in the insurance sector  OJ L 83/1, of 30.3.2010. 
59
 See G. Faure, T. Hartlief, “Insurance and expanding systemic risks”, OECD , Policy Issues in 
insurance, 2003, p.12. For a detailed analysis of the nature of the business insurance please see E.G. 
Vaughan and  .M. Vaughan, “Fundamentals of Risk and Insurance” 10th edition, John Wiley & Sons, 
2008. 
60
 See Faure, M., “Insurance and competition law: balancing the conflicts”, Global Issues in 
Insurance Regulation, London 17-18 April 2002, at p.6. Available at the following link: 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/business/cris/papers/Grif%20%20Michael%20Faure.pdf. (Accessed on 
3 July 2011).  
On this point see also G. Faure, R. Van Den Bergh, “Competition on the European Market for 
Liability Insurance”,  2002, p. 12. Available at : http://arno.unimaas.nl 
61
 The final price of insurance comprises the so-called ‘risk premium’ covering the cost of the insured 
product, a security charge, overheads and profit. The risk premium itself can be subdivided in two 
components: a) net premiums, aiming at covering the cost of the product insured on the basis of past 
statistical evidence (frequency and scale of claims) and b) a second component which levels the net 
premium either upwards or downwards according to predictions relating to the future (i.e. 
circumstances likely to happen capable of having an impact on the frequency or scale of claims).    
62
 See Faure, M., “Insurance and competition law: balancing the conflicts”, above, at p.6.   
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information sufficiently general to enable the calculation of average values, of  
crucial importance in order to determine insurance premiums.  
More specifically, economists maintain that, especially when claims are 
relatively infrequent and risk categories are relatively numerous, large statistics 
identified on the basis of information exchange between insurance undertakings  
would allow better actuarial calculations based on internal claims experience.
63
 This 
would result in a clear incentive for insurance firms either to merge or to cooperate in 
the pooling of claims
64
.  
Horizontal agreements would thus represent a fundamental feature of the 
insurance sector at any level: i.e., direct insurance (in which customers are the end 
users), reinsurance, whereby insurers are themselves the end users of policies 
subscribed with other insurers), and retrocession, through which providers of re-
insurance  obtain coverage for their own risks.  
If horizontal agreements on joint determination of risk would seem an 
essential component of the business of direct insurance, co-operation in the form of 
co-insurance and reinsurance is also considered necessary to meet the needs of the 
modern insurance markets, whenever the entity of the risk to cover considerably 
exceeds the assets of an individual insurer.
65
  
In addition to the above forms of co-operation, a further peculiarity of the 
insurance industry would be represented by an overall lack of transparency, which 
would thwart the capacity of consumers to compare insurance policies offered by 
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 See G. Faure, T. Hartlief, “Insurance and expanding systemic risks”, above, p. 26. 
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 See G. Faure, R. Van Den Bergh, “Competition on the European Market for Liability Insurance”, 
above,  p.23. 
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competing insurers
66
. This  information deficiency  would revert against  the 
functioning of the insurance  market mechanisms leading to inefficient results.  That 
is the reason why  standardization of policy terms has been traditionally considered 
as  “the correct regulatory answer to an alleged market failure.”67  
Several aspects of the insurance business may thus seem to be characterised 
by an inherently monopolistic nature difficult to be reconciled with Art. 101 of the 
Treaty of Lisbon which prohibits agreements between undertakings, decisions by 
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between 
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition within the common market .  
The application of Art. 101 TFEU to the insurance industry indeed poses 
serious questions; forms of co-operation in the form of joint determination of risk, 
co-insurance, reinsurance and the standardisation of policy terms represent the sort of 
quintessentially anti-competitive activities against which Art. 101 was specifically 
designed.  It is not surprising, therefore, that the insurance industry has traditionally 
vehemently rejected the idea of being subject to the application of antirust forms of 
regulation
68
.  
Are we facing a classic chicken and egg dilemma then? Not necessarily, as 
the way out can be found in Art. 101 itself. The third paragraph of this Article, as a 
matter of fact, allows the possibility of an exemption whereas anti-competitive 
agreements contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to 
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of 
                                                 
66
 See M. Faure, “Insurance and Competition Law, Balancing the Conflicts”, , p. 17. Available at: 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk(accessed on 3 July 2011). 
67
 See G. Faure, “Insurance and competition law: balancing the conflicts”, above, p. 11.  
68
 See the submissions to the Court of Justice made by insurance associations in the case Verband der 
Sachversicherer, Case C-45/68 Verband der Sachversicherer [1987] ECR 405, 449-452.  
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the resulting benefit, without resulting into the elimination of competition. Art. 
101(3) represents the basis for the adoption of the Insurance Block Exemption 
Regulation  that will be the subject of analysis in the following.  
2.4 EU competition policy in the insurance sector: the early years 
 
 The evolution of EU competition policy in the insurance industry is a parallel 
phenomenon to the above analysed Community attempts at creating a single market 
for the provision of insurance services.  The Commission had claimed from the 
outset that the EU Competition law framework
 
found full application to the insurance 
industry.
69
 During the eighties, prima facie endorsing the position of the 
Commission, the European Court of Justice confirmed that the insurance sector 
should be subject to the EU antitrust rules for the first time in the Verband der 
Sachversicherer
70
 judgment. In spite of that declarations of principle, in Verband der 
Sachversicherer the Court also acknowledged the need for cooperation as one of the 
paramount features of the insurance industry
71
; as a consequence, the Commission 
was tasked with the chore of carefully weighing up the special features of the 
insurance sector with a view to granting, where suitable, individual exemptions on 
the basis of Article 101(3).
72
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 As early as 1972, the Commission stated that the EC Treaty competition rules fully applied to the 
insurance industry (see, inter alia, the Commission Report on Competition Policy, 1972 (Vol. II) 
points 51-57). 
70
 Case C-45/68 Verband der Sachversicherer [1987] ECR 405, 449-452. In Verband der 
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insurance in the German market failed to obtain clearance by the Commission in relation to its 
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consequential loss insurance business.  
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 Ibid., at paragraph 12 
72
Article 101 of the Treaty of Lisbon ( prohibits all agreements between undertakings, decisions by 
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States 
and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within 
the common market. Article 101(3) provides for an exemption of any collusive practice capable of 
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The first two individual  exemptions were granted at the end of the eighties,  
with the just mentioned Verband der Sachversicherer
73
 and the Commission 
Decision  Nuovo Cegam
74
. The object of dispute in Nuovo Cegam  was the founding 
agreement of the Italian association of engineering insurers Nuovo Consorzio 
Centrale Guasti alle Macchine (‘New Central Engineering Insurers Association’) 
(‘Nuovo Cegam’). Under the founding agreement of the Association, a large number 
of direct insurers had established a mechanism by virtue of which it was possible to 
fix a common tariff of basic insurance premiums on the basis of an exchange of 
relevant information between the members of the Association.  The Commission 
found that the rules and the arrangements establishing Nuovo Cegam resulted in a 
significant restriction of the competition between undertakings who, but for the 
Association, would have been in direct competition with one another
75
.  
An exemption was eventually obtained on the basis of Art.85(3) (now Art. 
101 (3) as  Nuovo Cegam amended its power to fix tariffs of final premiums with the 
introduction of a common tariff of basic premiums which members of the 
Association were supposed to apply. By virtue of this new scenario, members of 
Nuovo Cegam were basically free to establish their own definitive premiums by 
adding to the basic premium a margin for commission, expenses or profit.  
In Verband der Sachversicherer, the association of property insurers 
comprising all the insurers dealing with fire insurance in the German market did not 
obtain positive clearance by  the Commission in relation to the decision of the 
consortium to recommend to its members specific increments of the premium rates 
                                                                                                                                          
consumers obtain a fair share of those benefits, there are no less restrictive means of achieving the 
efficiencies, and competition is not eliminated altogether. Art. 101(3) constitutes the basis for the so-
called ‘Block Exemption Regulations’ that have been introduced by the Commission over the years in 
order to grant exemption on a large scale to specific kinds of agreements.  
73
 Commission Decision Verband der Sachversicherer 7/02/85 OJ L35/20. 
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 See Commission  Decision ‘Nuovo Cegam’, above, at paragraph 15. 
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(the aim of this recommendation was allegedly to re-establish stable and viable 
conditions in the industrial fire insurance and consequential loss insurance 
business)
76
. In this case, the issue at stake was related to the so called gross premium 
risk, i.e., the final price charged by insurers for insurance products
77
.  
 Unlike in Nuovo Cegam
78
, the Commission was not prepared to grant an 
exemption to the agreement at issue. The distinction between the two cases lies in the 
fact that the agreement in Nuovo Cegam was focused on fixing a base premium, 
whereas the Verband der Sachversicherer recommendation established an increase of 
the final premium rates. Notwithstanding, the Commission pointed out that  if 
members of the Verband der Sachversicherer organisation had been left free to 
compete in relation to the margin covering operating costs an exemption could have 
been granted exactly like in Nuovo Cegam
79
. 
In the early nineties, a new wave of individual exemptions stemmed from 
further Commission Decisions. In Concordato Incendio
80
, an agreement comprising, 
inter alia,  the calculation of ‘required’ premiums based on the statistics received for 
standard risks was granted an exemption.
81
 According to the Commission, as a 
general principle “…the existence of standard conditions makes it easier for consumers to compare 
the terms offered by various firms and come to a decision in full knowledge of the facts”82 so that 
they “can compare and choose not simply in relation to the commercial premium which is being 
                                                 
76
 This recommendation was an attempt to confine the negative performance of the fire insurance 
business which had caused heavy losses for German undertakings in the period across 1979-1980.  
77
 For a definition of ‘insurance premium see footnote 52 at p35. 
78
 For an overview of the Nuovo Cegam Decision see the above paragraph. 
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   Commission  Decision Verband der Sachversicherer, at paragraph16. 
80
 Commission Decision, Concordato Incendio 1990 OJ L15/25. 
81
 Concordato Italiano Rischi Industriali (Concordato Incendio) was an association of Italian insurers 
which comprised 28 undertakings representing 50% of the Italian market for industrial fire insurance. 
The objective of the association was to improve the operation and quality of service to the policy 
holders provided by its members. 
82
 See Commission’s Decision, Concordato Incendio, above, at paragraph 23. 
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requested of them but also the extent of the coverage and all other services which an insurance 
company is supposed to provide, notably services as regards prevention and evaluation of damages”83. 
 Furthermore, the Commission acknowledged that by recommending its 
members to adopt uniform net premium and standard policy conditions, an insurance 
association effectively obliges these members to notify any derogation from these 
standard conditions when “they are likely to affect the statistics”84 as this “makes it possible to 
guarantee the uniformity of the statistics”85.  This notification requirement encouraged 
insurers to follow the recommendation.  
Shortly after Concordato Incendio, with the decisions in  Teko
86
 and 
Assurpol
87
 the Commission considered the possibility for exemption in relation to 
forms of co-operation in the field of co-insurance, agreements on co-insurance could 
benefit, according to the Commission,  from exemption if pools allow participants to 
improve their knowledge of risks, create financial capacity and develop technical 
expertise in insuring the risks. Under these circumstances pools were deemed to 
produce results in substantial rationalisation and cost saving, enabling each 
participant to obtain a more diversified and balanced portfolio
88
.  
It has been interestingly noted that the exemption in TEKO showed a 
favourable attitude of the Commission towards re-insurance pools which enable 
members to underwrite re-insurance outside the pool, or to individually determine 
insurance premiums
89
.   
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Overall, before the introduction of the first block exemption, the practice of 
pools was on a general level considered exemptible insofar as the task of creating 
statistical data or the magnitude of the risk insured went far beyond the capacity of 
individual insurers. 
 
2.5 The first Block Exemption Regulation: Council Regulation 3932/92 
 
After the first generation of insurance cases and individual exemptions analysed 
above, the Commission decided to introduce a block exemption through Council 
Regulation 3932/92.
90
 
The Regulation was adopted in order to allow the insurance industry to set up 
co-operation agreements, reducing at the same time the number of notifications and 
relative administrative workload involved.  
The legal basis for the adoption of Regulation 3932/92 was Article 85(3) EC 
(now Art. 101 TFEU), by virtue of which all agreements satisfying its terms are fully 
exempted without the need for individual notification
91
.  
The Council Regulation entitled the Commission to introduce a block 
exemption for agreements between insurance undertakings related to:(a) cooperation 
                                                 
90
 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3932/92 of 21 December 1992 on the application of Article 85 
(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices in the 
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91
 As outlined above (see Chapter one),  an exemption can be granted to  
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- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;  
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which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or 
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(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of 
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with respect to the establishment of common risk premium tariffs based on 
collectively ascertained statistics or the number of claims;(b) the establishment of 
common standard policy conditions;(c) the common coverage of certain types of 
risks; (e) the testing and acceptance of security devices. 
The Regulation was divided into six titles establishing the requirements for 
insurance contracts covered by the exemption; insurance contracts falling outside the 
terms of the Regulation continued to require individual exemption. 
 
2.5.1 (a) Cooperation with respect to the establishment of common risk premium 
tariffs 
 
Article 2 of Regulation 3932/92 specified that the exemption applied only to 
agreements establishing common risk premium tariffs based on statistical data 
gathered over a period of years covering matters such as number of claims, number 
of individual risks covered, total amounts paid, etc.  
Under Art. 2, exchanges of information between insurers for the purpose of 
setting down such tariffs ought to be “neutral with respect to competition”92(this 
means that the exchange of information could not involve so-called business secrets). 
Furthermore, premium tariffs could not involve subjective factors relating to the 
insurance undertakings, e.g., financial and commercial costs, commissions, etc.
93
 
Title II of Regulation 3932/92 clearly incorporated the Commission 
Decisions Nuovo Cegam and Concordato Incendio
94
, going, nevertheless further 
compared to the aforementioned decisions: the added value is enshrined in Article 2 
of the Regulation which provided for a clear distinction between joint calculation of 
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 See Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3932/92, above, Article 2. 
93
 Ibid., Article 3. 
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net premiums (aiming at fixing the cost of insurance on the basis of the past 
experience) and o joint research concerning the impact of external factors on the 
scale of claims (allowing insurers to modulate the cost of insurance on the basis of 
future extraneous circumstances)
95
.  
It is interesting to note that prior to the enactment of the Regulation, in Nuovo 
Cegam and, to a lesser extent, Concordato Incendio, the Commission seemed to have 
reserved the benefit of the exemption only for collaboration among newcomers to a 
market or among incumbents operating in a market where the risk evaluation was of 
particularly difficult execution
96
. Such distinctions were clearly not part of the block 
exemption introduced by Regulation 3932/92
97
. Nevertheless, unlike in Nuovo 
Cegam and Concordato Incendio, it has been correctly noted that Regulation 
3932/92 offered to the Commission the possibility to identify whether the 
cooperation between insurers went beyond the elaboration of genuine statistical 
data.
98
 
2.5.2 Standard policy conditions 
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Standard policy conditions in line of principle used to fall under the block exemption 
as they were considered to “have the advantage of improving the comparability of 
cover for the consumer and of allowing risks to be classified more uniformly”99.  
However, they must not lead either to the standardization of products or to 
the creation of too captive a customer base; accordingly, the exemptions applied on 
condition that they were not binding, but served only as models. The Commission 
did  recognise, however, that full standardisation of all conditions would not leave 
consumers much choice
100
. This problem was addressed by the Regulation in two 
ways: on the one hand, as outlined above the Regulation specified that the agreed 
conditions remained purely illustrative
101
. On the other hand, the Regulation 
provided that the block exemption did not find application where the standard 
conditions contained (inter alia) clauses which had an adverse impact on policies.
102
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 The Regulation did not find application in case agreements between insurers used to:(a) exclude 
from the cover losses normally relating to the class of insurance concerned, without indicating 
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(j) require the policyholder to obtain cover from the same insurer for different risks; 
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2.5.3 Common coverage of certain types of risk 
 
 
Title IV of Regulation 3932/92 (Article 10 to 13) specified the conditions under 
which institutionalised (as opposed to ad hoc) co-insurance and co-reinsurance pools 
were automatically exempted. 
The block exemption used to  cover the setting up and operation of co-
insurance and reinsurance groups as defined in Article 10 of the Regulation, but only 
on condition that the group’s market share did not exceed 10% in case of co-
insurance and 15% for reinsurance. The maximum for co-insurance increased to 15% 
in presence of a statutory obligation to insure the risks covered by the co-insurance 
and where these are catastrophe risks
103
.  
The same contract clauses enshrined in the pooling agreements which the 
Commission exempt in TEKO and Assurpol re-emerged in the block exemption 
Regulation as automatically exempted clauses.
104
  
                                                                                                                                          
(k) require the policyholder, in the event of disposal of the object of insurance, to make the acquirer 
take over the insurance policy. 
103
 It deserves to be noted that the 10% and 15% market shares used to comprise all products 
underwritten by the pool participants, including those underwritten outside the pool. The grounds for 
this division were rooted in the way the Commission traditionally approached joint ventures. When 
parent companies remained active on the same market as the joint venture, the Commission took the 
view that this joint venture distorts competition between the parents because “they can be expected to 
align their commercial policy on that of the joint venture”. This is often referred to as “the spill over 
effect” (the aforementioned points have been made by Luc Gyselen, in“EU antitrust Law in the Area 
of Financial Services”, above) . Article 11 of Regulation 3932/92 used to set down the spill over 
effect to the co-insurance or co-reinsurance pools: as a consequence, Luc Gyselen points out that the 
block exemption was inapplicable in cases where the insurance products into the pool by participants 
accounted for less than 10% and 15%, but where all the products underwritten by them exceed these 
thresholds. Article 11 of the Regulation set the standards above: whether in practice there was a 
substantial dissimilarity between the volume of business that the participants bring into the pool and 
that of all business underwritten by them (individually or through the pool) is a different matter. 
Experience tends to suggest that for normal risks a discrepancy is likely to occur more often than for 
aggravated or catastrophic risks (on this point see Luc Gyselen, “EU antitrust Law in the Area of 
Financial Services”, above; see also G. Faure, T. Hartlief, “Insurance and expanding systemic risks”, 
above . 
104
 On this point see Luc Gyselen, “EU antitrust Law in the Area of Financial Services”, above. See 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3932/92, above, Article 10 and Articles 12-13. The rationale 
which lies beneath the different market shares was to be found in the fact that the mechanism of co-
insurance requires the application by the pool participants of not only uniform conditions, but also of 
identical gross premiums, whereas  co-reinsures only need to jointly determine  the risk premium and 
the co-reinsurance premium (i.e. the co-reinsurance cost). In other words, price competition is still 
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Under Regulation 3932/92, the block exemption used to cover agreements 
which had as their object the setting-up and operation of groups of insurance 
undertakings or of insurance undertakings and reinsurance undertakings for the 
common coverage of a specific category of risks in the form of co-insurance or co-
reinsurance.
105
  
The exemption of the common coverage of risks provided by Regulation 
3932/92 was rather wide in scope. Common coverage agreements could determine, 
inter alia,  the nature and characteristics of the risks covered by the co-insurance or 
co-reinsurance, the conditions governing admission to the group, and the individual 
own-account shares of the participants in the risks co-insured or co-reinsured
106
.  
Under  the first block exemption, insurers were also allowed to establish joint 
settlement procedures (in co-reinsurance only for claims “exceeding the specified 
amount”107), and  they were further allowed to fix joint-reinsurance (of the co-
insured risks) or joint retrocession (of co-reinsured risks)
108
.  
Finally, insurers were allowed to back up such joint re-insurance or joint 
retrocession through the imposition of a ban on themselves to re-insure (respectively 
retrocede) their individual share in the co-insurance (respectively co-reinsurance). In 
case of co-reinsurance, they w re allowed to provide for an additional ban to reinsure 
their individual retention
109
. 
 
2.5.4 Security Devices 
 
                                                                                                                                          
present in the case of co-reinsurance, but eliminated in the case of co-insurance. On this point see also 
Faull & Nikpay, above, p. 638. 
105
 See Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3932/92, above, Art. 10. 
106
 Ibid., Art. 10. 
107
 See Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3932/92, above, Article 13. 
108
 Ibid., Art. 13. 
109
 Ibid., at Art. 13.  
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Under title V, the exemption covered only agreements between insurers applying to 
the setting of objective and non-discriminatory technical standards relating to the 
approval of security devices and their installation and the adoption of common 
standards for the approval of installation and maintenance contracts. 
The conditions for exemption  of such agreements were laid down by Article 
9 of the Regulation
110
. As will be established in the next Chapter, together with the 
regime related to standard policy conditions, this area has recently been the object of 
significant changes introduced by the current block exemption regime. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
110
 See Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3932/92, above, Title V. (a) the technical specifications and 
compliance assessment procedures are precise, technically justified and in proportion to the 
performance to be attained by the security device concerned; 
(b) the rules for the evaluation of installation undertakings and maintenance undertakings are 
objective, relate to their technical competence and are applied in a non-discriminatory manner; 
(c) such specifications and rules are established and distributed with an accompanying statement that 
insurance undertakings are free to accept for insurance, on whatever terms and conditions they wish, 
other security devices or installation and maintenance undertakings which do not comply with these 
technical specifications or rules; 
(d) such specifications and rules are provided simply upon request to any interested person; 
(e) any lists of security devices and installation and maintenance undertakings compliant with 
specifications include a classification based on the level of performance obtained; 
(f) a request for an assessment may be submitted at any time by any applicant; 
(g) the evaluation of conformity does not impose on the applicant any expenses that are 
disproportionate to the costs of the approval procedure; 
(h) the devices and installation undertakings and maintenance undertakings that meet the assessment 
criteria are certified to this effect in a non-discriminatory manner within a period of six months of the 
date of application, except where technical considerations justify a reasonable additional period; 
(i) the fact of compliance or approval is certified in writing; 
(j) the grounds for a refusal to issue the certificate of compliance are given in writing by attaching a 
duplicate copy of the records of the tests and controls that have been carried out; 
(k) the grounds for a refusal to take into account a request for assessment are provided in writing; and 
(l) the specifications and rules are applied by bodies accredited to norms in the series EN 45 000 and 
EN ISO/IEC 17025
110
. 
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3 The Recent and Current Scenarios: Regulation 
358/2003 and the Current Block Exemption 
Regulation
111
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Regulation 358/2003 
 
Six years after the entry into force of Regulation  3932/92, the European 
Commission released a Report on the operation of the new block exemption 
regulatory framework
112
.  The aim of the Report was to assess the practical impact of 
                                                 
111
 This Chapter  is largely based on extracts of the considerations expressed by the author in the 
article Lista A. "Stairway to Competition Heaven, or Highway to Hell: What Next for Insurance 
Competition Regulation?", Journal of Business Law, Issue I, 2011, pp.1-27. 
112
 The Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the operation of 
Commission Regulation 3932/92, COM (1999)192 final. 
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the exemption in the insurance sector with the view to operate changes and review 
Regulation 3932/92113. 
In the Report, the Commission outlined the difficulties arising in determining 
whether co-operation agreements on premiums remain within the limits of what is 
necessary for statistical purposes
114
; the analysis of such agreements focused mostly 
on the concrete effects of such agreements on the pricing policy that insurers apply to 
their customers: in case commercial premiums differ substantially, the agreement 
was deemed not to cause appreciable detriment to competition. 
Another important point outlined in the Report was related to standard policy 
conditions; the Commission mainly concentrated its attention on “black” clauses (in 
principle prohibited) such as that excluding certain risks from cover. Under 
Regulation 3932/92, standard policy conditions were authorised provided that they 
were not binding on their members, and  the Commission emphasised the need for 
stricter controls aiming at ensuring compliance with the requirements of the 
Regulation.
115
 
With such proposals in the pipeline, the next block exemption regulatory 
framework,
116
 Regulation 358/2003, entered into force on 1 April 2003 aiming to 
update Regulation 3932/92 and render it more ‘user friendly’.  
Those changes came at a time of increasing focus by the competition 
authorities on financial services and when the insurance sector was obliged to 
                                                 
113
 The Report on the operation of Commission Regulation 3932/92 led to the adoption of the new 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 358/2003 of 27 February 2003 on the application of Article 101(3) 
of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices in the insurance 
sector. 
114
 See the Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the operation 
of Commission Regulation 3932/92, above p.6. 
115
 See the Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the operation 
of Commission Regulation 3932/92, above p.14. 
116
 Commission Regulation (EC) No 358/2003 of 27 February 2003 on the application of Article 
81(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices in the 
insurance sector. 
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observe compliance procedures in this area of law far more strictly compared to the 
past 
117
.  
Regulation 358/2003 was in many respects similar to the previous  regime; it 
was designed  under the enabling Council Regulation of 1991 (the same Regulation 
which enabled the adoption of the 1992 regulation) and it continued to cover the 
same  types of agreement covered by Regulation  3932/92, i.e. (1) joint calculation 
and studies of risks; (2) the drawing up of standard policy conditions for direct 
insurance; (3) pooling arrangements (co-insurance groups and co-reinsurance 
groups); and (4) common rules for approving security devices.  In all cases, there 
were strict conditions to be met; the exemption for insurance pools was broadened 
with higher market share thresholds. Other exemptions remained very similar to the 
old regime, but were narrowed down in various respects.  
Contrary to the previous regime and  in line with Block Exemption 
Regulations relating to other sectors
118
, Regulation 358/2003 subjected the 
possibility of an exemption to the absence of a series of clauses enshrined in a ‘black 
list’ which appeared for the very first time in the text of the Regulation.119 
 
                                                 
117
 In 2001, the European Commission imposed fines of over £1 billion on companies which infringed 
competition law; individual companies have been fined hundreds of millions of Euro. 
118
 See, for instance, Commission Regulation (EC) No 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 on the application of 
Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of technology transfer agreements O JL 123/11, or 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1400/2002 of 31 July 2002 on the application of Article 81(3) of the 
Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices in the motor vehicle sector OJ L 
203/30. 
119
 The idea of introducing block exemption systems based on ‘black lists’ clauses came at a time of 
increased focus by the competition authorities on financial services and as the insurance sector, for the 
first time, moved to adopt compliance procedures in this area. In 2001, during the gestation period of 
Regulation 358/2003, the European Commission imposed fines of over £1 billion on companies found 
to have infringed competition law; individual companies have been fined hundreds of millions of 
Euro. 
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3.1.1 The exemption of joint calculations and studies of risks under Regulation 
358/2003 
 
Regulation 358/2003 used to lay emphasis on the importance for insurers of having 
accurate information about the risks which they insure, including future risks; 
consequently,  an exemption in relation to certain types of exchange of statistical 
information and joint calculation of risks was on that basis granted.
120
 
The reliability of joint calculations, tables and studies was believed to 
become greater as the amount of statistics on which they are based is increased
121
.  
Insurers with high market shares may generate sufficient statistics internally to be 
able to make reliable calculations, but those with small market shares will not be able 
to do so, much less new entrants.
122
According to the Commission, inclusivity in such 
joint calculations, tables and studies of information from all insurers on a market, 
including large ones, promotes competition by helping smaller insurers, and 
facilitating market entry for new undertakings.
123
 
The exemption of joint activity in this area was nevertheless subject to two 
specific conditions: exactly as per Regulation 3932/92
124
, joint calculations, tables 
and studies could  benefit from the exemption as long as they were based on the 
assembly of data, spread over a number of risk-years chosen as an observation 
period.
125
 The second condition for the block exemption was enshrined in Article 
3(1) whereby the exemptions used to apply on condition that the calculations, tables 
                                                 
120
 See Commission Regulation (EC) No 358/2003, above, recital 12. 
121
 Ibid.  recital 13. 
122
 Ibid.. 
123
 Ibid.  
124
 See Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3932/92, above, Art.2. 
125
 The statistical data must relate to identical or comparable risks in sufficient number to constitute a 
base which can be handled statistically and which will yield figures on (inter alia): (i) the number of 
claims during the said period, (ii) the number of individual risks insured in each risk-year of the chosen 
observation period, (iii) the total amounts paid or payable in respect of claims arisen during the said period 
(iv) the total amount of capital insured for each risk-year during the chosen observation period (Article 
3(1). 
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or study results were made available on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, to 
any insurance undertaking requesting a copy of them.
126
  
This sort of disclosure requirement  was an innovative element introduced by 
Regulation 358/2003 and, as it will be readily appreciated, was going to be further 
developed by the new block exemption regime entered into force in March 2010. For 
the moment, it deserves to be emphasised that the requirement for access to 
compilation of studies related to risks by any insurance undertaking primarily aimed 
at protecting and favour the entry into the market of new insurers.  
Clearly, the Commission realised at the time of the introduction of Regulation 
358/2003  the potential ‘boomerang effect’ of allowing joint calculation of risks.  If 
on the one hand the rationale for a block exemption in this area was to aid insurers to 
reduce costs, on the other hand in absence of any disclosure requirements association 
of  insurers well established in the market were in the position to use the shield of the 
block exemption vis-à-vis new entrants in the market. 
 
 
3.1.2 Common coverage of certain types of risks (pools) 
 
Regulation 358/2003 used to subject the exemption of pools to thresholds related to 
the parties’ market shares: co-insurance or co-reinsurance groups (pools) were 
allowed on condition that the combined market shares of their members did not 
                                                 
126
 This includes insurance undertakings which were not active on the geographical or product market 
to which those calculations, tables or study results refer. The Commission indicated that fees charged 
for access to studies to insurance firms which did not contribute to the studies could not be so high as 
to constitute a barrier to entry onto the market. The exemption did not cover agreements obliging 
undertakings not to use calculations or tables that differ from the ones available to all insurance 
undertakings or to depart from the results enshrined in such calculations. See Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 358/2003, above, I Article 4. The aim of this Article is clear: undertakings could jointly 
calculate risks, but they could not impose such calculations on external competitors which are 
therefore free to jointly or severally carry out their own studies and calculations. Moreover, the 
condition for the block exemption laid down by Article 3(1) required that calculations and tables must 
include as detailed a breakdown of the available statistics as was actuarially adequate. 
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exceed (a) in the case of co-insurance pools, 20% of the relevant market; (b) in the 
case of co-reinsurance pools, 25% of the relevant market.
127
  
Considering the extent of the thresholds imposed by Regulation 358/2003, the 
scope of application of the exemption of pools was rather broad, considerably 
broader compared to Regulation 3932/92
128
 . This liberal approach was enhanced by 
the fact that the exemption did not provide for a market share threshold for insurance 
pools which were newly created (i.e. after 1 April 2003, the date of the entry into 
force of Regulation 358/2003) in order to cover a new risk, for the first three years of 
their existence.
129
 
On a general level, pools did not infringe Article 101(1) if, in the absence of 
the group/pool in question, none or only one of the members of the group were able 
to offer the category of insurance concerned (even if other companies or pools do 
supply that category of insurance).
130
 However, where the subscription capacity of 
the group was such that it could have been replaced by at least two competing 
groups, the group may restrict competition within the meaning of Article 85 (1) 
(now101(1) depending on the level of its market power; hence the need for market 
share thresholds.
131
 
                                                 
127
 See Commission Regulation (EC) No 358/2003, above, Article  7 (2). The market share was 
calculated on the basis of the gross premium income; in case the gross premium income data was not 
available, estimates based on other reliable market information, including insurance cover provided or 
insured risk value, could have been used to establish the market share of the undertaking concerned; 
Article 7 (3). 
128
 See Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3932/92, above, Art.11(1). 
129
 See Commission Regulation (EC) No 358/2003, above, Article 7 (1). New risks were defined by 
Recital 20 of the Regulation as risks that did not previously exist. More specifically, a new risk, by its 
nature, requires an entirely new insurance product and cannot be covered by additions or 
modifications to an existing insurance product. This excluded risks that previously existed but were 
not insured
.
. Moreover, a risk whose nature is subject to significant changes (e.g. terrorism) would not 
be a new risk, even if there was a considerable increase in terrorism activity. Overall, the Commission 
indicated the areas for which pools were most often created as being aviation, nuclear and 
environmental (Recital 17). 
130
 Ibid., Recital 21.  
131
 Ibid., recital 22. These considerations clearly incorporate the line of reasoning adopted by the 
Commission in the cases Teko Technisches Kontor fuer die Maschinen-B-U-Versicherung (TEKO), 
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3.1.3 Standard policy conditions 
 
In line with the previous regime, under Regulation 358/2003, standard policy 
conditions were exempted if they were established and distributed with an explicit 
statement that they are non-binding and that their use is not in any way 
recommended. In addition, the Regulation  expressly required that participating 
undertakings were free to offer different policy conditions to their customers, with 
the conditions being accessible to any interested person and provided upon 
request.
132
 Finally, the exemption applied only on condition that the non-binding 
models were established and distributed only by way of guidance.
133
 
                                                                                                                                          
20/12/89 OJ L13/34,  and Assurpol 14/02/92,  OJ L37/16., where the Commission considered that 
agreements on co-insurance can benefit from exemption if pools allow participants to improve their 
knowledge of risks, create financial capacity and develop technical expertise in insuring the risks. 
Under these circumstances, pools result in substantial rationalisation and cost savings, enabling each 
participant to obtain a more diversified and balanced portfolio.  
In addition to the block exemption, the Commission still explicitly recognises that pools may 
otherwise benefit from an individual exemption, stating that as many insurance markets are constantly 
evolving, an individual analysis would be necessary to determine whether or not the conditions for 
exemption laid down in Article 101(3) are met. 
132
 See Commission Regulation (EC) No 358/2003, above, Article 5 (1). 
133
 Ibid., Article  5 (2). Such condition seems to imply per se a lack of conviction on the 
Commission’s part in relation to the validity of a block exemption as an effective means to ensure an 
effective access to information by consumers. From this perspective, civil law remedies against unfair 
policy conditions could represent a more suitable alternative 
The Regulation contained a long list of ‘black clauses’ whereby the exemption did not find application 
when  standard policy conditions contained clauses which, inter alia, provided for indications of the 
level of commercial premiums, indicated the amount of the cover or the part which the policyholder 
must pay himself (the ‘excess’), imposed comprehensive cover including risks to which a significant 
number of policyholders are not simultaneously exposed, etc. More specifically, Art. 6 used to 
prohibit agreements on standard policy conditions which contain the following clauses:(a) contained 
any indication of the level of commercial premiums; (b) indicate the amount of the cover or the part 
which the policyholder must pay himself (the ‘excess’); (c) imposed comprehensive cover including 
risks to which a significant number of policyholders are not simultaneously exposed; (d) allow the 
insurer to maintain the policy in the event that he cancels part of the cover, increases the premium 
without the risk or the scope of the cover being changed (without prejudice to indexation clauses), or 
otherwise alters the policy conditions without the express consent of the policyholder; (e) allow the 
insurer to modify the term of the policy without the express consent of the policyholder; (f) impose on 
the policyholder in the non-life assurance sector a contract period of more than three years; (g) impose 
a renewal period of more than one year where the policy is automatically renewed unless notice is 
given upon the expiry of a given period; (h) require the policyholder to agree to the reinstatement of a 
policy which has been suspended on account of the disappearance of the insured risk, if he is once 
again exposed to a risk of the same nature; (i) require the policyholder to obtain cover from the same 
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3.1.4 Joint determination of approved safety equipment 
 
Under Regulation 358/2003, agreements between insurers on technical specifications 
for security equipment  still used to benefit from  block exemption.  
In the course of preparations of Regulation 358/2003, the original idea of the 
Commission was to introduce a new condition for exemption of agreements between 
insurers on approved security equipment.
134
 According to a proposed draft, the 
condition for exemption was to be that technical specifications, rules, procedures or 
codes of practice adopted by national associations of insurance or reinsurance 
undertakings in other Member States must have been explicitly recognised as equally 
valid by an association or associations of insurance or reinsurance undertakings in 
one or several Member States.
135
The same applied to any approval of a security 
device or installing and maintenance undertaking issued by an association of 
insurance or reinsurance undertakings in another Member State.
136
 
Under Regulation 358/2003, security devices were exempt insofar as the rules 
for the evaluation of installation undertakings and maintenance undertakings were 
objective, relate to their technical competence and are applied in a non-
discriminatory manner
137
. Such specifications and rules were required to be 
established and distributed with an accompanying statement that insurance 
undertakings were free to accept for insurance, on whatever terms and conditions 
                                                                                                                                          
insurer for different risks; (j) require the policyholder, in the event of disposal of the object of 
insurance, to make the acquirer take over the insurance policy; (k) exclude or limit the cover of a risk 
if the policyholder uses security devices, or installing or maintenance undertakings, which are not 
approved in accordance with the relevant specifications agreed by an association or associations of 
insurers in one or several other Member States or at the European level” 
134
 Ibid.  
135
See the proposed Commission Regulation (EC) No 358/2003, above, Article 9 (n). 
136
 Ibid., Article 9 (m). Moreover, the draft Regulation did not offer any exemption to technical 
specifications, rules, procedures or codes of practice adopted by an association or associations of 
insurance or reinsurance undertakings in one or several Member States if there was equivalent 
technical specifications, rules, procedures or codes of practice at European level.  
137
 Ibid, Article 9 (b). 
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they wish, other security devices or installation and maintenance undertakings which 
do not comply with these technical specifications or rules.
138
 
 
 
3.2 The Current Regime: Regulation 267/2010  
 
The introduction of the current Block Exemption Regulation
139
 was, yet again, to be 
preceded by a Commission Report, the Report on the Insurance Block Exemption
140
. 
In the Report, the Commission came to the preliminary conclusion that agreements 
on cooperation in the area of joint calculations, tables and studies should be 
facilitated  and that the block exemption in this area deserved continuity of 
application. The same considerations arose  in relation to insurance pools.  
Finally, it was maintained that two of the constitutive elements of the old 
regime, i.e. standard policy conditions and security devices, should have been 
removed tout court from the scope of the block exemption, whereas the exchange of 
statistical information for risk calculation and the creation of insurance pools should 
continue to benefit from antitrust immunity.  
In line with what was pre-announced by the Report on the Insurance Block 
Exemption, the scope of application of the Block Exemption was dramatically 
reduced. 
After almost 20 years of granted antitrust bonanza, the insurance industry is 
thus at the dawn of a new era. Starting from March 2010, only agreements  on joint 
compilations, tables and studies of risk and co and re-insurance pools continue to 
                                                 
138
 Ibid, Article 9 (c). 
139
 Commission Regulation (EU) No 267/2010 of 24 March 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of agreements, decisions 
and concerted practices in the insurance sector (OJ L 83/1, 30.3.2010). 
140
 Commission Report on the Insurance Block Exemption, 24/03/2009. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/financial_services/insurance_ber_report_ep.pdf 
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benefit from a general exemption, whereas agreements on standard policy conditions 
and on minimum specifications for security devices are no longer sheltered by the 
shield of a block exemption, and are consequently fully exposed to the application of 
Art. 101 of the Lisbon Treaty.  
 
3.2.1 The new regime for Joint compilations, tables and studies under Regulation 
267/2010 
 
The block exemption continues to cover agreements on joint compilations, tables and 
studies, as the Commission still acknowledges the importance of  co-operation 
between insurance undertakings in this area
141
. 
  Nevertheless, there is a  significant change compared to the previous regime;  
the new block exemption crucially requires calculations and studies to be made 
available not only to all insurance companies, but also to consumer and customer 
organisations which request them
142
. This represents a welcome change, as the 
requirement of disclosure may work as a deterrent for insurance undertakings to 
avoid forms of information exchanges related to the actual insurance premium. 
Nevertheless, if on the one hand this requirement enhanced  the obligation to share 
information beyond the previous regime,  single individuals are not in the position to 
have access to these data. Further, the requirement enshrined in Art. 3(2) e is subject 
to an exemption on the basis of public security issues
143
, and the concept of public 
security remains yet to be clarified. 
 
                                                 
141
 Ibid., recital n. 9. 
142
 Ibid., Art. 3(2) e. Single individuals are not in the position to have access to these data. Further, the 
requirement enshrined in Art. 3(2) e is subject to an exemption non the basis of public security issues. 
143
 Ibid., Art. 3(2) d. 
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3.2.2 The new regime for co and re-insurance pools 
 
 
The current regime retains the block exemption for pools that cover “new risks” and 
for other pools subject to certain market share thresholds.  
In line with the previous regime, pools covering  new risks are exempted for a 
three years period, regardless of the participants’ market share144. The risk must be 
genuinely new or, exceptionally, a risk the nature of which has, on the basis of an 
objective analysis, changed so materially that it is not possible to know in advance 
what subscription capacity is necessary in order to cover such a risk
145
.  The concept 
of risk changed on the basis of object criteria is new and will have to be further 
elaborated. Nevertheless, this new concept may represent an important tool for the 
Commission in order to assess the effective necessity of the coverage of specific 
risks through pools. 
There are also changes in respect of pools covering existing risks. If under the 
previous regime market share thresholds were considered in relation to the turnover 
of the pool, from now on, the possibility of benefiting from the exemption will 
depend on the turnover of all participating companies on the relevant market, 
regardless of the fact that the turnover is achieved inside or outside the pool
146
. This 
narrows down the scope of application of the exemption considerably, and arguably 
will ignite a certain degree of uncertainty. This new scenario would be, in fact,  
particularly delicate for larger insurers, as uncertainty shall inevitably arise in 
relation to the calculation of market shares for all undertakings participating in the 
pool.  
                                                 
144
 Ibid., Art. 6 (1). 
145
 Ibid., Art. 1(6) b. 
146
 Ibid., Art. 6 (3) c. 
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For the first time, ad hoc co-insurance and co-reinsurance agreements will 
fall outside the application of the block exemption
147
. Ad-hoc co-reinsurance 
agreements on the subscription market, are defined by the Regulation as agreements 
whereby a certain part of a given risk is covered by a lead insurer and the remaining 
part of this risk is covered by follow insurers who are then invited to cover that 
remainder in order either to a) reinsure mutually all or part of their liabilities in 
respect of a specified risk category; or b) incidentally accept, in the name and on 
behalf of all the participants, the reinsurance of the same category of risks
148
. This 
means that insurance undertakings participating in ad hoc agreements will be fully 
exposed to the EU competition rules. 
 Overall, the new regime for pools represent an important step forward if 
compared to the old status quo. Nevertheless, doubts for the necessity of a block 
exemption still remain alive and kicking, and shall be considered at a later stage of 
this thesis. 
3.2.3 The future of agreements on Standard policy conditions 
 
Cooperation on the design of policy forms was generally considered acceptable as it 
was deemed to facilitate price comparisons for consumers.
149
 Considering that the 
supply of insurance services traditionally lacks transparency, in granting a block 
exemption the Commission took into consideration that non-binding standard policy 
conditions allegedly procured efficiencies for insurance undertakings and could have 
benefits for consumer organisations and brokers.  
                                                 
147
 Ibid., Art. 1(5) b. 
148
 Ibid., Art. 1(4)a, and  Art. 1(4)b. 
149
 See Patricia M. Danzon, The McCarran-Ferguson Act: Anticompetitive or Procompetitive?, above, 
p.28. On this point see also M. Faure, “Insurance and competition law: balancing the conflicts”, 
available at the following link: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/business/cris/papers/Grif%20-
%20Michael%20Faure.pdf (accessed on 3 July 2011) . 
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Exactly as with any kind of service industry, consumers need to have access 
to information in order to determine which service provider is most suitable for them. 
Information deficiencies are theoretically capable of deterring the functioning of the 
market, leading to ineffective results.
150
 A block exemption relating to the 
standardisation of policy conditions was therefore considered the correct regulatory 
response to an “alleged market failure”.151 
As from 24 March 2009, the scenario is radically different. The  new 
Regulation represents a weighty rebuttal of the above approach and  the end of the 
block exemption in this area. The Regulation does not regard standard policy 
conditions as a sufficiently sector-specific feature to merit special treatment by way 
of block exemption coverage. The Commission believes that insurance undertakings 
should be capable of assessing whether co-operation on standards is competition law 
compliant on the same basis as companies in other sectors, and guidance to this end 
will be issued separately in due course. 
 In the meantime, it needs to be emphasised that the removal of standard 
policy wording from the comfort zone of a block exemption is significant news and 
is likely to create legal  uncertainty for the industry, which may soon have to assess 
the competition law sensitivity of each standardisation agreement
.
.
152
 
The rationale for this radical change of policy appears to be that in the 
absence of a block exemption for standard terms, competition would allegedly be 
enhanced by virtue of the fact that insurers could supply a greater variety of policies. 
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 As recently happened in connection with the abolition of the Council Regulation (EEC) No 
4056/86 OJ L 378/4, 22/12/1986, which provided a block exemption for the maritime sector, the 
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policy conditions vis-à-vis Art. 101. 
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In the past, the rason d’etre supporting the current block exemption for standard 
policy conditions had been criticised for being erroneous both in formulation and in 
the proposed remedy.
153
 In particular, the claim that consumers are not capable of 
estimating the contents of insurance contracts is perhaps formulated  in excessively 
generic terms. 
It would be convenient to consider different classes of insurance.  In case of 
mass consumer insurance, for instance, it has been correctly noted  that policies 
containing sharply drafted exclusion clauses, the implications of which can only be 
assessed by a specialised lawyer, may be difficult to understand for consumers
154
.  
On the contrary, according to economic doctrine, in the field of commercial 
and industrial insurance, the commercial awareness of the typology of  customers 
does not appear to require specific legal protection
155
. Since the problem seems thus 
to arise mainly in relation to non-commercial buyers, it has been argued that the 
repeal of the block exemption should be confined to this area and the role of 
insurance brokers could be emphasised as a means of consumer protection.
156
 
Clearly this was not the intention of the Commission which, with Regulation 
267/2010, envisaged a complete repeal of the block exemption related to standard 
policy conditions. As we have established, the rationale for this decision is to be 
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 See M. Faure, “Insurance and competition law: balancing the conflicts”, above, p. 12. A 
competitive supply of insurance brokers could indeed assist consumers in finding an insurance policy 
that fits their preferences as far as premium and policy conditions are concerned. The Commission 
itself recently emphasised  that insurance brokers have increased their role in most Member States, 
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http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/financial_services/inquiries/final_report_annex.pdf(accessed 
on 1 July 2011). 
  69 
found in the assumption that the use of standard policy conditions was not a 
peculiarity of the insurance industry and thus did not deserve special consideration.  
Standard policy conditions are indeed of common use in trade; nevertheless, 
they do give rise to antitrust concerns. On a general level, problems occur whenever 
an association of undertakings imposes on its members an obligation to use common 
terms and conditions of sale and purchase. This inevitably reverts against 
competition as in the first place it limits the freedom of the undertakings involved to 
provide conditions which vary from the one imposed upon them. Most importantly, 
consumers may also be harmed by such practices  as their choice of service providers 
is inevitably narrowed down. 
Conversely, standard policy conditions are less likely to have a detrimental 
impact on competition where members retain the freedom to adopt dissimilar 
conditions if they wish to do so. Under the current regime, the freedom to implement 
diverse conditions is, as previously established, an essential condition for the 
exemption. Notwithstanding, standard policy conditions can still have an adverse 
effect on competition if a large proportion of the insurance undertakings adopt the 
same policy conditions. Thus, the theoretical freedom to adopt different standard 
policy conditions does not represent in this case a safety net as customers may be left 
with little or no choice in practice.  
A scenario without a block exemption will also inevitably give rise to the 
compelling need to identify suitable ways to regulate the flow of information related 
to insurance policies.
157
 The key here will be the identification and the enactment of 
valid forms of consumer protection. In order to protect consumers, some Member 
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States
158 
have already enacted a system of ex-post control of policy conditions 
through courts or relevant independent authorities. Such systems appear to suggest a 
valid alternative in order to shield consumers against hostile policy conditions whilst 
granting competition between insurance undertakings. 
 Apart from issues related to consumer protection, the repeal of the block 
exemption for standard policy conditions creates a scenario where agreements 
between insurance undertakings will need to be assessed on a case by case basis vis-
à-vis Art.101(3). The Commission will issue specific guidelines in due course in 
order to lead insurers through ‘self-assessment’ procedures. On the basis of Art 
101(3), individual exemptions will be granted if specific conditions apply: 
agreements on standard policy conditions will qualify for exemption insofar as they 
create efficiencies that outweigh the restriction of competition, consumers obtain a 
fair share of those benefits, there are no less restrictive means of achieving the 
efficiencies, and competition is not eliminated altogether.  
In order to be consistent with art 101(3), agreements on standard policy 
conditions will have then to prove that some leeway is granted to the undertakings 
concerned in terms of the possibility to deviate from the status quo of the agreement 
providing alternative conditions. For instance, an agreement binding only on specific 
pre-determined terms leaving the freedom to provide diverse conditions in relation to 
remaining provisions will be likely to benefit from an individual exemption. 
Conversely, agreements which will not confer any degree of freedom to provide 
alternative conditions will be considered anticompetitive unless beneficial for 
consumers. Under such circumstances, individual exemption may be granted to 
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standardisation agreements which effectively render particularly hermetic policy 
conditions accessible for consumers
159
. 
 Agreements on standard policy conditions could also possibly be exempt if a 
linkage exists with agreements on joint calculations of risks. The reason for this is 
that the original idea of the Commission was to provide a block exemption only for 
standard policy conditions related to joint calculation of risks
160
.  This idea was 
ultimately abandoned, but, considering that the joint calculation of risks will still be 
part of the new block exemption regime, it is perhaps not unreasonable to foresee a 
favourable treatment of standard policy conditions linked with agreements on joint 
calculation of risks. 
3.3 The future of Joint determination of approved safety equipment 
 
Under the current regime, agreements between insurers on technical specifications 
for security equipment  benefit from  the block exemption.  
In the course of preparations of Regulation 267/2010, the original idea of the 
Commission was to introduce a new condition for exemption of agreements between 
insurers on approved security equipment.
161
 According to a proposed draft, the 
condition for exemption was to be that technical specifications, rules, procedures or 
codes of practice adopted by national associations of insurance or reinsurance 
undertakings in other Member States must have been explicitly recognised as equally 
valid by an association or associations of insurance or reinsurance undertakings in 
                                                 
159
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one or several Member States.
162
 The same rationale applied to any approval of a 
security device or installing and maintenance undertaking issued by an association of 
insurance or reinsurance undertakings in another Member State.
163
 
Under the current block exemption regime, security devices are exempt 
insofar as the technical specifications and compliance assessment procedures are 
“precise, technically justified and in proportion to the performance to be attained by 
the security device concerned”164. The exemption finds application whenever the 
rules for the evaluation of installation undertakings and maintenance undertakings 
are “objective, relate to their technical competence and are applied in a non-
discriminatory manner”165. Such specifications and rules are required to be 
established and distributed with an accompanying statement that insurance 
undertakings are “free to accept for insurance, on whatever terms and conditions they 
wish, other security devices or installation and maintenance undertakings which do 
not comply with these technical specifications or rules”.166 
Just as with standard policy conditions, the new Regulation  draws the 
finishing line for the exemption of joint determination of safety equipment. Security 
devices are no longer considered sufficiently sector-specific to merit special 
treatment and will be removed from the block exemption framework. 
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4 The way forward: Repealing the EU insurance 
block exemption?
167
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 The way forward: Repealing the EU insurance block exemption 
 
The current regime does not consider agreements on standard policy conditions and 
safety equipment worthy of a block exemption. 
This  significant change brings us to the next level of analysis: is there still 
the need for a block exemption in the insurance industry related to joint calculation 
of risks and pooling arrangements? What, if any, would the legitimate policy reasons 
be for a repeal? And what would the consequences be in case of a complete repeal of 
the current block exemption regime?  
                                                 
167
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Journal of Business Law, Issue I, January 2011, p.1-28. 
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4.1.1 Repealing the block exemption for joint calculations and studies of risks? 
 
On the basis of the current block exemption regime, insurers are  allowed to share 
information and statistics in order to jointly determine the risk premium. The line of 
reasoning behind the Block Exemption appears to embrace the so called “premium 
calculation argument”.168  
This claim relates to the determination of premiums by insurance companies, 
with the rationale being that deficiencies in the individual statistics prevent insurers 
from attaining an accurate rating of risks. Co-operation among undertakings would 
therefore seem necessary in order to ensure that income and expenses are balanced, 
the insolvency risk is contained and the so-called ‘moral hazard problem’ is 
adequately faced.
169
   
The premium calculation argument furthermore posits that co-operation 
between insurance undertakings in relation to risk premium calculation is vital in 
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order to improve the conditions of the service and thus worthy of an exemption under 
Article 101(3) of the Treaty. 
Prima facie this argument appears to be accurate. It has been correctly noted 
that the peculiarity of the insurance business lies, indeed, in uncertainty
170
. In order 
to accurately project the exact cost of the claims and thus to be able to determine the 
premium, insurers need to rely upon forecasts relating to the probability of the 
insured event and the foreseeable extent of the loss
171
.  
Such assessment entails the need to have access to meaningful statistics, with 
co-operation thus necessary to generate the statistical data necessary in order to 
enable insurers to calculate the premiums.
172
 Nevertheless, economic doctrine has 
identified at least two main idiosyncrasies in relation to the premium calculation 
argument.
173
 In primis, insurers are not the only undertakings dealing with 
uncertainty, as uncertainty represents a normal business risk shared by any 
entrepreneur carrying on an economic activity and cannot justify, per se, the 
existence of cartels.
174
 
 Secondly, the premium calculation argument as enshrined in the current 
block exemption Regulation appears to be formulated in excessively generic terms. 
The doctrine has distinguished between different classes of insurance: 
“Zufallsrisiken” (risk determined by coincidence) and “Änderungsrisiken” (risks 
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relating to a change of the dangerous situation itself).
175
 Whilst the latter are of very 
difficult if not impossible prediction, the former can be easily determined on the 
basis of the law of the large numbers without the need for any joint form of co-
operation. 
176
Among this category of risks, difficulties may nevertheless arise in the 
determination of ‘one –off risks’, such as catastrophe risks, which are extremely 
difficult to determine.  
The difficulties arising in relation to Zufallsrisiken have been considered 
instead to be  mainly related to the incompatibility between anti-trust law and the 
long duration of insurance contracts used to insure them, rather than to the nature of 
the risks per se.
177
  Whilst long term contracts are believed by the insurers as an 
essential form of cooperation, especially in the field of prevention, it is rather  
difficult to justify their exemption under Article 101(3). 
178
  
Forms of joint co-operation in the field of prevention are allegedly considered 
worthy of exemption, as they are deemed  to allow a substantive reduction of claims 
which would consequently lead to a reduction of premiums ultimately beneficial of 
consumers.
179
 Contrary to these opinions, the Commission regards long term 
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insurance contracts as a threat to competition as they reduce the possibility of access 
to the market by new insurers.
180
 
Overall, uncertainties relating to the calculation of premium risks might be 
overcome by other legal means than premium fixing agreements. In the current 
situation, when consumers in mass insurance markets buy insurance, they are 
charged on the basis of the risk premium calculated by the insurers through the use of 
significant  statistics and historical data relating to the past frequency and entity of 
claims. These statistics tend to strike a balance between consumers having an 
historical record full of claims and others having no claims or small entity claims. In 
substance, the risk premium calculated on the basis of these statistics represents the 
average premium.
181
  
If insurers could not rely on the current block exemption on joint calculations 
and studies of risks, the main question would arise in relation to the determination of 
the risk premium. An alternative to joint co-operation could be represented by the 
introduction by law of a ‘tailor made’ type of insurance policies. 182  
When customers wish to shift between insurance providers, the latter could 
be obliged by law to provide the existing insured with a personal certificate or 
register showing his past record of claims. By virtue of this system, the new insurer 
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would then be in a position to calculate the risk premium on the basis of the personal 
record of the new customer.
183
 
This system could arguably have two beneficial features: firstly, it would 
represent an efficient form of information-sharing between insurers allowing them to 
pass on information on risks that generally promote competition rather than limiting 
it by cartel agreements on premiums. Secondly, this system might also enhance the 
competition among insurers, allowing customers to change insurance providers 
without being obliged (as often happens today) to start at the high beginner’s 
premium with their new insurer. 
 Objections may indeed arise in relation to new customers, i.e. consumers 
buying insurance for the very first time, and in relation to insureds with a personal 
record of frequent and expensive claims. The scenario theorised above would see the 
former unable to provide the required data to insurers, and therefore potentially 
subject to unduly high cost policies. The same applies to the latter, who will be 
penalised by the past frequency of their claims and thus may even be unable to find 
insurance companies prepared to offer services to them at an affordable price. For 
both categories of insureds fear on the part of public policy makers may arise due to 
the risk that a segment of consumers remain without insurance due to their inability 
to afford high premium costs or the refusal of undertakings to insure them. 
These concerns deserve consideration and appear to cast some doubts on this 
alternative regulatory framework to the current regime. In response, it seems possible 
to claim that replacing the existing block exemption with a ‘tailor made insurance 
system’ could arguably lead to a diversification of prices and of competition 
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beneficial also for first-time buyers and consumers with personal statistics showing a 
high number of past claims.  
The reason is simple: if insurers are no longer able to jointly determine the 
risk premium, the competition among them would be mainly based on an element of 
price diversification by virtue of which some undertakings, particularly new market 
entrants, will try to attract new customers on the basis of tariffs that are very 
convenient for first-time buyers, whilst others will provide attractive packages for 
consumers with a claims intensive past.  
As we established before, in absence of a block exemption for the joint 
determination of risks,   difficulties for insurers could arise in relation to the 
calculation of  one off risks (e.g. fire and operational failure) and no-fault based 
risks. Nevertheless, many statistical data, e.g. mortal car accidents rather than 
average life statistics are nowadays widely available and do not require the need for 
cooperation.
 
These data are, in fact,  also often accessible for no-fault based risks, 
e.g. flooding of a particular property, and may as well represent the basis for the 
calculation of the individual risks although they are not linked with the behaviour of 
the insured.
184
 
 In case of liability insurance, the theorised individual system of calculation 
of risks might not only represent a suitable alternative to the current block exemption 
regime, but may also lead to the creation of market efficiencies. The doctrine has 
identified the creation of a linkage between the premium and the behaviour of the 
insured as an efficient way to face the moral hazard problem.
185
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For instance, in the case of fault based insurance, where policies are solely 
determined on the basis of the conduct of the individual concerned, competition is in 
fact  deemed to ensure the creation of an optimal scenario whereby the premium 
perfectly reflects the behaviour of the insured, and, as a consequence, the moral 
hazard problem is efficiently faced.  
A competitive insurance market could therefore arguably not have only a 
positive effect on moral hazard issues, as it is allegedly deemed to enable the 
narrowing of the need for risk pools. And pools, as we are about to discover in the 
following, are considered crucial in order to avoid the risks of moral hazard and 
adverse selection.
186
  
4.1.2 Repealing the Block exemption for the cooperation in form of co-insurance 
and reinsurance? 
 
The need for insurers to cooperate in terms of coinsurance and re-insurance appears 
to be prima facie another essential element of business insurance, and represents the 
most extensive form of cooperation among competing insurers. The idea that co-
operation between insurers is crucial and, to some extent, required by the modern 
insurance markets, has been endorsed by both the U.S. and European insurance 
regulatory frameworks.
187
 
Coinsurance and co-reinsurance groups (so-called ‘pools’) are risk-sharing 
joint ventures among insurers or reinsures otherwise acting as independent 
                                                                                                                                          
Faure ( in“Insurance and competition law: balancing the conflicts”, above, p. 23) points out that 
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undertakings.
188
 They are typically created in order to diversify and share 
exceptionally large, ultra-hazardous or uneven risks. Each undertaking participating 
in the pool benefits from the profits of the pool or bears its losses pro-rata, i.e., in 
proportion to the quota owned. 
There are two main forms of pools: a) coinsurance pools, and b) reinsurance 
pools. The former are created by direct insurers in order to jointly cover specific 
types of risks (e.g. environmental, nuclear risks or terrorism). The foremost aim of 
the latter is instead to enable to diversify very large loss risks across national or 
international insurance markets.
189  
In the modern economy, insurance undertakings are under an enormous 
amount of pressure to cover risks of a magnitude that often go beyond and above the 
financial means of an individual insurer. 
190
  
If insurers are not in the position to diversify risks within their internal 
organisational structures, the natural tendency is then to cooperate with other 
undertakings in coinsurance or reinsurance pools;
191
 this tendency of insurers to co-
operate has  been considered, thus, as one of the several aspects which render 
business insurance a “naturally monopolistic” activity.192 
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Pooling arrangements for the joint coverage of ultra-hazardous risks and 
reinsurance are thus deemed to be beneficial for the competition in the insurance 
sector and even necessary in order to provide the insurance service in relation to 
peculiar types of risk.  As a matter of fact, authors emphasised that risks which are 
not readily diversifiable in the long term are inevitably subject to more expensive 
insurance policies or to limited  coverage availability for policyholders.
193
 
Such arrangements would then allegedly allow small insurance undertakings 
to enter into and be part of specialised markets. According to these  theories, 
allowing small insurers to pool would therefore result in an enhancement of 
competition, as in the absence of co-operation, only very large insurance 
undertakings (and sometimes not even them) would be able to offer coverage for 
particular risky activities.
194
  
Pooling is also deemed to facilitate the purchase of reinsurance, and through 
reinsurance the capacity to insure is meant to increase in a sort of beneficial circle for 
the insurance industry which ultimately would also help to stabilise operating 
results.
195
 
 Under the current regime, joint coverage is exempt provided the market 
shares of the participating insurers do not exceed a) 20% in the case of co-insurance; 
b) 25% in the case of co-reinsurance.
196
 In line with the aforementioned economic 
                                                 
193
 See Patricia M. Danzon, The McCarran-Ferguson Act: Anticompetitive or Procompetitive?, above, 
p.24. 
194
 See R. Havens and M. Theisen, “The application of United States and EEC Antitrust Laws to 
Reinsurance and Insurance Pooling Arrangements”, above, 1300-1301. See also J. Finsinger, 
“Verbraucherschutz auf Versicherungsmarkten”, Munchen, Florentz, 1988, pp. 70-72. 
195
 See R. Havens and M. Theisen, “The application of United States and EEC Antitrust Laws to 
Reinsurance and Insurance Pooling Arrangements”, above, 1300-1301. See also M. Faure, 
“Insurance and competition law: balancing the conflicts”, above, p. 10. 
196
 See Commission Regulation No 267/2010 , above, Article  7 (2). The rationale behind the 
differentiation of the market shares is that co-insurance mechanisms entail the obligation for the pool 
participants to apply uniform conditions and identical gross premiums, whereas in co-reinsurance 
pools the participants need to jointly fix the risk premium and the co-reinsurance premium. In other 
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theories, the new Regulation treats insurance pools favourably as they allow a greater 
number of insurers to enter the market, consequently  increasing the opportunity of 
covering particular risks which would otherwise remain uncovered.  
Despite such declarations of principle, the Commission did point out that  
pools may not always be justified, especially in case there is enough capacity for 
multiple pools to cover any given risk, and  in absence of exhaustive ready-made list 
of risks which require joint coverage.
197
 
Thus, from an antitrust perspective, co-insurance and re-insurance groups 
raise a very important question:  is it really possible to determine when a pool is 
necessary in order to cover a specific risk? In theoretical terms, the answer is yes. 
Assuming that insurers endeavour to achieve an optimal balance between premiums 
and losses, the more the risks are homogeneous and the higher the number of insured 
related to that risk, the lower the spread between premium and losses.
198
  
 Insurers who do not cover large numbers of homogeneous risks effectively 
have three options in order to spread the risks: re-insure individually, join a co-
insurance pool, or become part of a co-reinsurance group
199
. The first option is the 
                                                                                                                                          
words, price competition is set aside in the case of co-insurance, whereas co-reinsurance agreements 
still allow a certain margin of price competitiveness. For a definition of reinsurance see Merkin, R. 
“Arnould’s Law of Marine Insurance and Average”, Sweet & Maxell London, 2008, at p. 1562. In re-
insurance, only one insurer is responsible for the entire cover of a specific risk, but part of the risk will 
be ceded to one or more insurers for re-insurance scope where the risk exceeds the financial capacity 
of the cedent insurer.  Insurers may re-insure on an ad hoc basis or may istitutionalise the re-insurance 
through co-reinsurance groups. Co-reinsurance groups usually determine the terms of the insurance 
including the level of risk premium. 
197
 See the Commission’s Business Insurance Sector Inquiry Interim Report of 25 January  2007, 
above, p. 82. 
198
 This point was formulated by Luc Gyselen, in “EU antitrust Law in the Area of Financial 
Services”, in ‘Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 23rd Annual conference on international Antitrust 
Law and Policy’, New York, 1996, p. 34.  Available at: 
http://europa.eu.iny/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp1997_005_en.html5. (accessed on 3 July 
2011).  For instance, in case of third party liability car insurance, the accuracy of the calculation of the 
risk premium will increase considerably in relation to the degree of homogeneity of the risk insured, 
e.g., utility cars driven by women  up to 40 years old vis-à-vis all types of cars driven by people of all 
ages. 
199
 This analysis is based on the theories elaborated by Luc Gyselen, in “EU antitrust Law in the Area 
of Financial Services”, above. 
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safest from an antitrust perspective as it does not entail any form of joint 
determination of risk premium. Consequently, joint co-insurance or re-insurance 
should be allowed only in extreme cases when forms of individual re-insurance are 
not sufficient to spread risks.  
As often happens with theoretical legal arguments, the practical aspects are 
far more intricate. It is very difficult in practice to adopt specific criteria in order to 
ascertain how many homogeneous risks need to be insured before an acceptable 
spread is reached by insurers without the need to reinsure or to join co-insurance or 
re-insurance pools. It is equally arduous to determine when individual re-insurance 
practices represent an optimal and more efficient way to minimise risk rather than the 
use of pools.
200
 
Regulation 267/2010  would therefore prima facie represent the optimal 
regulatory framework for co-insurance and re-insurance pools (although doubts do 
arise in relation to the extent of the current block exemption). The doctrine has 
emphasised that inefficiencies may indeed well arise under the current block 
exemption regime in relation to pool agreements especially in case of powerful 
lobbies characterising specific insurance segments.
201
Moreover, the Commission 
itself emphasises that the need for co-insurance and reinsurance pools depends 
mainly on the frequency of claims and diversifiability of risks.
202
  
                                                 
200
 An attempt to do this was made in vain by Luc Gyselen, in the above quoted “EU antitrust Law in 
the Area of Financial Services”at p.45., 
201
 See M. Faure and R. Van den Bergh, “Liability for nuclear accidents in Belgium from an interest 
group perspective”, International Review of Law and Economics, 1990, 241-254. See also M. Faure, 
“Insurance and competition law: balancing the conflicts”, above, p. 11. M. Faure and R. Van den 
Bergh have identified examples of such inefficiencies in the field of nuclear insurance: as a result of 
the lobbying power of the Belgian nuclear insurance industry, the nuclear insurance and reinsurance 
pool agreements led to high premiums, a low availability of insurance capacity and low financial 
limits on the liability of the licensee of a nuclear power plant 
202
 See the Commission’s Business Insurance Sector Inquiry Interim Report of 25 January o 2007, 
above, p. 64. 
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These considerations revert the analysis to the rationale for allowing the 
block exemption of pools. If pooling is only justified under the belief that it leads to 
increased competition and creates efficiencies, the assumption would be that without 
pooling, only a limited number of insurers could provide coverage for certain types 
of risks
203
. Without any form of co-insurance or re-insurance practice, competition 
would thus be too limited.  
Conversely, if despite the existence of a block exemption pooling causes a 
high degree of consolidation on insurance markets, the end result is obviously not 
efficient and doubts inevitably arise in relation to the current status quo. 
Apart from issues relating to deficiencies and inefficiencies (which are likely 
to arise with or without a block exemption), the arguments pro and contra block 
exemption need to be carefully counterbalanced in view of the possibility to identify 
valid regulatory alternatives.  The current EU block exemption generally allows the 
possibility for insurers to cooperate in order to insure or reinsure any risks; from this 
perspective, a blanket exemption in relation to all classes of risk may not be 
optimal.
204
 
A valid alternative could be then  to allow pooling arrangements for joint 
insurance and re-insurance only in relation to catastrophic, ultra-hazardous or uneven 
risks (e.g. nuclear, environmental, aviation risks and terrorism). In other words, the 
idea would be to confine the block exemption to risks which otherwise would remain 
uncovered due to the impossibility for single insurers to diversify them internally.  
A suitable suggestion could therefore be to restrict the block exemption to the 
above mentioned specific types of risk and to maintain the current  thresholds 
                                                 
203
 See M. Faure, “Insurance and competition law: balancing the conflicts”, above, p. 10. 
204
On this point  see the observations made by  M. Faure, in “Insurance and competition law: 
balancing the conflicts”, above, p. 10. 
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enshrined in Regulation 267/2010 as they represent a safe harbour against excessive 
concentration. New risks and other peculiar situations could be covered by individual 
exemptions, and, most of all, the need for pools could be remarkably reduced by the 
abolition of the block exemption for joint calculation of premiums.   
As previously mentioned, in a perfectly competitive insurance market 
characterised by  an effective linkage between insured behaviour and risk premium, 
the moral hazard problem could be arguably faced in an optimal way  narrowing the 
need for risk pools. A teleological link therefore arguably exists between the joint 
calculation of premiums and the cooperation in form of co-insurance and 
reinsurance. 
All this brings us to the next level and to very important questions: it is really 
feasible to repeal the insurance block exemption tout court? And in absence of a 
block exemption, how would the insurance market react? In order to answer these 
questions, it appears profitable to deduct some inputs of analysis form the US 
scenario, where the insurance block exemption is currently under scrutiny with a 
view of a complete repeal.  
 
4.2 The US position 
 
In the U.S., the McCarran-Ferguson Act
205
 introduced in 1945, established the 
primacy of the states in regulating the insurance  industry
206 
, in conjunction with the 
enactment of  the insurance block exemption  from the federal antitrust statutes
207.
  
                                                 
205
 McCarran-Ferguson Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015. Before the enactment of the first federal 
antitrust legal framework, the American fire industry increased considerably giving rise to concerns 
about competition (see the GAO Report on the “legal principles Defining the Scope of the federal 
Antitrust Exemption for Insurance”, available at: http://www.gao.gov/products/B-304474 accessed on 
20 July 2011) ,the following historical background summarises the findings of the GAO Report). At 
the beginning of the 19
th
 century the insurance industry was dominated both economically and 
politically by fire insurance (see Kennet J. Meier, “The Political Economy of Regulation: The Case of 
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The block exemption enacted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act is confined to 
a) common risk premium tariffs; and b) common standard policy conditions. Under 
the Act, the insurance Industry is exempted from some federal antitrust statutes to the 
extent that it is regulated by the states. The exemption primarily relates to gathering 
data in concert for the purpose of ratemaking
208
. Conversely,  no exemption is 
granted in case insurance undertakings boycott, act coercively, restrain trade, or 
violate the Sherman Act.  
                                                                                                                                          
Insurance”  State University of New York Press (Aug 1988), page 50).  Prior to World War I, the 
largest part of marine insurance policies were stipulated with foreign undertakings, life insurance was 
a separate industry, and health insurance did not represent a significant segment of the insurance 
market at that time. Throughout the 19th century the fire insurance industry gave rise to a series of 
solvency concerns: in years when major fires occurred, many insurers were not able to honour 
payments or face losses (on this point see also Spencer L. Kimball and Ronald l. Boyce, “The 
Adequacy of State Insurance Rate Regulation: The McCarran-Ferguson Act in historical 
Perspective”, Mich. L. Rev. 545, 547-49 (1958), at p. 56). In order to address the persistent distress of 
insolvency, insurance companies began to share and poll their loss experience data in order to 
formulate more accurate and rational insurance rates. At regulatory level, the first reactions came from 
the States which for the first time established administrative bodies in order to regulate the activities 
of the insurance industry, and the legality of state intervention was acknowledged by the Supreme 
Court in the case Paul v. Virginia75 U.S. (8Wall.)168 (1868). The State Regulation framework 
enacted in the aftermath of  Paul v. Virginia  was shuddered by the Supreme Court decision in the 
case United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association 322 U.S. 533 (1944). In this case, the 
Court also acknowledged that the Sherman Act did find application in relation to interstate insurance 
(on this point see also the GAO Report on the “legal principles Defining the Scope of the federal 
Antitrust Exemption for Insurance”, above, page 2). In  response to the Supreme Court judgment in 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, the Congress enacted the  McCarran-
Ferguson Act in 1945 regulating the U.S. insurance industry at federal level. The McCarran-Ferguson 
Act was enacted after the congress rejected a series of bills aiming to completely exempt the insurance 
industry from the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7), and the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27). The 
Sherman Act is designed to deal with cartels and monopolies.The Clayton Act was enacted almost 25 
years after the Sherman Act in response to the perceived deficiencies in the latter (for a detailed 
historical background see the GAO Report on the “legal principles Defining the Scope of the federal 
Antitrust Exemption for Insurance” , above, page 6.The Clayton Act is designed to deal with price 
discrimination, exclusive dealings arrangements and corporate mergers. In particular, the Clayton Act 
prohibits direct and indirect price discrimination, exclusive dealings arrangements, corporate mergers, 
and interlocking directorates as long as these practices are capable of substantially hinder competition. 
 For a comprehensive overview of the legislative background of the McCarran-Ferguson Act see 
Charles D. Weller, “The McCarran-Ferguson Act’s Antitrust Exemption for Insurance: Language, 
history and Policy”, 1978 Duke l.J. 587, 589-98 (1978). 
206
 The purpose clause of the Act states that “the continued regulation and taxation of the business of 
insurance by states are in the public’s best interest.” 
207
 The McCarran-Ferguson Act was enacted after the congress rejected a series of bills aiming to 
completely exempt the insurance industry form the Sherman and Clayton Acts. For a comprehensive 
overview of the legislative background of the McCarran-Ferguson Act see Charles D. Weller, “The 
McCarran-Ferguson Act’s Antitrust Exemption for Insurance: Language, history and Policy”, 1978 
Duke l.j. 587, 589-98 (1978). 
208
 See the McCarran-Ferguson Act, above, § 1012 (b). 
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Furthermore, the act does not exempt insurers from state antitrust laws, which 
explicitly prohibit insurers (and all businesses), from conspiring to fix prices or 
otherwise restrict competition.  
The McCarran-Ferguson Act block exemption is subject to three conditions: 
1) The challenged activity is part of the "business of insurance"
209
; 2) the challenged 
activity is regulated by state law
210
 and 3) the challenged activity does not constitute 
a boycott of unrelated transactions. 
211
 As we are about to discover, the US 
regulatory framework is not too dissimilar from the EU anti-trust scenario. 
                                                 
209
 The first condition of the insurance block exemption introduced by the McCarran-Ferguson Act is 
that an activity constitutes part of the “business of insurance”(again, the following historical 
background summarises the findings of the GAO Report on the“legal principles Defining the Scope of 
the federal Antitrust Exemption for Insurance”, above). Since the Act is silent in relation to the 
definition of what constitutes “business insurance”, the definition of this concept was the object of a 
series of U.S. Supreme Court judgments. 
During the period starting from the enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act till the late sixties, the 
Supreme Court defined the concept of business insurance as to encompass “all activities engaged in 
by insurance companies”  ( Am. Family Life Assurance Co. of Columbus v. Planned Mktg. Assocs., 
389 U.S., 1144-45 (E.D. Va. 1964, as quoted by the GAO Report onthe “legal principles Defining 
the Scope of the federal Antitrust Exemption for Insurance”, above, at p.3). This scenario changed 
radically in 1969, when the Court in SEC v. National Securities Inc (393 U.S. 453, 459-60 (1969), 
decided to give a very narrow interpretation of the notion of “business insurance” specifying that the 
exemption enacted by  the McCarran-Ferguson Act found application solely in relation to the business 
insurance. After SEC, courts endeavored to detect the activities unique to the insurance industry, 
identifying three elements that need to be considered in order to ascertain whether a specific activity 
falls within the category of “business insurance”. As indicated by the U. S. Supreme Court in Union 
Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno (458 U.S. 119 1982), these elements are to be found firstly  in practices 
related to the transfer of risk from the policyholder on to the insurance undertaking. Secondly, a 
linkage needs to exist between the practice and the policy relationship between insured and insurer. 
Thirdly, the practice needs to remain confined within the insurance industry (see the GAO Report on 
the “legal principles Defining the Scope of the federal Antitrust Exemption for Insurance”, above). 
This “trend” was recently confirmed in the case Gilchrist v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co 
(390 F.3d 1327,11
th 
Cir. 2004). 
210
 The McCarran - Ferguson Act provides for an exemption of the insurance business from the 
federal antitrust laws only to the extent that such business is “regulated by State law”. In FTC v. 
National Casualty Co357 U.S. 560 (1958), the Supreme Court held that the power of the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) to regulate the insurance industry was withdrawn by the McCarran-
Ferguson Act in those states where an insurance regulatory framework exists regardless of its 
specification or effectiveness. In other words, the McCarran-Ferguson exemption does not depend on 
the quality of a State’s insurance regulatory framework or on its effective enforcement. This point was 
confirmed in Mitgang v. Western Title Ins. Co. 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH), and in Commander Leasing 
Co. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 447 F.2d 77, 84 (10
th
 Cir. 1973) (see the GAO Report on the 
“legal principles Defining the Scope of the federal Antitrust Exemption for Insurance”, above). 
211
 The third condition of the insurance federal block exemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act is 
that the insurance activity may not constitute an agreement or act aiming to boycott, coerce or 
intimidate. The case law relating to this condition is almost entirely focused on the concept of boycott 
rather than the coercion and intimidation elements (see the GAO Report on the “legal principles 
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4.3 The McCarran Ferguson Act and the EU BER: two faces of the same 
coin? 
 
 
Several structural and substantive elements currently differentiate the US antitrust 
regime from the EU regulatory framework, although the two systems are, as it will 
be readily appreciated, remarkably similar.  
A fundamental structural difference between the U.S. and European insurance 
regulatory frameworks is that the McCarran-Ferguson Act introduced a peculiar 
concurrent system of insurance regulation at Federal and State level: as outlined 
above, the McCarran - Ferguson Act provides for an exemption of the insurance 
business from the federal antitrust laws only to the extent that such business is 
regulated by State law. The real intent of the McCarran-Ferguson Act was, as a 
matter of fact, to uphold the existing state insurance regulatory framework by virtue 
of which insurers were allowed to lay down and determine rates “under the auspices 
of industry-owned rating bureaus that filed the rates for the approval with the state 
regulatory authority”212.  
The block exemption enacted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act aimed also at 
preserving the state regulatory structure adding an exemption from federal antitrust 
laws
213
. This means that single States were (and still are) indeed in the position to 
freely regulate the insurance industry and even to repeal the block exemption within 
                                                                                                                                          
Defining the Scope of the federal Antitrust Exemption for Insurance”, above). The question was 
solved by the Supreme Court in St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, in which the Court held that 
if the Congress in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act had the intention to confine the scope of the 
exception to boycotts of competing insurance companies or agents and to preclude the protection of 
policyholders, it would have made this concept explicitly (see the GAO Report on the “legal 
principles Defining the Scope of the federal Antitrust Exemption for Insurance”, above).  
212
 See D.T. Armentano, “Antitrust and Insurance: Should the McCarran Act be repealed?”, Cato 
Journal, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Winter 1989), p. 731. 
213
 Spencer L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate Regulation: The 
McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 545 (1958). 
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their territory
214
. Such scenario would be unthinkable in Europe where the block 
exemption was introduced by EU Regulations which became integral part of the 
legal systems of the Member States, and are destined to prevail in case of contrast 
with national laws.  
Apart from procedural differences, the three conditions of the McCarran-
Ferguson insurance exemption analysed above show also substantive differences 
between the U.S. and European insurance regulation. The current EU block 
exemption Regulation appears to be more specific than the American one. As 
previously mentioned, Regulation  267/2010 specifically exempts joint calculation 
and studies and risk pooling arrangements (co-insurance groups and co-reinsurance 
groups).  
The insurance block exemption framework introduced by the McCarran-
Ferguson appears to be, prima facie, far more generic and wider if compared to the 
EU regime: it is indeed up to the courts to specify the exact entity and the extent of 
the block exemption and its conditions. In particular, the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
does not limit the exemption to specific types of agreements: any activity part of the 
“business of insurance” can be exempted as long as it does not constitute a boycott of 
unrelated transactions. Nonetheless, the U.S. insurance regulation ended up 
exempting, just as Regulation 267/2010, activities of insurance undertakings relating 
to the joint calculations of tariff premiums, and the joint coverage of specific types of 
risks such us terrorism, environmental and nuclear risks. Security devices are not part 
of the U.S. block exemption regime, and now of the EU system either, as they have 
been removed from the new EU Block Exemption regulatory framework together 
with agreements on standard policy conditions.  
                                                 
214
 The only US state that repealed the insurance block exemption to date is California.  
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Beyond these considerations, what appears to be a noteworthy is the fact that 
the specifications offered by the US courts case law in relation to the application of 
the McCarran and Ferguson Act appear to draw a common thread between the two 
systems. For instance, in American Column and Lumber,
215
 the US Supreme Court 
held that the behaviour of an insurance associations that provided its members with 
suggestions related future premium prices based on the exchange of past statistical 
data was incompatible with the McCarran and Ferguson Act. If the same case were to 
be considered under the current EU block exemption regulatory framework, the 
outcome would be exactly the same, as the exemption for the exchange of statistical 
data provided by the Block Exemption Regulation does not apply if there is any 
element of price fixing, i.e. if the exchange of information ultimately leads to 
agreeing the premium.
216
     
In Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insurance Rating Board,
217
 the court found  the practice 
of an association of insurance undertakings to impose to its members specific 
standard policy conditions against the US insurance exemption regime. Yet again, on 
the basis of the same considerations expressed above, a decision eventually adopted 
by the EU authorities on the basis of the same circumstances would have had, in the 
past, an identical outcome.
218
 Apart from some atavistic discrepancies, the two block 
exemption systems appear thus to be definitely comparable if not very similar. 
Most importantly, in parallel with the review process that is shaping up the 
new EU Block Exemption Regulation, the US Congress is currently in the process of 
repealing the insurance block exemption enacted in 1945 by the McCarran - 
                                                 
215
 257 U.S. 357 (1921).  
216
 See Regulation 358/2003, above, Art 3 (1). 
217
 451 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1971). 
218
 This is due to the fact that under Regulation 358/2003 standard policy conditions were exempt 
only insofar as , inter alia, they   expressly mentioned that participating undertakings were free to 
offer different policy conditions to their customers (Art 5(1) b). 
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Ferguson Act. The essence of the debate over the possible repeal of the McCarran - 
Ferguson Act is mainly related to the controversial information sharing practice 
among undertakings. Nevertheless, cooperative activities with respect to 
underwriting, reinsurance, and participation in risk pools have been also largely 
under scrutiny since many years and are still object of discussion
219
. In the past two 
years, the consultation process activated by the Congress lead to the publication of 
several reports and opinions in favour or contra the repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act, in conjunction with a series of opinions and studies have been produced 
assessing the possible consequences of a post–exemption scenario220. Together with 
the investigations conducted at European level, the US governmental reports 
represent an invaluable  source of  information which will be now taken into account 
as we are about to face the next set of teleological questions: would a complete 
repeal of the insurance block exemption be favourable from an anti-trust perspective? 
How would the insurance market react to such scenario? What would the alternative 
regulatory means be in order to ensure effective competition among insurance 
undertakings?     
 
4.4 Consequences of a complete repeal of the insurance Block Exemption 
Regulation 
 
A scenario where insurers are no longer allowed to co-operate triggers conflicting 
visions in relation to possible consequences on the market.  One stream of opinions is 
                                                 
219
 See, inter alia, D.T. Armentano, “Antitrust and Insurance: Should the McCarran Act be 
repealed?”, above, and the“Report of the President and the Attorney General of the National 
Commission for the Review of antitrust Laws and Procedures”, Washington D.C., Government 
Printing Office, 22 January 1979. 
220 In the past two years, the consultation process activated by the Congress lead to the publication of 
several reports and opinions in favour or contra the repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 
 See, inter alia, the “Report of the President and the Attorney General of the National Commission for 
the Review of antitrust Laws and Procedures”, above. 
  94 
deeply rooted in the general arguments pro block exemption and sees the interaction 
between insurers as beneficial in so far as promoting low costs and effective rivalry 
between companies of various sizes.
221
 In an uncertain world as the insurance 
business, horizontal agreements  and forms of cooperation should not considered  to  
be harmful for the social welfare.
222
 
According to economic theories developed in the U.S., business competition 
in the insurance industry should be considered as a dynamic process developing 
under conditions of uncertainty that can include “interfirm rivalry as well as interfirm 
cooperation.”223 
Allowing horizontal agreements between insurers may thus help to reduce 
information costs, price-adjustment costs, and business risk generally.
224
 If the 
probability of increasing price above competitive levels remains reasonably low, the 
existence of the increased efficiencies associated with cooperation between insurers 
is believed to be capable of enhancing social welfare. 
The underlying rationale in defence of the current status quo would therefore 
be that competition law can be efficiently used in the form of a block exemption in 
                                                 
221
 See D.T. Armentano, “Antitrust and Insurance: Should the McCarran Act be repealed?”, above, p. 
743. On this point see also Franklin W. Nutter, The Insurance Wars: The Battle Over McCarren-
Ferguson – Keep It!, THE BRIEF 10 (1989).3, p. 18. Jonathan R. Macy & Geoffrey P. Miller, The 
McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945: Reconceiving the Federal Role of Insurance Regulation, 68 N.Y.U.. 
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 See Patricia M. Danzon, “The McCarran-Ferguson Act: Anticompetitive or Procompetitive?”,  
above, p.36. See also the GAO, “Ultimate Effects of McCarran-Ferguson Federal Antitrust Exemption 
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(accessed on 1 July 2011). 
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 See D.T. Armentano, “The Failure of Antitrust Policy”, Published in The Freeman: Ideas on 
Liberty - June 1994, p.7. Available at:  
http://www.utdallas.edu/~plewin/TheFoundationforEconomicEducationonanti-trust.pdf.(accessed on 1 
July 2011).Journa81985): 247—65. 
224
 See D.T. Armentano, “Antitrust and Insurance: Should the McCarran Act be repealed?”, above, p. 
740. 
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order to shelter the insurance industry  from “the rigors of the free-market 
competitive process.”225  
 The paramount criticism contra the repeal of the current block exemption 
regime is thus based on the idea that a scenario without exemption would only 
increase short-term competition leading to a decrease in inter-firm competition, 
believed to be an essential element of efficient competition in the insurance sector.
226
 
This criticism is deeply route into economics theories developed at the beginning of 
the eighties in the U.S. and then migrated to Europe. According to some 
conventional competition theories, consumer welfare results enhanced whenever 
intensive interfirm rivalry thrives.
227
  In a market characterised by easy access and 
within which products are homogenous and market information is readily available,   
price will naturally “tend to equal marginal costs and, in equilibrium , marginal 
costs.
228”  
These theories fail to acknowledge the concept of ‘confusopoly’ , i.e. the 
condition whereby the market force of competition is eroded by a group of 
undertakings providing similar products (services) which, rather than competing 
with one another, decide to intentionally mystify end users.  
According to this paradigm, the presence of a high number of undertakings 
providing homogenous products should not be interpreted as a symptom of 
                                                 
225
 See D.T. Armentano, “The Failure of Antitrust Policy”, Published in The Freeman: Ideas on 
Liberty - June 1994, above,  p.10. See D.T. Armentano, “Antitrust and Insurance: Should the 
McCarran Act be repealed?”, above, p. 742. 
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See D.T. Armentano, “Antitrust and Insurance: Should the McCarran Act be repealed?”, above, p. 
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 The economic theories exposed in this paragraph are based on the seminal work of P. Ash , 
“Industrial Organization and Antitrust Policy”. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1983. 
See also Baumol, William, and Ordover, Janusz. “Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition.” Journal 
of Law and Economics 28 (May 1985): 247—65. 
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 See D.T. Armentano, “Antitrust and Insurance: Should the McCarran Act be repealed?”, above, 
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inherent competitiveness as this scenario could lead to rather paradoxical 
consequences. This is due to the fact that the higher the number of undertakings 
in a market, the higher is the incentive for existing undertakings to collectively 
increase the prices
229
.  
As a consequence, this  theoretical framework leads to a sort of  equilibrium whereby  
firms lay down monopolistic prices and consumers choose not to become informed. 
The reason for this is that if all undertakings charge the same price (or similar 
prices), end users would not find worthwhile to incur into search costs in order to 
find the best deal. By the same token, if end users are not informed, firms then would 
tend to determine monopoly prices as to maximise profits from  those consumers 
who decide to use their services/buy their goods in a random way
230
.  
This theoretical scenario can be effortlessly applied to the insurance industry, 
where by employing complex pricing schedules insurers are furthermore in the 
position to render the consumer’s understanding the real value of their services as a 
rather difficult task. These informational asymmetries between undertakings and 
consumers can lead to price dispersion and ultimately curtail competition itself
231
.  
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The doctrine of ‘confusopoly’ appears therefore to confute other economic 
paradigms which revolve around the idea of a market characterised by a high number 
of undertakings offering homogeneous products, as a perfectly competitive market. 
It is worth noting, however, the specific downward pressure on insurance 
premiums exercised by virtue of insurers’ awareness of the tendency inherent to 
‘good risks’ of eschewing insurance altogether if premiums become larger than the 
insured’s tolerance level. Although this tendency is well recognised as idiosyncratic 
to insurance, there appears to be no current research on the equilibrium between this 
mechanism and the doctrine of confusopoly as determinants of pricing structure and 
it is therefore not known which has the greater influence. 
In particular, the inter-company cooperation in the insurance sector is 
considered beneficial in order to promote low costs and effective competition 
between insurance undertakings of various sizes
232
. Repealing the block exemption 
would inevitably lead to curtail this cooperation between insurers through antitrust 
law, and  this would result in an increment of costs and prices of insurance services. 
Higher costs and increased market concentration are considered the likely 
consequences of the repeal of the insurance antitrust exemption
233
.
 
 The doctrine emphasises also that  a complete  repeal  would likely have a 
detrimental impact on competition and “reduce the availability for some high-risk 
coverage as the threat of antitrust litigation would reduce participation in efficiency 
enhancing cooperative activities.”234  
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Assuming that these considerations are valid, it is also true that, conversely, 
competition can be undermined by monopoly power. The doctrine points out that 
monopoly power can be attained through “internal growth, through merger with 
other firms, through inter-firm collusive agreements to reduce output or fix prices, 
through product differentiation, or through various legal restrictions and barriers to 
entry.”235 The outcome of the exercise of such kind of power,  would be to “reduce 
consumer welfare (consumer surplus) and to misallocatescarce economic 
resources.”236 One of the foremost scope of antitrust laws would thus be to preserve 
competitive markets and to act as a deterrent for private monopoly power.
237
 
When it comes to the insurance industry, part of the economic doctrine starts 
from the assumption that the insurance market is intended to be “workable 
competitive.”238 The reasons for this allegedly inherently competitiveness of the 
insurance industry are, according to these theories, mainly two.   
In primis, the insurance products are believed to be relatively homogenous 
and product differentiation as a barrier to entry is not considered a relevant issue in 
the insurance market.
239
 Furthermore, the great variety of business opportunities in 
insurance, and the apparent absence of substantial economies of scale would 
allegedly “allow small, intermediate size, and large-scale firms to coexist and be 
rivalrous in the  insurance market.”240 
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4.4.1 More in defence of the current insurance antitrust acquis 
  
In light of the above considerations, the real controversy in the application of 
antitrust rules to the insurance industry would seem therefore not to lie with the 
nature of the market per se, considered, as we have just seen, perfectly competitive.  
The debate should rather revolve  around the forms of cooperation between 
insurers allowed by antitrust laws. Allowing extensive forms of co-operation 
between insurers has always been object of much debate. Till nowadays, in spite of 
the scepticisms toward inter-firm co-operation
241
,  the predominant economic 
theories  endorsed by antitrust regulators justify such practices  on the basis of the 
peculiar nature of the insurance business.  
The peculiarity of the insurance industry would, thus, “lie in uncertainty”242, 
and some authors have emphasised that forms of horizontal co-operation are not 
necessarily always harmful. In an uncertain world, such as the insurance business, 
Armentano points out that  “it is not obvious that horizontal agreements lower social 
welfare; horizontal agreements may reduce information costs, price-adjustment costs, 
consumer search costs, inventory costs, and business risk generally.”243 Contrary to 
other industries where “accounting costs are incurred in the present and are known at 
the time of contracting and price-making, Armentano maintains that in the insurance 
business, actual financial data related to specific policies can be known by insurers 
with complete accuracy only at the moment in which the policy expires
244
.  
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Allowing horizontal co-operation between insurers would therefore be the 
answer to an alleged structural failure inherent to the insurance industry
245
. Further, 
since individual insurers are unlikely to have the capacity of producing large 
statistical data necessary for an accurate anticipation of future costs, co-operation on 
statistical info is deemed to be an essential feature in order to enable insurers to 
achieve an efficient cost estimation and ratemaking paradigm. 
These economic theories are unanimously endorsed by insurers all across 
Europe which vehemently  support  the retention of the status quo. 
246
 The overall 
idea is that much is to be gained in terms of market efficiency by renewing the 
existing EU insurance block exemption regulatory framework.  
In particular, the claim is that,  if exposed to an effective anti-trust regime, the 
insurance  market as a whole may have to face high legal expenses in order to 
establish the validity of agreements between insurers vis-à-vis Art. 101 TFEU. All 
this would ignite a domino effect which is deemed to cause delays, legal costs, and 
ultimately higher premiums for clients.
247
  
Another recurrent belief is that as a consequence of the repeal of the current block 
exemption, the incentive would  consequently be towards consolidation in the 
insurance industry through mergers,  all this resulting yet again in higher costs for 
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insurance services.
248
 Recent research appears to endorse this claim
249
. It has been 
noted that in the last decade, banks and insurers have been allowed to merge on 
numerous occasions across Europe, leading to a scenario which already now denotes 
a remarkable degree of consolidation
250
, and this situation can only be exacerbated 
by the global financial crisis. One of the pivotal factors behind the high degree of 
consolidation characterising the financial services industry has been found in the way 
the EU Merger Regulation
251
  has been applied to this sector
252
. More specifically, it 
has been pointed out that the EU merger regulatory framework has been applied to 
the insurance sector in a more lenient fashion compared to other sectors of the 
economy
253
.  
These observations need to be read in conjunction with the case law related to 
the application of Art. 101 to the insurance considered in the previous part of this 
thesis, and appear to corroborate the idea of a more indulgent application of Art. 102 
to the insurance sector vis-a-vis a theoretical full application of Art. 101 in absence 
of a block exemption. 
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4.5 Balancing the truth: Economic theories and further legal considerations 
 
This stream of economic doctrine contra the repeal of the block exemption regime 
deserves serious consideration.  
Nevertheless, in the opinion of the author, it appears to be contradicted by the 
current status of the European insurance market. It is submitted that the analysis of 
the impact of the current regulatory framework clearly demonstrates that despite 
benefiting from the block exemption, the continental insurance industry is already 
characterised by a high degree of consolidation. 
254
 
In the last few decades, the market has seen a remarkable rise in merger and 
acquisition activities, leading to a high foreign penetration of national markets but at 
the same time to a higher degree of consolidation of the insurance industry. Signs of 
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consolidation are particularly evident  in terms of number of current actual and 
potential competitors and access to the insurance market.
 255
 
The consolidation of the EU insurance market does not represent a good 
symptom of competition. As it is well known, a high degree of market concentration 
would inevitably result in an increment of prices.
256
  
Empirical research has proven that in countries where the insurance industry 
is subject to a high degree of concentration and market regulation, the insurance 
prices are on average 17% higher than in countries where the insurance sector is 
characterised by deregulation and competitiveness among undertakings.
257
 These 
findings have been confirmed by studies carried out on behalf of the Commission, 
which show that in relation to specific types of insurance, premiums are remarkably 
lower in deregulated and competitive insurance markets, rather than in highly 
regulated ones.
258
 
It is interesting to note that if the impact of the block exemption on the 
internal market appears to have exacerbated the tendency towards a higher 
concentrated market, whereas deregulation helped to opened up the market entry of 
new insurers. In terms of access to the market, in fact, the situation is radically 
different, since  the European Union’ efforts to create a single insurance market have 
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led to an improvement in the conditions for competition. The key issue here was 
deregulation: prior to deregulation, competition in Europe between insurers was 
hindered by protracted procedures in order to obtain insurance licences and by 
regulated tariff systems that restrained competition in many Member States.
259
 
The introduction of a ‘single licence’ now allows for much faster market 
entry. Deregulation at European level in this case was crucial in order to ensure 
competition, and  it is important to emphasise that this positive integration 
development is completely unrelated to  the current block exemption regime.
260
 
Nevertheless, deregulation in the field of access to the market does not appear 
to have led to a general expansion in cross-border trade in insurance.
261
 Is this 
stagnation of insurance services at national level in any way related to the block 
exemption system then? It is opinion of the author that this might well be the case. If 
deregulation was the key in order to favour the entrance of new insurers into the 
market, the block exemption seems on the contrary to have shut the door. Allowing 
insurers to cooperate and share information in order to determine the risk premium 
tariffs, together with the low degree of integration which currently characterises the 
internal market clearly contributed to consolidation in the sector. 
The worrying aspect of the consolidation characterising the insurance 
industry across the internal market is that, although consolidation takes place mostly 
on a cross-border basis through acquisitions, from a consumer perspective choice 
does not improve as there is little if any cross-border provision of services.
262
 This 
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scenario could be easily considered as a direct result of the block exemption 
regulation: with some exceptions
263
, the cooperation in the calculation of the average 
cost of risk and on statistical studies allowed by the current block exemption 
regulation remains, in fact,  confined within the territories of Member States.
264
 
 
 
 
4.5.1 A scenario without a block exemption  
 
The scenario described above is emblematic. The current block exemption not only 
appears to have caused a higher degree of consolidation in the insurance industry, it 
has also failed to contribute to the integration of the sector at European level.  
It appears that negative synergies arising from the block exemption system 
have contributed to the creation of a stagnating market in which the cooperation 
between undertakings remains confined largely within the territory of the Member 
States. The upshot of this scenario is the realisation of a form of cross -border 
consolidation currently characterising the internal market, which unfortunately did 
not result in an enhancement of cross border provision of insurance services. 
Due to this stagnation, the EU insurance market appears to be in need of an 
impetus, and perhaps in the future the Commission should err on the side of 
deregulation in this particular case.  
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These considerations shift the analysis onto the hypothetical effects of a 
complete repeal of the block exemption in terms of consumer welfare, as we need to 
bear in mind that one of the main function of competition law is consumer 
protection. On a general level, it must be emphasised that there are no studies 
demonstrating that insurance regulation is capable of producing more benefits than 
costs for consumers.
265
  
On the contrary, studies conducted in the US seem to uphold the opposite 
conclusion.  The major voice in favour of the repealing of the insurance block 
exemption is represented, inter alia, by the Comments submitted by the Office of 
Attorney General of New York State in Response to the request for Public Comments 
on Immunities and Exemptions
266
 .  The Report is the outcome of a two years 
investigation in the insurance sector carried out in the State of New York The 
investigation disclosed serious and well substantiated evidence of ‘big-rigging’ that 
resulted in artificial inflation of commercial insurance rates in the absence of real 
competition
267
.  
The Report furthermore outlines that the lack of competition in the insurance 
sector is far from being confined within the New York State territory, representing, 
on the contrary a  pervasive national problem
268
.  
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The Office of Attorney General of New York State points the finger against 
the McCarran-Ferguson exemption held to be responsible for the lack of competition 
in the insurance industry. In particular, the report outlines how detrimental it is for 
the competition to enable insurers to agree on rates for insurance, effectively 
eliminating competition between them
269
. The suggestion emerging from the 
document would be the repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson Act to the extent that it 
allows information sharing between insurers which should be subject to the same 
collective exchange of information standards that have been developed through the 
case law and that are applicable to other industries
270
.  
Nevertheless, in the light of the “particular requirements of the insurance 
industry”271, the Report advises the Congress to consider saving clauses in the 
legislation in order to enable insurers to participate in joint underwriting agreements 
and ancillary activities in a manner that does not restrain competition. Further, the 
Report also acknowledges the need for insurers to cooperate in the development of 
standards that would enhance consumer understanding of their insurance policies, 
such as standards for the use of plain language and simplified forms for insurance 
policies
272
. 
The findings of the Office of Attorney General of New York State’s Report 
have been endorsed by the Testimony of the Director of Insurance Consumer 
Federation of America before the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate, 
regarding the implications of repealing the insurer’s antitrust exemption273.  
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The Testimony of the U.S. consumer Federation asserts that allowing 
insurance undertakings to cooperate in order to determine the risk premium results in 
higher cost for the insured
274
. The Testimony also claims that repealing the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act would be beneficial for consumers and enhance competition 
in the insurance sector
275
. Nevertheless, empirical examples provided by the 
Testimony appear to warn that in case of repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson antitrust 
exemption, forms of co-operation between insurers would be easily caught by 
antitrust law
276
.  
 Furthermore, the Testimony emphasises that the collusive behaviour of 
insurers lead, inter alia, to the  recent insurance crisis in the wake of hurricane 
Katrina, in the aftermath of which hundreds of thousands of people had their 
homeowners insurance policies cancelled due to prices skyrocketing
277
. 
Most of all, the Testimony launches a reprimenda against the market 
inefficiencies of the insurance industry, which appear to be exacerbated by the 
collusion allowed by the McCarran-Ferguson’s antitrust exemption leading insurers 
to charge inflated prices in order to cover inefficient operations
278
.  
The US scenario represents an interesting platform for discussion; apart from 
a few atavistic discrepancies, the U.S. and European insurance markets are indeed 
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comparable, as are the insurance block exemption regulation systems enacted by the 
two Continents.
279
  
In the US, the block exemption originally enacted by the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act is confined to common risk premium tariffs, and Common standard policy 
conditions. Under the Act, the insurance industry is exempted from some federal 
antitrust statutes to the extent that it is regulated by the states.  
The exemption primarily relates to gathering data in concert for the purpose 
of ratemaking. Conversely,  no exemption is granted in case insurance undertakings 
boycott, act coercively, restrain trade. The insurance block exemption framework 
introduced by the McCarran-Ferguson appears to be, prima facie, much more generic 
and wide compared to Regulation 260/2010: it was indeed up to the courts to specify 
the exact entity and the extent of the block exemption and its conditions. In 
particular, the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not limit the exemption to specific types 
of agreements: any activity part of the “business of insurance” can be exempted as 
long as it does not constitute a boycott of unrelated transactions.  
Nevertheless, the U.S. insurance regulation ended up exempting, just as 
Regulation  358/2003 used to do, insurers activities relating to the joint calculations 
of tariff premiums, standard policy conditions for direct insurance and the joint 
coverage of specific types of risks such us terrorism, environmental and nuclear 
risks. 
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A clear point of fracture between EU and US insurance regulation lies with the fact 
that the US regime is based upon state regulation. If in the EU the regulatory 
scenario has been , at least thus far, characterised by the presence of EU insurance 
regulatory framework superimposed on individual Member States, the US legislator 
adopted the opposite approach, exempting state-regulated insurance businesses from 
federal antitrust law.  
As a result, in the US the insurance regulatory power lies with the individual 
States
280
, and this can lead to regulatory divergences as we are about to discover with 
the analysis of the introduction of Proposition 103 by the Californian State
281
. 
A very  interesting point of the aforementioned  Office of Attorney General 
of New York State’s Report  points out that the repeal of the antitrust exemption in 
the field of motor insurance operated by the California authorities through 
Proposition 103
282
 radically changed the structure of the insurance market. A study 
conducted by the Consumer Federation of America
283
 concluded that since 1989 (the 
year of the enactment of Proposition 103) the motor insurance market in California 
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has produced “remarkable results for auto insurance consumers and for the insurance 
companies operating in the field.”284 
In particular, the study reported that operating in an open competition system 
insurers were able to realise very substantial profits, above the national average, 
while consumers benefited from a remarkable decrease of the motor insurance 
prices.
285
 
Despite the fact that these statistics are confined only to the State of 
California, they do possess noteworthy value. As we have just established in the 
above, the U.S. and European insurance markets are indeed comparable, as are the 
insurance block exemption regulation systems enacted by the two Continents.
286
 
                                                 
284
 See “The testimony of the Director of Insurance Consumer Federation of America before the 
Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate, regarding the implications of repealing the insurer’s 
antitrust exemption”, above, p. 16. See also S.B. Pociask, J.P. Fuhr and L. F. Darby, ”Insurance 
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tariffs, and Common standard policy conditions Under the Act, the insurance Industry is exempted 
from some federal antitrust statutes to the extent that it is regulated by the states. The exemption 
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exemption is granted in case insurance undertakings boycott, act coercively, restrain trade. The 
insurance block exemption framework introduced by the McCarran-Ferguson appears to be, prima 
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McCarran-Ferguson Act does not limit the exemption to specific types of agreements: any activity 
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Nevertheless, the U.S. insurance regulation ended up exempting, just as Regulation  358/2003, 
insurers activities relating to the joint calculations of tariff premiums, standard policy conditions for 
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4.6 In defence of the idea of free competition 
 
Repealing the block exemption could have beneficial effects also in Europe, 
especially in light of the simultaneous enactment of possible alternative regulatory 
frameworks. In particular, the idea of the introduction of ‘tailor made’ or 
‘individualised’ insurance policies might represent a valid solution for some forms of 
insurance (e.g. especially liability or fault based insurance) in terms of consumer 
welfare, competition, and the economics of moral hazard.  
As previously established, the introduction of ‘tailor made’ insurance policies 
in conjunction with the advent of effective competition in the insurance industry  
would arguably act as a deterrent facing the so called ‘moral hazard’ problem in an 
efficient way. The creation of an effective linkage between the behaviour of the 
insured and the insurance policies would mean that competition law could be used as 
a tool for the implementation of complementing liability rules to be used in terms of 
deterrent function.
287
 
A fully competitive insurance market accompanied by the introduction of 
insurance policies calculated on the basis of individual data might also arguably 
result in a greater variety of policies considered indispensable in order to  guarantee 
the insurability of risks, and could also allow the possibility to limit risk pools, 
otherwise necessary in order to avoid the risks of moral hazard and adverse 
selection.
288
  
                                                                                                                                          
The only main fundamental difference between the U.S. and European insurance regulatory 
frameworks is that the McCarran-Ferguson Act introduced a peculiar concurrent system of insurance 
regulation at Federal and State level, whereas the EU block exemption applies to all Member States.  
As outlined above,  the USA and EU block exemption regulations are very similar, identical in terms 
of aims and objectives. 
287
 See M. Faure, “Insurance and competition law: balancing the conflicts”, above, p. 23. 
288
 See M. Faure, “Insurance and competition law: balancing the conflicts”, above, p. 23. On this 
point see also G. Priest, “The current insurance crisis and modern tort law”, Yale Law Journal, 1987, 
pp. 1521-1590.  
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 Finally, repealing the current block exemption and introducing a system of 
effective competition among insurers may arguably result in a remarkable 
improvement in terms of efficiency and correct functioning of the entire insurance 
industry.
289
 The current scenario is in fact characterised by the possibility of insurers 
to indulge in anticompetitive behaviours relying upon the shield offered by the block 
exemption. It is not a secret that rate service organisations and information sharing 
allow insurers to engage in price fixing practices, and to consequently limit the 
number of competitors within the market.  
Furthermore, the existence of shared data renders superfluous for companies 
to monitor their own costs, and this, as economic doctrine correctly pointed out 
“leads to inefficiencies that would not otherwise exist.”290  
In spite of the above considerations militating for a scenario seeing insurers 
fully exposed to anti-trust law, advocating a complete repeal without ancillary 
measures may not be an optimal solution. This is due to the situation of legal 
uncertainty that would characterise such a scenario, and, from this point of view, the 
claim of insurers that all this would translate into high legal costs deserves 
consideration.  
A valid suggestion might be a repeal accompanied by the enactment of  safe 
harbours protecting  possible pro-competitive behaviours, such as the common 
coverage of certain types of risks (e.g. nuclear, environmental, aviation and 
terrorism), and the introduction of the system of individualised insurance policies 
theorised above another concern relating to a possible scenario without exemption is 
                                                 
289
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relating to the determination of the insurer activities which would withstand the 
antitrust laws. In absence of a block exemption, there would be uncertainty in 
relation to the application of the antitrust rules by the courts. That is the reason why 
the United States Government Accountability Office suggests the introduction of 
“safe harbours” for certain insurance activities such as the collection of historical 
data
291
. 
In any event, just like what will happen with the repeal of the Block Exemption 
related to standard policy conditions and safety equipment, a further repeal of the 
remaining pillars of the Block Exemption would surely be accompanied by specific 
guidelines.  
For the time being, the theoretical full application of Art. 101 to the insurance 
industry will now be considered in light of the recent EU Commission’s Guidelines 
on horizontal cooperation agreements
292
. 
In absence of a block exemption, any exchange of information between 
insurance undertakings would be capable of infringing Art.101 and should be 
carefully weighed beforehand in order to avoid severe sanctions.  According to the 
Commission’s Guidelines, the exchange of market information may lead to 
restrictions of competition in particular in situations where it is liable to enable 
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undertakings to be aware of market strategies of their competitors
293
. When it comes 
to the insurance industry, the exchange of relevant statistical data between insurers 
can indeed qualify as an exchange of market strategies information, as joint statistical 
data are used in order to determine insurance premiums, which can be defined as the 
quintessential market strategy tool for insurers. 
Nevertheless, the Guidelines also acknowledge that information exchange is 
common feature of many competitive markets and may generate various types of 
efficiency gains and help to solve problems of information asymmetries
294
. 
Moreover, the Commission also sees information exchanges as beneficial for 
consumers in case they reduce end users’ search costs and improve their choice295. 
In absence of a block exemption, exchange of information between insurers 
would need to be self assessed vis-a-vis the application of Art. 101. The starting 
point is that any information exchange  can only be addressed under Article 101 if it 
establishes or is part of an agreement, a concerted practice or a decision by an 
association of undertakings.  
Even in absence of an official agreement between insurers, the exchange of 
information may still be caught by Art. 101 if it amounts to a concerted practice. The 
Guidelines on horizontal cooperation point out that  in line with the case-law of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, the concept of a concerted practice refers to 
a form of coordination between undertakings by which, without it having reached the 
stage where an agreement properly so-called has been concluded, practical 
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 See the Commission’s  Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
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cooperation between them is knowingly substituted for the risks of competition
296
. 
The concept of concerted practice is a broad concept which includes even a 
hypothetical scenario where only one insurance undertaking discloses statistical 
information to its competitor(s)
297
.  
The next step of analysis for the assessment of the exchange of information 
between insurers is the identification of the nature of the exchange. As established 
above, not all the exchange of information practices are considered harmful by the 
Guidelines which, in particular, look favourably upon the exchange of historic data. 
According to the Guidelines, the exchange of historic data is unlikely to lead to a 
collusive outcome as it is unlikely to be indicative of the competitors’ future conduct 
or to provide a common understanding on the market
298
. 
When it comes to the insurance sector, the main question is whether joint 
statistics could qualify as historical data. On an abstract level, the answer to this 
question is affirmative; joint statistic data on the frequency of claims indeed has the 
character of historical information. Nevertheless, it is opinion of this author that the 
concept of historical data needs to be assessed in relation to the nature of a specific 
market. In a market like the insurance industry, the exchange of historic data 
regarding frequency of claims and other relevant statistics, despite the declarations of 
principle of the Commission Guidelines can have an impact on future behaviours of 
insurers and provide an understanding of the market. The reason for this is that, let us 
no forget, the exchange of historical data in the insurance industry lead to the 
                                                 
296
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determination of insurance premiums having severe market implications in terms of 
the conduct of insurance undertakings.  
Where would all this leave insurers in case of a complete repeal of the current 
block exemption? The only possible way for insurers to circumvent the application 
of Art. 101 would be to prove that the information exchange may lead to efficiency 
gains within the meaning of Art. 101(3). According to the Guidelines, information 
about competitors’ costs can enable companies to become more efficient if they 
benchmark their performance against the best practices in the industry and design 
internal incentive schemes accordingly
299
. Most importantly, the Guidelines 
explicitly refer to exchange of consumer data between companies in markets with 
asymmetric information about consumers (such as the financial services market)
300
. 
The Commission points out that within the financial services market, keeping track 
of the past behaviour of customers in terms of accidents or credit defaults provides 
an incentive for consumers to limit their risk exposure
301
. Moreover, according to the 
Guidelines, information about consumers’ past behaviour also makes it possible to 
detect which consumers carry a lower risk and should benefit from lower prices. In 
this context, information exchange can also reduce consumer lock-in, thereby 
inducing stronger competition, since the information is generally specific to a 
relationship and consumers would otherwise lose the benefit from that information 
when switching to another company
302
.  
The Guidelines appear therefore to offer a possibility for individual 
exemption under Art. 103. Nevertheless, it needs to be emphasised that restrictions 
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that go beyond what is necessary to achieve the efficiency gains generated by an 
information exchange do not fulfil the conditions of Article 101(3)
303
. In order to 
fulfil the condition of indispensability, insurers will need to prove that the data's 
subject matter, aggregation, age, confidentiality and frequency, as well as coverage, 
of the exchange are of the kind that carries the lowest risks indispensable for creating 
the claimed efficiency gains
304
.  
In case of a complete repeal of the insurance block exemption, this concept of 
indispensability of the exchange of information will assume a completely different 
role in view of the adoption or not of possible ancillary measures. If the repeal of the 
current regime is not to be accompanied by the introduction of alternative means of 
information sources for insurers about insureds (such as the introduction of consumer 
‘passports’ containing individualised historic statistical data theorised above), then 
the Guidelines will represent an interesting platform for obtaining individual 
exemption of information exchange agreements. 
Conversely, if the repeal of the current block exemption regulatory 
framework will be accompanied by the enactment of a ‘tailor made insurance 
system’, the element of the indispensability of the exchange of information will be an 
arduous burden of proof for insurers to overcome. 
In any case, it deserves to be pointed out that according to the Guidelines, 
efficiency gains attained by indispensable restrictions must be passed on to 
consumers to an extent that outweighs the restrictive effects on competition caused 
by an information exchange
305
. This means that insurers will ultimately be subject to 
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the burden of proof that the exchange of information has a beneficial impact of end 
users.  
Interestingly,  the Guidelines indicate that the lower the market power of the 
parties involved in the information exchange, the more likely it is that the efficiency 
gains would be passed on to consumers to an extent that outweighs the restrictive 
effects on competition
306
. This means that for small insurers (and new market 
entrants) the burden of proof would be considerably lower compared to larger or well 
established market players. 
 
Conclusions  
 
The current framework of insurance regulation in Europe is on the verge of 
significant changes: as from March 2010, the drawing up of standard policy 
conditions for direct insurance and common rules for approving security devices will 
no longer be part of EU block exemption regulatory framework. 
In the light of these significant changes, the time seems ripe enough for re-
considering the application and scope of the entire European insurance regulation. 
We have seen that the impact of the block exemption on the internal market 
translated into an EU insurance market characterised by a high degree of 
consolidation at cross-border level but not accompanied by an enhancement of cross-
border provision of insurance services. As a result, competition among insurance 
undertakings appears to be restrained and insurance policies not well diversified.  
Repealing the current block exemption system could thus seem, prima facie a 
natural way forward. In absence of a block exemption for the joint calculation and 
studies of risks, the enforcement of an ‘insurance tailor made system’ might arguably 
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lead to a diversification of prices and of an enhancement of competition beneficial 
for both insurers and insured. Furthermore, the diversification of policies would 
reflect the behaviour of the insured, helping to reach an optimal control of moral 
hazard risks narrowing the need for risk pools.  
Valid alternatives seem to exist also in order to regulate the areas of co-
insurance and re-insurance: the current EU block exemption generally allows 
insurers to cooperate in order to insure or reinsure any risks; from this perspective, a 
blanket exemption in relation to all classes of risk may not be the best possible 
solution. A valid solution might be to allow pooling arrangements for joint insurance 
and re-insurance only in relation to catastrophic, ultra-hazardous or uneven risks (e.g. 
nuclear, environmental, aviation risks and terrorism). In other words, the idea would 
be to confine the revised block exemption to risks which otherwise would remain 
uncovered due to the impossibility for single insurers to diversify them internally.  
These considerations do not appear to represent a quantum leap, as  the future 
of the current block exemption regulation of the insurance industry is more than ever 
under heavy shadows of doubts.  
The EU regulators have already decided to take steps towards a considerable 
reduction of the scope of the current insurance antitrust immunity. In light of these 
imminent changes, a future scenario in which the insurance industry will be subject 
to effective competition does not seem to be too remote. The first steps of a stairway 
to competition heaven? Possible, even probable, although the concrete consequences 
remain to be seen and heaven could twirl into hell. 
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PART II –ART.101 AND THE BANKING SECTOR 
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5 The Application of EU Competition rules to the 
banking Industry: General Issues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the application of Art. 101 
TFEU to the banking sector. The starting point will be the identification of the 
controversial issues relating to the impact of competition law on the banking 
industry.  
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The analysis will then focus on early case law seeking to explain how the 
application of EU antitrust law to the banking sector has developed since the outset 
of the Community till nowadays, with the intent to create a platform for the 
subsequent analysis of the current situation and recent developments.   
 
5.2 The application of EU Competition rules to the banking Sector: general 
issues  
 
Exactly in the same way as the insurance industry, at the outset of the Community 
also banks and credit undertakings denied the applicability of EU competition law to 
the banking sector.  
We have to wait for the case Zuchner v Bayerische Vereinsbank AG
307
, in 
order to have confirmation of the fact that the EU competition framework fully 
applies to banks and credit institutions. The subject matter at issue in Zuchner was a 
money transfer taking place between Germany and Italy.  The holder of a bank 
account in Germany, Mr. Zuchner, transferred some money to a payee in Italy and  
was charged by its bank (the Vereinsbank) a cross-border money transfer fee, which 
appeared to be in contrast with the nominal fee charged for national transactions. Mr 
Zuchner took his bank before a German court contesting the existence of a collusive 
practice among German banks having as its object the charging of uniform cross-
border transfer fees in contrast with Art. 85 of the EC Treaty (now Art. 101 TFEU). 
The German court initiated a preliminary rulings procedure under Art. 234 EC
308
,  
seeking the advice of the ECJ in relation to the compatibility of the cross-border 
money transfer fees with the EU competition rules. Preliminarily, the Vereinsbank 
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contested this claim, arguing that EU Competition provisions did not apply to 
banking undertakings. It was maintained that by reason of the special nature of the 
services provided by banking undertakings, banking undertakings should have been 
considered as undertakings “entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest 
within the meaning of Article 90 (2) (Now Article 86) and thus not subject, pursuant to that provision, 
to the EC competition rules.”309 
Contrary to this claim, the ECJ held that the relevant provisions of the Treaty 
did not have the effect of exempting banks from EU the Competition provisions
310
. 
In dismissing the Vereinsbank’s claim, the ECJ, therefore,  held for the very first 
time that the EU antitrust framework fully applies to the banking sector.  
 
5.3 The regulatory framework for the Banking Sector 
 
Despite the declarations of  principle of the ECJ in Zuchner , the application of EU 
competition law to the banking industry has in the past been thwarted by severe 
regulatory restrictions implemented nationally across Europe.
311
 These restrictions 
served a number of social and economic purposes, e.g. the specific allocation of 
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finances to selected industries in the post-second world war period,
312
and  restraints 
on market access and competition were justified by way of concerns related to the 
financial stability.
313
 
Starting from the mid-70s, the European regulatory framework of the banking 
sector shifted towards a more market-oriented approach leading to a complete 
liberalisation of, inter alia, interest rate controls and of quantitative investment 
restrictions on financial bodies.
314
  
In particular, the process of harmonisation promoted at European level by the 
banking directives generated a significant liberalisation of cross-border access for 
foreign banks. The original plan of the Commission was to enact a regulatory 
framework aiming at promoting the free establishment and the provision of banking 
services across the internal market, and to establish a common set of rules for the 
supervision and the regulation of the financial institutions.
315
  
The first step of the harmonisation process of the banking sector was made 
through the adoption of  the First Banking Directive
316
 in 1977.  The Directive aimed 
at prohibiting any type of discriminatory restrictions on the freedom of establishment 
and the freedom to provide services of banks and other financial institutions. On the 
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basis of the platform established by the First Directive, a Second Banking 
Directive
317
 was enacted in 1989 with the aim to harmonise the national laws relating 
to the authorisation of financial institutions.  
Another significant step towards the harmonisation of banking services across 
the internal market was taken through the enactment of the Directive on cross-border 
transfers
318
. The aim of the  Directive on cross-border transfers was to facilitate and 
to lay minimum quality standards for cross-border payments across the internal 
market. In 2001, the Directive on cross-border transfers was complemented by the 
adoption of Regulation 2560/2001 on cross-border payments in Euro
319
.   
On the basis of this platform of harmonisation, the ultimate aim of the 
Commission was the creation of a ‘passport’ whereby a bank  authorised to operate 
within the territory of a Member state could establish branches all across the internal 
market without the need for any further authorisations.
320
  
The process of harmonisation in the banking sector recently culminated in the 
adoption of the Capital Requirements Directive.
321
 Together with Directive 
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2007/64/EC, the Capital Requirements Directive currently represent the regulatory 
point of reference of the banking sector. The Capital Requirements Directive was 
designed in order to create a more efficient and competitive payment market and in 
order to ensure the financial soundness of credit institutions. Its foremost aim was to 
bring benefits to consumers, who could ultimately be in the position to save on 
banking costs.
322
  
 
 
5.4 The nature of the banking sector and antitrust issues 
 
Part of economic doctrine appears  to rebut the idea of the application of antitrust 
rules to a heavily regulated and ‘special’ system such as the banking sector.323 From 
an economic perspective, the need for banking regulation stems out of 
“microeconomic concerns over the ability of bank creditors (depositors) to monitor 
the risks originating on the lending side and from micro and macroeconomic 
concerns over the stability of the banking system in the case of a bank crisis.”324 In 
addition to official forms of regulations (statutory laws and administrative 
provisions), the banking sector has been subject to the influence of governments 
always ready to interfere whenever a collapse of bank or specific mergers and 
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acquisitions gave rise to a widespread political pressure for intervention.
325
 Such 
official and informal forms of stringent control of the banking sector have been 
embraced as the epitome of the underlying idea of the banking industry falling 
outside the area of application of antitrust law. 
  In particular,   regulatory forms of intervention such as restrictions for new 
entries, pricing restrictions, and line-of business restrictions were traditionally 
considered as graphic examples of the incompatibility between the banking sector 
and antitrust law.
326
   
The current European regulatory framework implemented through a series of 
Directives had a severe impact on competition in the banking sector. Despite not 
leading to a substantive deregulation, the progressive process of harmonisation of the 
banking services across the internal market culminated in the adoption of instruments 
of prudential supervision defined by the economic doctrine more compatible and 
germane to a competitive system.
327
 
Nowadays, and more than ever, the application of antitrust law to the banking 
sector is then raising important competition issues in view of the process of 
harmonisation implemented at European level aiming at assessing the level of 
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competitiveness in the banking industry across the internal market, also in view of 
considerations related to the fact that the banking sector is subject to sector specific 
regulation 
. It is undeniable that sector specific regulation, e.g. financial supervision and 
barriers to entry can also have a severe impact on competition and on consolidation. 
If barriers to entry are set to high standards, the banking market may ultimately 
consist of a limited number of players. Conversely, in presence of low barriers to 
entry the threat of competition coming from new entrants can ignite waves of 
consolidation by way of mergers and acquisitions between established banking 
undertakings anxious to seize market power.  
If we were to apply the aforementioned ‘global approach’ under EU law, the 
consolidated Commission practice of the concurrent application of sector-specific 
regulation and competition rules to conduct allegedly in breach of antitrust rules, 
would arguably lead to the full application of antitrust law to the banking sector. In 
other words, the subjection of financial institutions to a discrete regulatory regime, 
harmonised at the level of the EU, would not dispense them from complying with EU 
competition rules, and consolidation would invariably be seen as a negative 
indication of scarce competition. 
Contrary to the EU approach, which revolves around the full application of antitrust 
law a to the application of antitrust law to the banking sector, a country which has 
recently introduced a novel approach is the US where the recent Supreme Court 
decision in Credit Suisse
328
 appeared to have opened the way along the opposite 
route.  
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 Credit Suisse v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007).  
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In Credit Suisse, a group of investors initiated a legal action against US underwriters 
and institutional investors for manipulation of the after-market prices of stocks sold 
in initial public offerings (IPOs), in breach of federal and state antitrust rules. The 
case eventually reached the Supreme Court which held that the conduct occurring in 
highly regulated environments is implicitly immune from the application of antitrust 
laws if the application of those laws could potentially conflict with sector specific 
regulation.  
Here lies the novelty point of Credit Suisse: the message arising from the US 
Supreme Court’ judgment is very clear: industries subject to dynamic and 
sophisticated regulatory oversight such as the banking sector may be immune from 
the application of competition law. In the judgment, some points indeed clearly seem 
to echo the acknowledgment of the complexity of the application of antitrust rules to 
the banking sector
329
.  
From a teleological perspective, is it then at all possible to reconcile the 
complexities arising from the application of competition law in the banking sector? 
The US answer arising from Credit Swisse is clearly negative, with the rationale 
being that a court of law is not equipped with the economic expertise necessary to 
assess the scenario arising from the banking sector, a sector already subject to sector 
regulation and extremely difficult to decode. 
With respect, this line of reasoning is not very convincing. In the first place, 
the economic complexity of a sector should not justify, per se, the immunity from the 
application of antitrust law. Nevertheless, this observation perhaps strays out from 
the actual message arising form Credit Suisse, i.e., exemption from the application of 
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competition law in the banking sector would arise only insofar as there is a conflict 
with the sector specific regulation. 
 It is opinion of the author that even in this case a statement of antitrust 
immunity can hardly be justified, and shadows should be cast on the sector 
regulation in contrast with antitrust law. The reason for this is that one of the primary 
aims of sector specific regulation should be, in the author’s opinion, to foster 
competition, rather than impairing it. The fact that a conflict arises between the 
application of antitrust law and a sector regulatory framework should, per se, 
represent a motive for re-consideration of that specific regime.  
 The next level of analysis would be to re-consider Credit Suisse in light of the 
European scenario. Even providing that EU law was to embrace the US Supreme 
Courts’ approach in Credit Suisse, it is opinion of this author that the situation would 
be, nevertheless, radically different. The reason for this is that unlike in the US, 
where courts of law are tasked with the duty of enforcement of competition law, EU 
antitrust law relies on an administrative-based system revolving around national 
antitrust authorities and ultimately the EU Commission. Contrary to courts of law, 
competition authorities do possess the necessary expertise to assess complex 
economic issues such as those stemming from the banking sector, “limiting the risk 
of erroneous or over-intrusive decisions through the parallel mis-application of 
sector-specific regulation and competition rules”330. 
In light of these considerations, it is opinion of this author that the US 
Supreme Court’s judgment in Credit Suisse should not reverberate across the 
Atlantic and cast doubts re the full application of Art. 101 to the banking sector. 
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There are two main areas of application of Art. 101 of the Treaty when it 
comes to the banking sector:  price competition issues and non-price competition 
behaviours.  
Price competition issues are related to any agreements between bank 
undertakings, decisions by banking associations and concerted practices which may 
affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market. In 
particular, price competition issues may arise from any kind of price agreements, 
recommended terms and conditions, with specific reference to payment systems, 
multilateral interchange fees and the so called  ‘no-discrimination rules’. 
 Non-price competition issues are, on the contrary, related to operational 
agreements between bank undertakings, which, as it will be readily appreciated, 
although do not have direct repercussions on  the price charged to the end users of 
the banking services raise serious competition concerns. For instance, agreements 
which restrict the access to payment systems by new banks do ignite serious antitrust 
interrogatives and deserve consideration.  
The analysis will now focus on price competition issues. Non price 
competition matters will be considered in the following.  
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6 Price Competition Issues in the Banking Sector 
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6.1 Price competition issues in the banking industry: the early stage 
 
Price agreements are a classic paradigm of possible anticompetitive patterns in the 
banking industry, as  any system implemented by banks whereby common clients 
fees are charged is, per se, an infringement of Art. 101 TFEU.  
  136 
It has been correctly noted, however, that it may be difficult in practice for a 
complainant to provide compelling  evidence of such price fixing practices
331
. The 
Zuchner case epitomises the compelling difficulties which may arise in terms of 
providing evidence of anticompetitive behaviours by banks. The ECJ here was asked 
to address the issues relating to the compatibility between the EU competition rules 
and the practice of German Banks to charge uniform cross-border transfer fees. In 
assessing this claim, the ECJ line of reasoning was confined to the analysis of a 
possible concerted practice within the meaning of Art. 101 of the Treaty
332
.  
Art. 101 of the Treaty prohibits, inter alia,  any concerted practice capable of 
affecting trade between Member States and having as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common market
333
. A 
concerted practice has been defined by the ECJ as a “form of coordination between 
undertakings which, without having reached the stage where an agreement properly so called has been 
concluded, knowingly substitutes practical cooperation between them for the risks of competition.”334  
According to the ECJ, the criteria of coordination and cooperation necessary 
for the existence of a concerted practice in no way require “the working out of an actual 
‘plan’, but must be understood in the light of the concept inherent in the provisions of the Treaty 
relating to competition, according to which each trader must determine independently the policy 
which he intends to adopt on the Common market and the conditions which he intends to offer to his 
customers”.335 Although this requirement of independence does not deprive traders of 
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the right “to adapt themselves intelligently to the existing or anticipated conducts of their 
competitors”336, it does, nevertheless, strictly preclude any direct or indirect contract 
between such traders, the object or effect of which is to create conditions of  
competition which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the market in 
question, “regard being had to the nature of the products or services offered, the size and number of 
the undertakings and the volume of the said market.” 337 
The German bank in question (Vereinsbank) did not deny the existence of a 
uniform service charge for the transfers of specific amounts of money from one 
Member State to another
338
. Nevertheless, an attempt was made to emphasise that 
this similarity of conduct was not the result of an agreement or concerted practice 
between banks, the object or the effect of which was to produce results forbidden by 
Art. 101. It was, on the contrary, claimed that the justification for the imposition of 
communal charges had to be found in the costs incurred by banks in handling funds 
transfers.  
According to the ECJ, the fact that the charges in question were justified on 
the basis of the costs involved in all transfers abroad normally by the German banks 
on behalf of their clients, did not exclude “the possibility that parallel conduct in that sphere 
may, regardless to the motive, result in coordination between banks which amounts to a concerted 
practice within the meaning of article 101 of the Treaty.”339  
Considering that the practice covered international transactions, the scenario 
could have been considered capable of affecting trade between Member States within 
the meaning of Art. 101 only if the object or effect of the system was to “affect 
significantly the conditions of competition in the market in monetary transfers by banks from one 
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Member State to another.”340 That would have been the case, if “a concerted practice enabled 
the banks participating in it to congeal conditions in their present state thus depriving their customers 
of any genuine opportunity to take advantage of services on more favourable terms which would be 
offered to them under normal conditions of competition”. 341 
It has been noted that the above statements are rather vague, failing in 
practice to address the Vereinsbank’s cost-justification argument.342 Indeed, in order 
to be significant, the argument in support of the Vereinsbank’s position should have 
implied that all the German banks faced identical costs in handling cross-border 
transfers343.    
Considering the lack of objective justifications for identical costs, it has been 
claimed that Vereinsbank’s cost-justification argument must have further implied 
that “all the German banks had agreed to pay foreign (creditor) banks a uniform 
interchange fee as compensation for any costs borne by the latter, and that without 
any need for concentration, they passed on this fee to their clients.”344 The essence of 
the argument must therefore have been based on the existence of a sort of “uniform 
interchange fee which produced a knock-on effect on the client fees and caused them 
to be identical”.345 
If such assumptions are correct, the antitrust issues in Zuchner in reality 
translated into the legality of a multilateral interchange fee, rather than to the analysis 
of a uniform client fee. It has been correctly pointed out, however, that the ECJ does 
not refer in any way to the  idea of a multilateral interchange fee
346
 when in its 
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judgments it mentions “a concerted practice enabling the banks participating in it to congeal 
conditions in their present state”347.   
The analysis of the phenomenon of multilateral interchange fees and their 
repercussions on competition will be carried out in the next chapter. For now, the 
attention will remain on the Zuchner case, which provides further interesting points 
worthy of analysis.  
 
6.2 The Zuchner case and the judicial assessment of price agreements 
 
Having established the theoretical basis  for the application of Art. 101 in terms of 
concerted practices to the banking sector, in Zuchner the ECJ left to national courts 
the  task of the concrete assessment of the situation, providing, nevertheless, 
interesting guidelines. In order to establish whether a concerted practice among 
banks charging communal fees subsists, the ECJ in Zuchner suggests to consider 
specific aspects of the concrete scenario. Firstly, the Court invites national judicial 
bodies to consider possible links between bank undertakings, i.e., if they are 
exchanging  information on the subject of, inter alia, “the rate of the charges actually 
imposed for comparable transfers which have been carried out or are planned for the future and 
whether, regard being had to the conditions of the market in question, the rate of charge uniformly 
imposed is no different from that which would have resulted from the free play of competition.”348 
The first key element for the assessment of a concerted practice in the 
banking industry is, thus, the existence of any sort links in terms of contracts or 
information exchange between banking undertakings. According to the ECJ, 
consideration must be also given to “the number and importance in the market in monetary 
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transactions between Member States of the banks participating in such practice, and the volume of 
transfers on which the charge in question is imposed as compared with the total volume of transfers on 
which the charge in question is imposed as compared with the total volume of transfers made by the 
banks from one member country to another.”349  
The additional elements of the number and the entity of the Community 
transactions undertaken by the banks allegedly participating in a concerted practice 
must also be taken into account.  
Last, but not least, it isbe possible to claim the application of Article 101 of 
the Treaty only insofar as the contested concerted practice relating to money transfer 
fees is capable of “significantly affecting conditions of competition in the market for the services 
connected with such transfers”.350 
In sum, in order to claim the existence of a concerted practice between banks  
in relation to uniform transfer fees it is necessary under Zuchner to prove in first 
place that there is a form of coordination between undertakings. Evidence of 
cooperation between banks (e.g. exchange of information) is therefore the first 
element which must be provided. 
Secondly, it is necessary to prove that the banks involved are depriving their 
customers of any genuine opportunity to take advantage of services on more 
favourable terms which would be offered to them under normal conditions of 
competition. 
Additional essential elements to be taken into account are the number and the 
entity of the Community transactions undertaken by the banks involved in the 
practice (the fulfilment of this requirement would also prove the element of intra-
Community involvement necessary in order to claim the application of Art. 101 
TFEU).  
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Finally, the contested concerted practice must be deemed to be capable of 
significantly affecting conditions of competition in the market for the services 
connected with such transfers. 
 
6.2.1 The assessment of concerted practices: a realistic approach? 
 
In light of the above considerations, it appears to be very difficult (if not prohibitive), 
in practice, to provide convincing evidence of concerted practices in the banking 
sector. In the first place, it is very difficult to provide evidence of information 
sharing or cooperative links between banks which, of course, tend to happen secretly 
and very discreetly.  
The remaining elements are not easy to prove either. Proving that banks are 
depriving their customers of any genuine opportunity to take advantage of services 
on more favourable terms which would be offered to them under normal conditions 
of competition can indeed become an extremely intricate task. It would be necessary 
to carry out a very complex economic analysis of the market, and to theorise possible 
different scenarios relating to an ideal market characterised by a level competitive 
playing field. 
It may be slightly less difficult, nevertheless by no means less demanding, to 
prove the remaining elements, i.e., to provide the number and the entity of the 
Community transactions undertaken by the banks involved in the practice, and to 
assess the possible impact of the practice on the market for the services connected 
with such transfers. 
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Overall, the Zuchner case seems to provide two conflicting messages: the 
statement of full application of EU competition rules to the banking sector; and the 
difficulty to provide evidence of accountable anti-competitive behaviours by banks. 
 
6.3 The post-Zuchner scenario 
 
After the ECJ judgment in Zuchner, payment systems were object of scrutiny of the 
first Commission decision related to the banking sector. In Uniform Eurocheques
351
, 
antitrust issues arose in relation to  the creation of the international Eurocheque 
system whereby a percentage of the amount of any cheque was paid to the payee 
bank from the Eurocheque issue bank. 
The banking undertakings  part  of the Eurocheque System claimed that  the 
system fell outside the scope of application of competition law due to the social and 
economic nature of the services provided. This claim was resoundingly  rejected by 
the ECJ, which considered the Eurocheques System the outcome  of a private 
initiative of financial institutions not entrusted in any way with the operation of a 
service of general economic interest adopted by the public authorities.
352
 
Moreover, the Commission emphasised that even in the event that the 
Eurocheque system had been entrusted by an international authority or a group of 
national public authorities with the provision of an international means of payment, 
the application of the Community’s competition rules to credit institutions could not 
in any way “obstruct fulfilment of that hypothetical special assignment.”353  
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The analysis focused on the possible application of Article 85 (now Art.101) 
to the Eurocheque system. According to the Commission, any agreement or decision 
aiming to fix the price and the conditions relating to the presentation of a cheque in a 
foreign country from the home country of the institution which issued the cheque is 
by its nature capable of affecting trade between Member States
354
.  
The agreements and decisions within the Eurocheque systems, which have as 
their object the fixing of the price of a service were moreover considered as 
restrictive practices explicitly falling within the general prohibition indicated in 
Article 85 (now Art, 101 (1).  
In particular, these practices were deemed to have as their effect “the 
prevention of the competition between the banks in any country and in specific in 
any Member State in the enchasing of uniform eurocheques drawn on banks in other 
countries.”355 Competition was also considered to be effectively prevented between 
issuing banks in the same Member State as to the maximum guaranteed amount.
356
 
After concluding that the price agreement arising from the Eurocheque 
System was capable of appreciably affecting competition on the currency exchange 
market between Member States, the Commission considered the possible eligibility 
of the  Eurocheque System for an exemption under Article Article 85 (3)  (now Art, 
101 (3).  The criteria for an exemption under Art. 101 were deemed to be fully met. 
In the first place, the  Eurocheque System was considered as a remarkable 
contribution to the  improvement payment facilities within the Common market.
357
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Furthermore, the users of the Eurocheque system were deemed to have obtained a 
fair share of the resulting benefit
358
, and  it was also noted that the restrictions 
imposed on the issuing and accepting credit institutions were indispensable  in order 
to guarantee the correct functioning of the Eurocheque system
359
.  
Competition was not considered completely impaired also by virtue of the 
fact that the Eurocheque agreements did not govern the relations between the drawee 
banks and their customers,
360
 and that the agreements and decisions concerned “did 
not afford the credit institutions which issue uniform eurocheques the possibility of 
eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of international means of 
payment”.361  
On the basis of the existence of this form inter-system competition, the 
Commission decided to grant an exemption under Art. 85 (3) (now Art.101(3). 
It has been correctly noted that in Eurocheque the Commission did not 
clearly drawn a dividing line between cash distribution service characterising the 
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Eurocheque system (comprising three entities: two banks and the client signing a 
Eurocheque) and mere payment service (which involves four entities: the two banks, 
the client signing a Eurocheque, and the trader accepting a Eurcheque)
 362
. The latter 
ignites a cluster of more complex anti-trust issues and will be the subject of analysis 
in the following Chapter. 
After Eurocheque, the Commission received a series of notifications of bank 
agreements providing uniform client fees.  In Association des Banques Belges
363
 and 
in Associazione Bancaria Italiana
364
, the Belgian and Italian banks involved in a 
form of price fixing agreements decided not to enact them after receiving statements 
of objection from the Commission
365
. The same happened in Dutch Banks
366
.  
More recently, banking agreements fixing uniform tariffs lead to two 
Commission decisions in German Banks,
367
 and Lombard Club.
368
In German Banks, 
five German banks established the imposition of common charges in relation to 
specific currency-exchange transactions during the transitional period prior to the 
introduction of the euro. The introduction of a single currency meant the end of the 
possibility for banks to charge for the exchange of euro-zone currencies. In order to 
compensate for this predicted loss of revenue, the German banks in question 
concluded an agreement aiming at charging common tariffs for the exchange of euro-
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zone banknotes during the transition period coming prior the introduction of a single 
European currency
369
.  
 The Commission decision in German Banks was eventually annulled by the 
Court of First Instance due to the failure of the Commission to provide enough 
evidence that an agreement on the effective level of the fees was put in place by the 
banks concerned
370
. The decision of the Court of First Instance appears to prove that 
it is sometimes extremely difficult to provide unequivocal evidence of price fixing 
agreements in the banking sector.  
 In Lombard Club, eight Austrian banks were fined by the Commission due to 
the establishment of a “far reaching and high institutionalised cartel covering every 
area of banking activity.”371The cartel was governed by a series of committees and 
sub-committees whose meetings were recorded in documents seized by the 
Commission. The Lombard Club case epitomises the difficulties arising from the 
application of Art. 101 to banking systems of member States traditionally based on 
intensive forms of co-operation between banking undertakings and not accustomed 
to  a bare exposition to anti-trust  rules. Before the accession to the EU, the Austrian 
system did not provide for competition laws aiming at prohibiting cartel agreements, 
and far from being uncommon,  banking agreements were designed and intended as 
‘useful means of avoiding uncontrolled price competition.’372 The submissions of the 
Austrian banks to the Commission echoed the political and social routes of cartel 
agreements in the Austrian banking sector and the atavistic fear of the detrimental 
                                                 
369
 Far from being just confined to the German territory, similar agreements were put in place by 
banking undertakings also in Belgium, Austria, Portugal, Ireland and the Netherlands, and eventually 
dropped after the issuing of several statements of objections by the Commission (see press releases 
IP/00/704, IP/00/784, IP/00/908, and IP/00/1358). 
370
 See joined cases T-44/02 OP, T-54/02 OP, T-56/02 OP, T-60/02 OP and T-61/02 OP, Dresdner 
Bank and Others v Commission of the European Communities, [2006] ECR II 357. 
371
 See press release IP/02/844 of 11/06/2004. 
372
 See Commission Decision in  Austrian banks ‘Lombard Club’, above, at paragraph 367. 
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consequences arising from a ‘too rapid, and in particular, a poorly prepared transition 
to free competition’373.  
 
 
6.4 Conclusion  
 
This Chapter has provided a necessary background to the foremost issues relating to 
the application of the EU Competition rules to the banking sector. We have seen that, 
exactly as with the insurance industry, banking undertakings initially claimed the 
impossibility of the application of the EU antitrust rules to the banking industry.  
Contrary to this claim, since the very first decisions on the impact of 
competition law on the banking industry the Commission unanimously with the ECJ 
emphasised that EU competition law finds full application to banking undertakings, 
although it has been established that the enforcement of anti-trust rules in this area 
posits some major complexities. 
As it will be readily appreciated, this scenario gave (and still gives) rise to 
extremely controversial questions especially  in relation to the application of antitrust 
law to card payment networks, the subject of scrutiny in the next chapter. 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
373
 Ibid., at paragraph 367. 
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7 Payment Card Systems and competition concerns:  
Multilateral Interchange Fees and No-
discrimination rules
374
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1 Background375 
 
                                                 
374
 This Chapter is structured on the basis of extracts  and on the author’s considerations expressed in  
Lista A. (2008) “Card Payment Systems and Competition Concerns: Multilateral Interchange Fees and 
No-Discrimination Rules, a Necessary Evil?”, Journal of Business Law, Issue 7, September 2008, 
686-719. 
375
 This Chapter is structured on the basis of extracts of the author’s considerations expressed in  Lista 
A. (2008) “Card Payment Systems and Competition Concerns: Multilateral Interchange Fees and No-
Discrimination Rules, a Necessary Evil?”, Journal of Business Law, Issue 7, September 2008, 686-
719. 
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Money transmission represents the fulcrum of the entire modern economy. Everyday 
money flows uninterruptedly among individuals, corporations, governments in order 
to ensure payment transactions at any possible level.  The overall procedure by virtue 
of which funds are transferred form one individual to another is known as payment 
system
376
. 
During the last century we have assisted at drastic changes in terms of money 
transmission mechanisms. At the beginning of the 20
th
 century almost all money 
transactions were operated mainly in cash or trough cheques. Since Diners Club 
introduced the payment cards in 1950, the payment card systems have become one of 
the main transactions means characterising the modern market economy
377
.  
Generally, there are two main types of payment cards distinguished on the 
basis of the nature of the card issuing entity:  general purpose cards or bank cards, 
and proprietary or private label cards
378
. General purpose cards are subsidised by 
memberships associations and accepted by numerous and unrelated merchants
379
, 
whereas proprietary cards are generally accepted by a single retailer
380
.   
                                                 
376
 For a definition of payment systems see, inter alia, the “Encyclopedia of Banking Law”, London 
Butterworth, 2002, pp 1-364. See also D. Cruickshank,  “Competition in UK Banking: A Report to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer”, March 2000, Chapter 2, p. 53. The document is available at: 
http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/documents/financial_services/banking/bankreview/fin_bank_reviewfi 
nal.cfm.  
Finally, see also Section 7 of the Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998 of Australia available at: 
http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/2/3141/0/PA000110.htm 
377
 According to a research conducted but the Deutsche Bank, some 59.7 billion cashless payments 
were executed in the EU-25 in 2003. These transactions include payments by debit or credit card, 
credit transfers, direct debits, cheques and card-based e-money. Even though cheque payments 
accounted for 7.4 billion transactions or 12.5% of the total, they were not in the focus of the New 
Legal Framework. Card payments and credit transfers lead the statistics by volume, as each are used 
for about 30% of total cashless payments. See the Deutsche Bank Research “EU Monitor: Financial 
Market Special”, No. 27, 29 August2005, p. 5. The Report is available at http://www.dbresearch.com/ 
.pdf.   
378
 See the Controller of the Currency, Administrator of National Bank, “Credit card Lending-
Comptroller Handbook”, 1998, p. 8. Available at: http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/credit.pdf.  
See also D.W. Carlton and A.S. Frankel, “The antitrust Economics of Credit Card Networks”, 
Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 63 (1995), at pp. 645-646. 
379
 See the Comptroller of the Currency, Administrator of National Bank, “Credit card Lending-
Comptroller Handbook”, above, at p. 8. The largest part of banks offering general purpose cards are 
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A payment card transaction comprises the participation of four main entities: 
a cardholder, the card issuing bank, a payee (a retailer), and the merchant acquirer 
(the merchant bank). When a card holder makes a transaction using the card, he 
obtains goods or services by a merchant (retailer) who, in return, receives money 
from the merchant bank. The merchant bank on its part, obtains fund from card 
issuing bank
381
.  
In substance, the card payment service is a service essentially offered to two 
parties, i.e., the cardholder and the merchant: they can be defined as the end users of 
a circle comprising also the card issuing bank and the merchant bank. Such four 
party payment systems are enacted by large networks (e.g. Visa or MasterCard) 
requiring a certain degree of inter-bank cooperation and money transfer
382
.  
These systems are based in first place on the contractual relationship between 
card holders and card issuers, i.e. the bank whose name is on the card. Basically, by 
charging cardholders for card services “issuing banks can recoup the costs of 
services provided (e.g. transaction processing and billing) and earn a profit 
margin.”383 On their parts, issuers generally charge several fees to cardholders (e.g. 
                                                                                                                                          
members of Visa or MasterCard, the two foremost credit card system networks. Visa and MasterCard 
enact worldwide payments trough their operative banks. Banks acquire the membership in the 
network, and in return they are able to offer bank cards product and services. General purpose cards 
can be sub-categorised in three main types: a)debit cards, through which it is possible to access 
directly to the money deposited in the cardholder’s account; b) charge cards, requiring the cardholder 
to pay the card issuer in full for the transactions operated in a fixed period of time, at the end of that 
period; and c) credit cards, allowing the cardholder to take out a fixed time credit with the card issuer. 
On this point see the Comptroller of the Currency, Administrator of National Bank, “Credit card 
Lending-Comptroller Handbook”, above, at p. 11. 
380
 Propriety cards are issued on the basis of an agreement between a bank and a merchant (e.g. a 
department store) and are accepted only by the merchant stipulating the agreement with a bank. On 
this point see the Comptroller of the Currency, Administrator of National Bank, “Credit card Lending-
Comptroller Handbook”, above, at p. 11. 
381
 For a detailed description see D. Cruickshank, “Competition in UK Banking: A Report to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer”, above, at pp 251-252. 
382
 See the Commission “Report on the retail banking sector Inquiry”, 31/01/2007, at p.97. The 
Report is available at;  http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-fmi/pdf/recent-news/EC-
Report-on-Retail-Banking.pdf. 
383
 See the Commission “Report on the retail banking sector Inquiry”, above, at p.97. 
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annual fees and transactions fees). Moreover, issuers are usually able to attract 
customers through payment cards, offering them other services such as loans or 
current accounts
384
.  
Overall, it has been noted that the payment card industry suffers from a 
“chicken and egg problem that needs to be solved”385. The essence of such problem 
lies in the fact that merchants are not inclined to accept payment cards unless a large 
number of consumers is willing to use them, and consumers on their part are not 
prepared to use payments cards if not accepted by merchants on a large scale
386
.  
This scenario triggers network effects by virtue of which the more people are 
using payment cards, the larger is the number of merchants allowing card 
payments
387
.  
 
7.2 Competition Issues  
 
The impact of network effects on competition is vast. Establishing a network of 
payment card system is a long and difficult process requiring the use of considerable 
financial resources
388
. Once a payment card network has been established, the 
creation of new networks is so difficult that it becomes almost prohibitive. New 
networks willing to enter into the market are not, as a matter of fact, in an enviable 
                                                 
384
 Ibid. 
385
 See D.S Edwards. “The antitrust Economics of  two sided Market “, AEI-Brookings Joint Centre 
for Regulatory Studies, Related Publication 02-13, September 2002, at p. 2. Available at: http://aei-
brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect-safely.php?fname=../pdffiles/phpMt.pdf(accessed on 20 July 
2011). 
386
 On this point see Edwards D.S. “Payment card business: Chickens and Eggs, and other 
Conundrums”, 2001, Financial Times Online, available at: 
http://www.ftmastering.com/mmo/mm03_2htm (accessed on 20 July 2011). 
387
 On this point see J. McAndrews, “Network Issues and Payment Systems”, Philadelphia Fed’s 
Business Review, 1997, November-December Issue. 
388
 The most difficult step in establishing a card payments network is to increase the number of 
customers willing to use payment cards.   
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position: they would need in first place to invite customers to use their networks 
rather than existing ones (a very difficult task considering the tendency of customers 
to prefer larger networks). The second obstacle to overcome is represented by the 
fact that merchants are already in possession of equipment belonging to the existing 
network
389
. 
Another remarkable impact of network effects on competition is related to the 
essential need for cooperation between the different parties involved in a payment 
card system. It is in fact vital that all four parties involved in the network 
(cardholder, merchant, card issuer bank and merchant bank) cooperate in order to 
process any payment transaction
390
.  
 Organisations like Visa and MasterCard have been particularly efficient in 
creating platforms by virtue of which their members could sign up customers and 
merchants in their business areas. All this ignited a sort of domino network effect 
ultimately leading to the creation of global brands
391
.  
Competition in the payment cards sector tends, thus, to be very extremely 
stern. Creating a new card payment network capable of competing with Visa or 
MasterCard appears to be a journey of titanic dimensions. Besides the obstacles 
created by the above mentioned network effect, competition in the payment cards 
sector takes place at two different levels interconnected with one another. In first 
place we have the so called ‘inter-system-network’ market, within which diverse 
                                                 
389
 On this point see D. Cruickshank, above, at p. 65.  
390
 In order for a payment card network to function, consumers must use payment cards, which must 
be accepted by merchants and by both the acquiring and issuing banks. On this point see S. 
Sienkiewicz, “Credit Cards and Payment Efficiency”, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia , August 
2001, at p. 6. Available at: 
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc/papers/2001/PaymentEfficiency_092001.pdf. (accessed on 20 
July 2011). 
391
 See S. Sienkiewicz, “Credit Cards and Payment Efficiency”, above, at p. 8.  
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payment systems networks (e.g. competition between different payment systems, 
namely cash payments, credit cards and cash cards) operate
392
.  
Secondly, competition takes place in the so called ‘intra-system’, where 
financial institutions (largely banks) compete with one another in order to issue cards 
to customers and acquire payments from merchants
393
. 
Network effects, competition taking place at different levels, thus, render this 
area particularly complex from an antitrust perspective.  
 
7.3 Antitrust assessment of Payment Card Systems 
 
Traditionally, the core idea of competition lies in the rivalry between firms and their 
possibility to compete with one another.  It has been noted above that  the sui generis 
structure of the payment card networks renders competition particularly difficult in 
this area.  
In addition to this, some authors pointed out that the nature itself of the 
payment card industry entails the need for cooperation as a “necessary and desirable 
instrument to achieve efficiencies”394. From this perspective, it has been further 
noted that the imposition of a competitive market structure is likely to have  
                                                 
392
 See the Commission’s “Guidelines on Market Investigation References”, September 2002, at p. 19. 
Available at: 
http://www.competitioncommission.org.uk/our_role/consultations/past/pdf/ebmarket.pdf. (accessed 
on 20 July 2011). 
393
 Ibid., at p 19.  
394
 See, inter alia,  D.W. Carlton, “The Economics of Cooperation and Competition in Electronics 
Services Network Industries”, p. 32. Available at: http://www.nextera.com/content/publications.htm 
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counterproductive effects
395
 as the “implication of network effects is that antitrust 
interventions may be futile”396.  
In economic terms, the raison d'être for this would be that in network 
industries (such as the payment card industry), the markets are characterised as a 
‘winner takes most’ kind of environment397. According to these theories, 
superimposing a different market structure (imposing, for instance, by law a certain 
degree of competition) would alter the natural equilibrium in these markets, 
becoming a futile and counterproductive exercise
398
.   
The question to be unravelled now is how EU competition law applies to 
payment card systems (the question on how competition law should apply to the 
payment card sector will be discussed in the following).  
Major payment card systems such as Visa or MasterCard  are structured as 
organisations comprising a high number of members coordinated with one another 
through a network of rules or bylaws granting a high level of interoperability (e.g. 
multilateral interchange fees and no-discrimination rules)
399
. Such rules or bylaws 
can indeed be regarded as agreements between undertakings or decisions of 
associations of undertakings within the meaning of Art. 101 of the Treaty.  
                                                 
395
 See Nicholas Economides, “Competition Policy in Network Industries: An Introduction”, NYU 
Centre for Law & Business, Working Paper Series CLB-03-021 at p. 15. Available at the following 
link: http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/emplibrary/03-021.pdf. (accessed on 20 July 2011). 
396
 Ibid., at p. 15. 
397
 Ibid., at p. 15 
398
 Ibid., at p. 15 
399
 See Teresa Rodríguez de las Heras Ballell, “Multilateral Agreements on Prices in Payments 
Systems: An Antitrust Approach”, in Jose Rivas (ed), World Competition, Kluwer Law International 
2002, Volume 25 Issue 2), pp. 223-237, at p. 224. 
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As a result, they can be caught by EU competition law as long as they are 
capable of affecting trade between Member States, or have as their object or effect 
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market
400
.  
Nevertheless, exemption can be granted in case  concerted practices, 
agreements between undertakings or decisions of associations of undertakings which 
contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting 
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the 
resulting benefit, and which do not: (a) impose on the undertakings concerned 
restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; b) 
afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a 
substantial part of the products in question
401
.  
The question of the application of the EU competition rules to the payment 
card systems mainly revolves around the nature of the rules or bylaws granting 
interoperability within a payment card network. What is the real impact of such intra-
network rules? Are they inherently intrinsic to the operation of card payment 
systems? Most importantly, do they allow consumers a fair share of their alleged 
resulting benefit, without imposing on the undertakings concerned restrictions which 
are not indispensable to the attainment of their objectives?  
                                                 
400
 See Article 101 TFEU. As noted above (See Chapter 2), Article 101 prohibits  those concerted 
practices, agreements between undertakings or decisions of associations of undertakings which:  
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;  
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;  
(c) share markets or sources of supply;  
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing 
them at a competitive disadvantage;  
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the 
subject of such contracts.  
401
 See Article 101 (3) TFEU. 
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These questions arise especially in relation to the so called ‘multilateral 
interchange fees’ and ‘no-discrimination rules’ analysed in the following.  
 
7.4 Multilateral Interchange Fees 
 
It has been already appreciated that a card payment transaction generally involves 
different sub-transactions; a) Card Issuer- Card Holder, b) Merchant- Card Holder, c) 
Acquirer-Merchant, and d) Card Issuer-Acquirer. A credit card transaction typically 
involves four parties: the consumer, the retailer, the retailer’s bank (merchant 
acquirer) and the consumer’s bank (the card issuer).  
It goes without saying that these transactions entail the payment of fees and 
of different types of charges. On processing any transaction, a fee is levied from the 
merchant acquirer to the card issuer, which is then passed on to the retailer, and 
ultimately the consumer. This fee is known as an interchange fee. It is set by the card 
issuers as a collective agreement between them and all the banks with whom they 
deal (hence the term multi-lateral interchange fee, hereafter ‘MIF’). 
The diagram in the next page illustrates this situation. 
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    Joe Cardholder      Merchant/retailer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Joe’s bank      Merchant’s bank 
  Card issuing bank     Acquiring bank 
            
 
 
 
1) The card issuing bank supplies Joe with a card.  
2) When Joe buys a cup of coffee from the retailer, the card issuing bank charges his 
account with £1 plus fees. The fees may be an annual fee as well as a fixed amount 
or percentage on the transaction. 
3) The card issuing bank pays the acquiring bank 98.5p, deducting a 1.5p interchange 
fee. 
4) The acquiring bank pays the merchant 98p, charging 0.5p.  
The “merchant’s discount” is £1 – 98p = 2%. 
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It is not open to banks to negotiate individual fees with the credit card 
companies. Nevertheless, not all payment card systems ignite the use of multilateral 
interchange fees.  
For instance, a card payment system in which all cardholders and merchants 
derive their card services from a unique financial organisation does not entail the 
existence of multilateral interchange fees
402
. Examples of such card payment systems 
are American Express or Diners Club. In particular, American Express established 
and developed a network system based on a direct relationship between the card 
issuer (American Express), cardholders and merchants
403
.  
This creates a so called ‘closed network’ within which the association deals 
directly with cardholders and merchants establishing the level of fees to be paid by 
these two groups
404
. In other words, American Express or Diners Club created a 
‘three-party system’ imposing their pricing decisions vis-à-vis cardholders and 
merchants. 
Such “direct” card systems are in open contrast with the interchange systems 
set up by Visa or MasterCard.  Visa or MasterCard created network systems whereby 
                                                 
402
 On this point see S. Weiner and J. Wright, “Interchange Fees in Various Countries: Developments 
and Determinants”, 2005, at p. 6. Available at the following link: 
http://www.kansascityfed.org/PUBLICAT/PSR/Proceedings/2005/Weiner-Wright.pdf. (accessed on 
20 July 2011). 
403
 Ibid. p.5.  For a detail analysis of the American Express and Diners Club card payment systems see 
also R. S. Pindyck, “Governance, Issuance Restrictions, and Competition in Payment Card 
Networks”, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 2007, at p. 5. Available at the following link: 
http://web.mit.edu/rpindyck/www/Papers/PaymentCardsRSPJune07WP.pdf. (accessed on 20 July 
2011). 
404
 For an economic analysis, see B. Klein; A.V.Lerner, K.M. Murphy, and L. Plache, “Competition 
in Two-Sided Markets: The Antitrust Economics of Payment Card Interchange” 2005-2006, 73 
Antitrust L.J., p. 571. See also S. Weiner and J. Wright, “Interchange Fees in Various Countries: 
Developments and Determinants”, above, at p. 6. At the core of a ‘closed network’ lies the 
determination of the cardholder’s fees versus merchant’s fees. For instance American Express stated 
in 2004 to have received 71% of its card related revenues from merchants without charging any fees 
to cardholders ( on this point see S. Weiner and J. Wright, “Interchange Fees in Various Countries: 
Developments and Determinants”, above, at p. 7). 
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their members (card-issuers and acquirers) supply card services to end users
405
. 
Under those systems, the founder associations do not deal directly with cardholders 
and merchants and are therefore prevented from determining the fees to be charged 
on these sides
406
.  Visa or MasterCard systems involve four parties a) Card Holders, 
b) Merchants c) Card Issuer Bank and d) Merchants giving rise to a so called ‘two 
sided market’ in which the two end-user groups are cardholders and merchants407.  
In such a scenario, multilateral interchange fees come into play as a means by 
virtue of which is possible to achieve a “desired balance of cardholder usage versus 
merchant acceptance across the two sides of the market”408 .  According to economic 
doctrine, through multilateral interchange fees it is possible to “transfer revenues 
from one side of the market to the other in order to generate the desired level of card 
activity”409. 
A multilateral interchange fee can thus be defined as an interbank payment 
made for each transaction carried out with a payment card
410
.  
                                                 
405
 See S. Weiner and J. Wright, “Interchange Fees in Various Countries: Developments and 
Determinants”, above, at p. 7. See also A.S. Frankel and A.L. Shampine, “The economics effects of 
Interchange Fees”, 73 Antitrust Law Journal No. 3 (2006). 
406
 Ibid. p.7. 
407
 See Fumiko Hayashi and Stuart E. Weiner, “Competition and Credit and Debit Card Interchange 
Fees: A Cross-Country Analysis”, Payments System Research Department - Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City Working Paper 05-03 2005, at p. 3. Available at: 
http://www.unfaircreditcardfees.com/uploads/Competition_and_Credit_and_Debit_Card_Interchange
_Fees.pdf. (accessed on 20 July 2011). 
408
 See S. Weiner and J. Wright, “Interchange Fees in Various Countries: Developments and 
Determinants”, above, at p. 8. 
409
 See Fumiko Hayashi and Stuart E. Weiner, “Competition and Credit and Debit Card Interchange 
Fees: A Cross-Country Analysis”, above, at p. 4. 
410
 See H. Leinonen,”The Efficiency Of Multilateral Interchange Fees” The Bank of Finland - 08 
May 2007, at p. 1. Available at the following link: http://www.gtnews.com/article/6739.cfm. 
(accessed on 20 July 2011). 
In the Visa system, it is paid to the cardholder's bank by the retailer's bank and constitutes a cost for 
the latter which is normally passed on to retailers as part of the fee they pay to their bank for each 
Visa card payment. The default level of the Visa MIF, which applies unless two banks agree otherwise 
is set by the Visa Board and laid down in the Visa International payment card rules, have been 
notified to the Commission for clearance (see Press Release IP/02/1138).  
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On a general level, interchange fees may vary considerably and are usually 
determined on the basis of the different method of processing (i.e. paper based 
transactions or electronic payments), and the type of card used (i.e. consumer or 
commercial corporate cards)
411
.  
As analysed in the following, multilateral interchange fees can also be set on 
different levels on the basis of International or Domestic Schemes. At international 
level, the MasterCard and Visa systems, the member banks or representatives acting 
on their behalf usually determine the interchange fees
412
. In a parallel way, domestic 
interchange fees are generally established locally by a board of member banks
413
.  
Domestic multilateral interchange fees may therefore be defined as transactions 
taking place in the country where the card was issued
414
.  
The Commission points out in its Interim Report on Payment Cards that this 
sort of  ‘double-system’ of International and Domestic multilateral interchange fees 
is structured in such a way to create a “fallback” effect. By virtue of this “fallback” 
effect, in the absence of an agreement between member banks, there is always “an 
interchange fee that acquirers pay to issuers, whether a multilaterally agreed default 
rate at local level or a multilaterally agreed cross-border fee; this excludes the 
possibility that acquirers pay no interchange fees to issuer”415.  
In substance, it has been correctly noted that MIFs are nothing other than a 
“commonly agreed price at the interbank level and therefore a blatant price-fixing 
                                                 
411
 For a detailed analysis see the “Commission’s Interim Report on Payment Cards”, Sector Inquiry 
under Article 17 Regulation 1/2003 on retail banking, 12 April 2006, at p. 18. The report is available 
at the following link: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/sector_inquiries/financial_services/(accessed on 
20 July 2011). 
412
 Ibid., at p. 19. 
413
 Ibid., at p. 19. 
414
 Ibid., at p. 20. 
415
 See the “Commission’s Interim Report on Payment Cards”, above, at p. 19.  
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device”416. It goes without saying that, due to their multilateral price-fixing character 
, MIFs raise serious competition concerns. These concerns will be analysed in the 
following.  
 
7.5 MIFs  and EU Competition Law 
 
A multilateral interchange fee is usually determined by groups of service providers 
for interbank transfers of a given payment instrument
417
. In substance, MIFs are 
mainly used in order to transfer revenues/charges from the acquiring (merchant’s) 
bank or institution to the issuing (cardholder’s) bank or institution418. 
As emphasised by the Commission, agreements determining interchange fees 
on a general level, “lead to a transfer of revenues from acquirers to issuers and 
thereby distort price competition between acquiring banks”419. The Commission puts 
emphasis also on the quasi tax effect  that interchange fees have on each payment 
with a card at a merchant outlet
420
. 
Since MIFs are jointly determined by service providers in competition with 
one another within the same market, they can be thus considered as blatant price 
fixing practice
421
 capable per se of infringing Art. 85 (1)  (now Art. 101 (1)TFEU.  
7.6 The Early Commission’s Decisions relating to MIFs 
 
Since the outset of the European Union, the legality of MIFs has been under the 
scrutiny of the Commission through a series of investigations and decisions.  In the 
                                                 
416
 See Faull & Nikpay, “The EC Law of Competition”, above, p. 643. 
417
 See H. Leinonen,”The Efficiency Of Multilateral Interchange Fees”, above, at p. 1. 
418
 Ibid., at p. 1, 
419
 See the “Commission’s Interim Report on Payment Cards”, above, at p. 32. 
420
 Ibid., at p. 32. 
421
 See H. Leinonen,”The Efficiency Of Multilateral Interchange Fees”, above, at p. 1. 
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aforementioned Uniform Eurocheques - Package Deal
422
 , the object of controversy 
was the agreements relative to the governing rules of the Eurocheque System, 
creating a system of MIF. The agreements in question were considered necessary for 
the correct functioning of the system and clearance was granted. 
This raison d'être was reiterated in Association Belge des Banques  (ABB)
423
, 
in which the Commission was asked to assess, inter alia, two different payment 
systems giving rise to MIFs (one related to the handling of security transactions, and 
the other arising from the processing of cross-border payments). Just like in Uniform 
Eurocheques- Package Deal, the payment system related to the handling of security 
transactions was exempted on the basis of essentiality and transactions cost 
arguments
424
. 
Another exemption was granted in the subsequent Commission decision in 
ABI
425
. In this case, the MIFs arose from various payment systems notified by the 
Italian banking association. It has been correctly noted that this decision contains an 
obiter dictum implying that MIFs on a general level restrict competition and 
therefore are per se  caught by Art. 85 (now Art. 101)
426
.  
MIFs were the object of the dispute yet again in Dutch Banks I
427
. This time 
the outcome of the decision was different, as the Commission acknowledged that the 
banks involved in the payment system under scrutiny were incapable of proving that 
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such agreements on inter-bank commissions were actually necessary for the 
successful implementation of certain forms of cooperation, , between a number of 
banks.    
The overall position of the Commission arising from the above decisions 
appear to be therefore  that only in exceptional cases, i.e. where a compelling 
necessity for forms of inter-bank co-operation is established, agreements on inter-
bank commissions may be worthy of exemption under Art, 85 (3) (now Art. 
101(3)
428
). Essentiality appears, thus, to represent a necessary pre-requisite for the 
exemption of MIFs. 
The detrimental effect of MIFs on competition was subsequently emphasised 
in Eurocheque Package Deal II
429
. With this decision, the Commission refused to 
renew the exemption granted to the Eurocheque Package Deal I, on the basis of two 
main reasons. The first reason was to be found in the fact that some banks part of the 
system systematically paid an interchange fee equal to the maximum amount of MIF 
determined by the Euroceque system
430
. Secondly, the Commission found that all the 
banks participating in the network in practice ultimately passed the cost of the MIFs 
on to their clients
431
.  
The Commission decision not to renew the exemption for MIF in Eurocheque 
Package Deal II,  has been considered idiosyncratic and therefore object of criticism. 
This in view of the fact that the knock-on effect of the MIF in the relationship 
                                                 
428
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between bank and cheque holder is indeed caught by Art. 85 (1) EC (now Art.101 
(1), but should have deserved an exemption under Article 101 (3)
432
.  
In other words, the idea would be that although the MIF in Euroceque 
Package Deal II indeed ultimately reverberated against clients, this should not 
necessarily mean that this phenomenon is not inherently necessary for the entire 
system to be functional, and therefore capable of being exempt under Article 101 
(3)
433
. 
This line of reasoning, with respect, does not appear very convincing. It is 
undoubtedly true that Article 101(3) provides for the possibility for an exemption of 
agreements/concerted practices capable of distorting competition whenever they are 
necessary to promote technical or economic progress. Nevertheless, although the 
Eurocheque System may be considered as a means of economic progress, another 
essential condition that must be fulfilled in order to obtain an exemption under article 
101 (3) is that consumers must be capable of sharing the beneficial effect of such 
system. The fact that the MIF was in this case systematically passed on to end users 
appears to represent a worthy argument against the concession of an exemption.  
The same rationale for the exemption of the MIFs in Euroceque Package 
Deal II, was later applied in the statement of objection released by the Commission 
in Dutch Banks II
434
. In this case, the objection was based on the evidence that such a 
system was capable of operating (although in a less integrated way) before the 
introduction of the MIF. It has been correctly noted that yet again, the Commission 
                                                 
432
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strongly relied on the systematic knock-on effect of MIFs on customers, as it did in 
Euroceque Package Deal II
435
.  
This line of reasoning, nevertheless, leaves an important issue open to debate: 
can MIFs without systematic knock-on effects be exempted? In other words, is the 
Commission prepared to grant an exemption in case MIFs are not passed on to 
customers, or can an exemption be granted only if MIFs are indispensable for the 
correct function of a specific payment system? And assuming that MIFs are 
indispensable for the functioning of a payment system, is the Commission inclined to 
grant exemption in case of the presence of knock–on effects?  
 
7.7 The post -Eurocheque Package Deal II scenario and the Commission’s 
Notice on cross-border transfers. 
 
Endeavouring to answer the above questions, the Commission issued in 1995 a 
Notice on cross-border transfers
436
.  
The Notice dealt in first place with the question of the compatibility of MIFs 
with Art. 101(1). This question is structured in three main points: the first point 
revolves around the impact of MIFs on the so called ‘interbank market’437; the 
second point is connected to the effects of MIFs on competition among  banks; and 
the third point deals with the effects of MIFs on competition between different 
payment systems. 
With regard to the impact of MIFs on the interbank market, the Commission 
states that MIFs “restrict freedom of action of banks individually to decide their own 
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pricing polices”438. This statement is not backed up by further explanations related to 
the effects of MIFs on the interbank systems and to the reasons why this should 
represent an infringement of Art. 101(1). Criticism was inevitably raised especially 
in relation to the notions of ‘freedom of actions’ and ‘individual pricing policies’439. 
These notions has been labelled as hollow concepts since “market forces do not play 
any rules at interbank level”440. In particular, the core argument of this criticism lies 
in the conviction that MIFs are inherent to payment systems. In other words, in order 
to correctly function,  payment systems require the existence of MIFs. Or, as Gyselen 
points out “to put it in orthodox antitrust jargon: MIFs are ancillary restraints to an 
otherwise legitimate cooperative arrangement”441. 
In order to deny the existence of any interbank markets, it has been noted that  
the relationship between banks within the framework of a payment system is “merely 
one between cooperating partners who have adhered to a particular payment system 
cooperating for the benefit of their respective clients”442. 
Furthermore, it has been  submitted that the banks participating in a payment 
system do not choose each other; the reason for this lies in the fact that banks find 
themselves cooperating with each other as a consequence of the initiation of a 
transaction for which a payment is due
443
. To put it in a different way, these banks 
are “obligatory partners to each other”444. In light of the thereof, one could claim that 
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a hypothetical free market activity at interbank level would arguably result in a 
breaking point for the entire payment system.  
 In a typical free market activity, banks would be able to negotiate freely the 
price of the MIFs essential for the processing of transaction payments. Such 
negotiation could ultimately lead to the request for excessively high MIFs that banks 
owing them would not be prepared to pay.  All this would result in the freezing of 
payment transactions and the consequent erosion of the payment system.  
The second element taken into account by the Commission in the Notice 
regarding the compatibility of MIFs with Art. 101, is the impact of such fees on intra 
system competition. The Commission expresses its concern stating that MIFs “are 
likely to have the effect of distorting the behaviour of banks vis-à-vis their 
customers”445. Such concerns were not new and was already at the core of previous 
Commission’s Decisions or statements of objections446. Nevertheless, it has been 
interestingly pointed out that beyond the Commission’s concern regarding the 
behaviour of banks vis-à-vis their customers, lied the idea of possible consequent 
restrictions on intra-system competition
447
.   
From this perspective, the main concern would be that MIFs may become a 
sort of “uniform floor in the all bank’s client commissions”448 compressing therefore 
“the margins within which they indulge in price-competition”449. Evidence of such 
parallel conduct was found by the Commission  in Eurocheque Package Deal II and 
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Dutch Banks II, and held against the banks participating in the payment systems at 
issue.  
The main criticism to this evaluation of the Commission lies in the fact that 
no competition issues may arise as long as the banks participating in a specific 
payment system have not explicitly agreed with one another to revert MIFs vis-à-vis 
their clients.  The line of reasoning of the Commission seems clear on this point: in 
its Notice, it is stated that “there will be a restriction of competition under Art. 101(1) 
when there is an agreement or concerted practice between banks to pass on the effect 
of the interchange fee in the prices they charge their customers”450.   
The Commission appears, thus,  to emphasised that in light of  Art. 101(1), it 
is not necessary to have an official agreement capable of restricting or distorting the 
competition in order to violate the EU antitrust law; a concerted practice (i.e. a 
collusive behaviour among undertakings) would do. In other words, whenever MIFs 
are de facto passed on by banks to their customers, such MIFs cause a restriction on 
intersystem competition between banks participating in a payment system, and 
violate Art. 101(1). On the contrary, whenever no evidence of such pass-on practices 
is provided, it becomes difficult to maintain that MIFs somehow hinder competition 
within the framework of  a bank-customer relationship
451
. 
It has been correctly noted that the absence of such evidence appears to 
indicate that “MIFs have been absorbed into the overhead costs of the banks 
participating in a specific payment system”452. As a result, this ‘cross subsidisation’ 
would lead to a distortion of the “natural allocation of costs between banking 
                                                 
450
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services, but Art. 101 does not prevent banks from causing such distortion as long as 
they decide independently to do so”453.  
The third point taken into account by the Commission in its Notice relates to 
the effects of MIFs on the intersystem competition. The Commission notes that 
“sufficiently strong intersystem competition could restrain the effects of the 
interchange fee on the prices charged to customers…provided that the competing 
systems do not themselves also contain similar multilateral interchange fees”454.  
Invariably, the concept of intersystem competition needs to be addressed in 
relation to the relevant market at issue. The Commission in first place emphasises 
that in case of cross-border payment transactions, it is necessary to identify possible 
alternatives in terms of payment instruments
455
. In second instance, the Commission 
acknowledges that within the category of cross-border transactions “there may well 
be separate narrower markets depending on the value of the payment, the type of 
beneficiary or the required speed for the execution of the payment”456 . 
Finally, the Commission stresses the need to consider on a case-by-case basis 
the “cross-border credit transfers (or particular segments, such as retail cross-border 
credit transfers) as the relevant market”457.   
7.7.1 Possibility of Exemption under Art. 101(3) 
As analysed above, according to the Commission MIFs may give rise to competition 
concerns falling within the scope of Art. 101(1) whenever: 
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a) A MIF is capable of reducing the freedom of banks to determine their own 
price policies
458
; 
b) A MIF reverts against intra-system competition with a negative impact on the 
behaviour of banks vis-a-vis their clients
459
; and 
c) A MIF restricts or hinder inter-system competition. 
With regard to the exemptibility of MIFs under Art. 101(3), the Commission’s  
Notice distinguishes between SHARE and BEN payments and OUR payments. In 
cross-border payments, customers are usually offered one of the three above choices 
to pay
460
. In SHARE transfers, the fees are shared by sender and receiver, whereas in 
BEN transfers all fees relating to the transfer should be charged to the receiver, at the 
request of the sender. Finally in OUR   transfers all fees are charged to the sender. 
This distinction appears to be largely influenced by the Commission’s Decisions in 
Eurocheque Package Deal I and II. 
In substance, when it comes to a possible exemption under Art. 101(3) doubts 
arise on the Commission’s part in relation to the indispensability of MIFs for the 
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current functioning of payment systems where the transfer is SHARE or BEN. Such 
systems, as a matter of fact, denote a natural inclination to pass MIFs on to clients
461
.  
The message is thus loud and clear: MIFs cannot benefit from exemption in 
case it is possible for the banks receiving them to obtain a sort of “double 
compensation” (one from the sender’s bank or its correspondent and one from their 
clients
462
). 
The Commission’s approach is radically different in relation to MIFs for 
OUR transfers. The raison d'être here recalls Euroceque Package Deal II rationale: 
whenever beneficiary banks part of a payment system processing OUR transfers are 
not in the position to recover any costs from their clients, MIFs fall within the 
meaning of Art. 101(3), and are, thus, exemptible
463
. 
The Commission’s Notice pushed the boundaries for the exemption further if 
compared to its Decision in Eurocheque Package Deal II: according to the Notice, 
banks wishing to obtain an exemption for MIFs in relation to OUR transfer systems 
are required to justify them by reference to incurred costs
464
. In addition, the 
Commission requires the MIFs to be a “default fee allowing members of the system 
to negotiate bilateral fees below the reference level”465. This last requirement appears 
to denote the necessity on the Commission’s part to emphasise the need for a 
                                                 
461
 See the Notice on the application of the EC Competition rules to cross-border credit transfers, 
above, at paragraph 45. Yet again, a parallel with Euroceque Package Deal I and II can be easily 
drawn. 
462
 For a more detailed analysis see Luc Gyselen, “EU antitrust Law in the Area of Financial 
Services”, above, at p. 18.  
463
 See the Notice on the application of the EC Competition rules to cross-border credit transfers, 
above, at paragraph 46. 
464
 Ibid., at paragraph 47. Banks are under the duty to demonstrate that: a) the beneficiary’s bank of 
the MIFs carries out one or more functions related to cross-border transfers; b) they are bound to be 
the recipients of MIFs; and c) the entity of the MIFs corresponds to the level of the average additional 
costs of  participating banks operating as beneficiary’s banks.  
465
 See the Notice on the application of the EC Competition rules to cross-border credit transfers, 
above, at paragraph 46. 
  172 
minimum level of competition without which is difficult to accept the idea of an 
exemption.  
 
7.8 The Commission’s Decision in Visa International-Multilateral Interchange 
Fee 2002  
 
In recent years, the Commission had the chance to apply the line of reasoning 
established in its Notice on the application of the EU Competition rules to cross-
border credit transfers to the MIFs arising from the Visa payment system
466
.  
The issue object of dispute was in this case the MIF relating to the 
multilateral interchange fees for cross-border payments with Visa cards. The default 
level of the Visa’s MIF which applies unless two banks agree otherwise was set by 
the Visa Board, and laid down in the Visa International payment card rules, which 
have been notified to the Commission for clearance
467
.  
In September 2000, the Commission released a formal statement of objection 
to the current Visa MIF.
468
  After long discussions with Visa, a proposal for a 
modified MIF scheme was submitted to the Commission, enabling Visa to obtain an 
exemption under Article 101(3) of the EU treaty.
469
 
The key elements of the modified MIF scheme which triggered the 
exemption
470
 were essentially three: a) a progressive reduction of  the level of the 
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intra-regional  MIFs  for different types of cards
471
; b) secondly, the MIF was capped 
at the level of costs for certain specific services provided by issuing banks, which in 
the Commission's view corresponded to services provided by cardholders' banks 
which benefit those retailers who ultimately pay the cross-border MIF
472
; and c) 
finally, Visa agreed to allow member banks to disclose information about the MIF 
levels and the relative percentage of the three cost categories (currently considered 
business secrets) to retailers at their request. Retailers were supposed to be informed 
of this possibility
473
.  
The new version of Visa MIF was weighed up by the Commission only 
within the context of cross-border payments
474
. The Commission appreciated the 
necessity of some forms of default  agreements on exchange terms between issuers 
and acquirers within the framework of an international payment card system, as 
bilateral negotiations between all the member banks would lead to cost increment 
and inefficiencies.  
In line with previous case-law on MIFs and its Notice on the application of 
the EU Competition rules to cross-border credit transfers, the Commission 
maintained that the multilateral setting of the Visa MIF between competing banks 
constitutes indeed a restriction of competition.  
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Nevertheless, the Commission concluded that a multilaterally-fixed 
interchange fee may indeed lead to beneficial efficiencies and economies within a 
payment network, and therefore can benefit from an exemption, but only if it is set in 
a reasonable and equitable manner.  
The two concepts of reasonability and equitability were not defined, arguably 
on purpose. This allows the Commission not only to determine on a case by case 
basis whether the three conditions laid down in the Notice are fulfilled, but also to 
assess future scenarios with a large degree of discretion arising from these vague 
concepts of reasonability and equitability. 
 
7.9 The recent Commission Decisions in MasterCard intra-EEA fallback 
interchange fee 
 
MIFs have yet again been the object of scrutiny on 19 December 2007, when the 
European Commission interestingly declared that the MasterCard's MIF for cross-
border payment card transactions with MasterCard and Maestro branded credit cards 
infringed Article 101
475
. The Commission maintained that MasterCard's MIF, 
inflated the cost of card acceptance by retailers without leading to proven 
efficiencies. 
  It is of great necessity to specify a priori that the recent Commission 
Decision is far from representing a general reprimenda of all MIFs; it, indeed, takes 
into account only one specific MIF operating within the MasterCard payment card 
system, the so called "intra-EEA fallback interchange fee".  This specific MIF  is 
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ignited by cross-border card payments with MasterCard and Maestro cards, and by 
domestic payments in some Member States. Furthermore, the decision prohibits the 
"intra-EEA fallback interchange fee" only in relation to consumer credit and debit 
cards but not insofar as it involves commercial (e.g. corporate) cards
476
.  
The MasterCard's MIF under scrutiny was considered by the Commission as 
a mechanism capable of hindering price competition between acquiring banks by 
artificially inflating the basis on which these banks charge merchants.  
According to Commission’s estimates, MasterCard's MIF amounted to more 
than 70% of the merchant service charges for credit cards in Belgium (2002) and for 
approximately 60% of these charges in Italy (2003)
477
. Without this MIF, merchants 
were deemed to pay lower prices for accepting cards and, accordingly, customers 
should have incurred lower costs
478
. 
The Commission did not consider MasterCard's MIF eligible for an 
exemption under Article 101(3). The main reason for this is that the MIF was 
deemed to operate with unrealistic assumptions, and MasterCard failed to submit 
empirical evidence to demonstrate any positive effects of its MIF on the market
479
. In 
other words, the value of the MIF was found to be artificially inflated and did not 
correspond to the effective recovery costs necessary in order to process card payment 
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transactions. As a result, the Commission maintained that MasterCard's MIF 
rendered card payments artificially more expensive
480
. 
Further, in carrying out the assessment of the compatibility of MasterCard 
Europe MIF with Art. 101 (3), the Commission claimed to have attributed particular 
importance to the question whether in setting the intra-EEA fallback interchange fee 
MasterCard used a ‘methodology’ that guaranteed from the outset that both 
cardholders and merchants obtain a fair share of eventual benefits
481
. MasterCard, in 
practice, was found to set the level of its MIF using “cost benchmarks”; however, the 
outcome of the Commission’s investigation was that these benchmarks were “largely 
arbitrary and inflated”482. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Commission 
could not safely assume that by pursuing its member banks' aim of maximising sales 
volumes, MasterCard's MIF created efficiencies that benefit all customers, including 
merchants.  
On the basis of these considerations, the Commission declared the 
MasterCard's MIF incompatible with Article 101 (3) of the EC Treaty
483
. 
The reaction of MasterCard to the Commission Decision did not take long: a 
Press Release was issued announcing the immediate recourse to appeal the Decision 
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before the Court of First Instance (now General Court)
484
.  MasterCard believed to 
have solid grounds for its appeal. In particular, the firm conviction that market 
forces, not regulation, should drive key decisions such as the setting of interchange 
fees and retailers’ choices over which forms of payment to accept, is accompanied by 
strong statements on the necessity of MIFs as balancing mechanisms in order to 
fairly share costs among all the participants in a payment system
485
.   
 
 
7.10 The Commission’s Decision in Visa International-Multilateral Interchange 
Fee 2002 and the Decision on MasterCard on intra-EEA fallback 
interchange fee: two faces of the same coin? 
 
It is inevitable to re-consider the recent Commission Decision on MasterCard MIF in 
light of the previous Visa MIF Decision of July 2002. The first striking difference 
between these two decisions is, of course, the outcome. If in 2002 the Commission 
granted a five years exemption to the Visa MIF, it was not prepared to do the same in 
relation to the MasterCard intra-EEA fallback interchange fee. 
The main issue to be assessed here is whether this difference in terms of 
outcome is the result of a different approach possibly indicating a new trend, or if the 
Commission applied the same line of reasoning to both cases, reaching opposite 
conclusions due to the different circumstances underlying the two MIFs.
486
  
The Commission asserts  to have adopted exactly the same line of reasoning 
to both Decisions, the starting being that MIFs as a price fixing type of agreements 
                                                 
484
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are caught by Art. 101. I light of Art 101(3), the  validity of the relevant MIF was 
then assessed vis-à-vis the empirical proof that the MIF creates efficiencies that 
outweigh the restriction of competition, that there are no less restrictive means of 
achieving the efficiencies, and that consumers are capable of obtaining  a fair share 
of those benefits.  
Due to the overall lack of empirical evidence supported by MasterCard, the 
Commission in that case acknowledged to have put more emphasis on the analysis of 
the  MIF intended as an instrument aiming at “internalising network externalities in 
order to increase system output”487.  
The Commission did not dispute, as a matter of principle, that such 
interchanges fees “may yield efficiencies which rest on the importance of network 
effects on both sides of the markets”488. However, it was emphasised that an 
imbalance of network externalities must be “carefully assessed on the basis of 
empirical evidence including both cost and revenue data related to providing 
payment services that fall respectively on issuing and acquiring, the willingness to 
pay of cardholders and merchants (elasticities) and the competitive conditions on 
both sides of the scheme”489.  
In order to benefit from exemption, such  MIFs must therefore be based on a 
detailed, robust and compelling analysis that relies in its assumptions and deductions 
on empirical data and facts showing an effective correspondence between the level of 
the MIF and the real cost recovery needs. 
                                                 
487
 See the Commission’s  Press Release on the Decision MasterCard  intra-EEA fallback  
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The lack of empirical evidence of the linkage between MIF and recovery 
costs in the MasterCard case therefore empowered the Commission to develop its 
analysis further compared to the Visa Decision.  
An interesting element of this analysis is represented by the Commission’s 
statement  that a “mere increase in a scheme's system output alone without at the 
same time benefiting the scheme's users (that is cardholders and merchants as well as 
their customers) cannot be considered as an objective efficiency within the meaning 
of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty (now Art.101 93 TFEU)”490. The lesson to be learnt 
is that “any methodology to set a MIF should therefore from the outset ensure that a 
fair share of the benefits is granted to the final users of a card scheme”491. 
In light of the above, the recent MasterCard decision should arguably  not be 
regarded as a general change of approach of the Commission in relation to the 
compatibility of MIFs with EU competition law. The underlying principles remain 
the same as in Visa MIF 2002: MIFs indeed have anticompetitive effects and they 
need to be assessed under Art. 101 (3) in order to evaluate the possibility of an 
exemption. If the methodology of the application of MIFs from the outset guarantees 
of their application that they represent a necessary means for recovering the effective 
transaction costs of card payments, and that both cardholders and merchants obtain a 
fair share of eventual benefits, an exemption will be granted. 
A very interesting point to be extrapolated from the recent MasterCard 
Decision is that the Commission is strictly monitoring the real impact of MIFs 
focusing on consumer protection. Here seems to lay the common thread between the 
two Decisions: in the Visa case, the Commission clarified that MIFs in order to 
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qualify for an exemption under Art. 101(3) need to reflect the effective transaction 
costs of card payment systems. With the MasterCard Decision, the Commission 
appears to state clearly that it will not be prepared to tolerate artificially inflated 
MIFs, based on unrealistic assumptions, and ultimately not beneficial to consumers.  
This explains the current state of play of the law. Invariably, authors still 
debate on the essence of MIFs, their necessity, and  their real impact on competition. 
All this will be taken into account in the following, where the reasons pro and contra 
MIFs are carefully weighed in conjunction with suggestions for possible regulatory 
alternatives. 
 
7.11 The Economic perspective: Arguments pro MIFS 
 
As previously established, MIFs  tend to represent blatant price fixing kind of 
agreements distorting the conditions of competition within the framework of the 
issuing and acquiring payment card systems.   
Ought MIFs to be allowed then? And what are the reasons in support of their 
existence? 
There are two broad economic rationales in support of the existence of MIFs: 
the first is that they are an essential condition of any payment system and therefore 
are inherent to them. The second raison d'être for MIFs is based on the idea of their 
necessity for the optimisation of inherent costs of payment systems, and on the 
conviction that MIF would be ultimately beneficial to cardholders and merchants 
alike.
492
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7.11.1 Are MIFs essential conditions  of any payment system? 
 
On a general level, MIFs are paid to the cardholder's bank by the retailer's bank 
reflecting costs for the latter, which are thereafter normally passed on to retailers as 
part of the fee they pay to their bank for each card payment. Accordingly, 
economically MIFs can be defined as  sort of “compensation vehicles”493 providing 
incentives for banks to issue more cards, acquired more merchants, enhancing thus 
the network system.  
The essential line of reasoning for MIFs would then be that such fees are 
deemed necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the cooperation between the various 
parties involved in the card payment system, optimising the incentives in order to 
increase the network size. In practice, a scenario without MIFs would see each card 
issuer determining its own fees and each acquirer contracting its merchant fee to be 
charged against the merchant for its acquiring services. This is considered by some 
authors to be inefficient and cost consuming
494
.  
MIFs would therefore come into play in order to trigger the so called 
‘network effects’ acting not only as inducement for the expansion of the payment 
card system, but also as condition sine qua non  for the existence of the system 
itself
495
.  
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According to VISA, MIFs should not be considered as the price for specified 
services provided by issuers to acquirers or merchants
496
. Rather, MIFs should be 
interpreted as “transfer of costs between undertakings, which are cooperating in 
order to provide a joint service in a network characterised by externalities and joint 
demand”497.  
MIFs could thus be defined as financial devices capable of neutralising the 
“imbalance between the costs associated with issuing and acquiring revenues coming 
from cardholders with a view to increasing the demand for and consequently the use 
of payment services”498.  
It is submitted by VISA that without jointly determined MIFs  the banks 
would not take into account, or too little account of the ‘positive externalities 
generated by their decisions’499. MIFs would thus enable payment systems to 
function most efficiently and effectively. In this regard,  MIFs  should fall, in Visa’s 
view, within the scope of application of the Commission’s Guidelines on Horizontal 
Cooperation
500
 which states that horizontal cooperation between “competing 
companies that cannot carry out the project or activity covered by the cooperation 
will not fall within Article 81(1)  (now Art. 101 (1) because of its very nature”501.  
                                                 
496
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MIFs appear to be, therefore, prima facie inherently necessary for the current 
functioning of payment card systems; yet, serious concerns indeed arise in relation to 
their anticompetitive effects.  The economic answer to these concerns would be that  
if contextualised in the optic of a two sided market, MIFs would not necessarily be 
the cause of anticompetitive anxiety
502
.  
As emphasised above, payment card systems operate in a two-sided market; 
within the framework of such systems there are two joint providers (the card issuer 
and acquirer) and two joint users (the cardholder and the merchant). Such markets 
are characterised by the need to compete for two different types of customers with 
“different elasticities of demand”503. Two-sided markets end up, thus,  embodying  
peculiar network effects: in order to optimise outputs suppliers cannot necessarily 
“price each side at marginal cost plus normal profit”504.  
On the contrary, it has been maintained that an increase in marginal cost on 
one side “does not necessarily result in an increase in price on that side relative to 
price on the other side.”505 Equilibrium and optimal pricing seems to depend from an 
economic perspective “on the price elasticities of demand of customers on sides, the 
network effects, and the marginal costs resulting from changing output on each 
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side”506.  As a consequence, the pricing structure determination is destined to have a 
definitive impact on the final equilibrium of the system
507
.  
From this perspective, in order to exist and efficiently perform, a payment 
card system must induce both cardholders to use cards and merchants to accept 
them
508
. The success of either markets will strictly depend on the other; the more 
consumers will use cards, the more merchants will be inclined to accept them and 
vice versa
509
.  
Here seems to lay the peculiarity of payment card systems: payment card 
systems are two-sided markets, and two-sided markets are radically different from 
ordinary markets. Within the framework of an ordinary market, price fixing practices 
are generally anticompetitive and harmful for consumers.   
On the contrary, it has been maintained that in a two-sided market collusive 
practices do not necessarily have a negative impact on competition due to the 
asymmetric platform competition characterising such markets 
510
.   
In a payment card system, cardholders and merchants (the two joint users 
representing one side of the market) are likely to have differing demands for card 
services, as well as issuing and acquiring banks are likely to have differing cost 
configurations
511
.On a general level, one transaction side will be in the position to 
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recover more than its costs, due to the elastic nature of the demand of the consumers 
on that side
512
.  
MIFs would then be the right tool in order to achieve an optimal balance 
capable of satisfying the demands of both sides, considering that a payment from the 
issuing bank to the acquiring bank would in any case  be necessary in order to 
compensate merchants
513
.  
From this perspective, MIFs are seen as balancing devices necessary in order 
to increase the value of the payment systems by shifting costs between issuers and 
acquirers and thus shifting charges between consumers and merchants
514
.  
Apart from being an integral part of any payment system, it is also submitted 
by part of the economic doctrine that MIFs would  require a collective agreement for 
two reasons.  
Firstly, the alternative of bilateral negotiations would inevitably impose high 
transaction costs with the consequential risk of destabilisation of the equilibrium 
price
515
.  Bilateral agreements may also have a detrimental impact on competition; in 
order to enter in the payment system, possible new members would be forced to 
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bilaterally negotiate fees with thousands existing members with a potential restrictive 
effect on competition from the potential members
516
. 
Another possible risk arising from multilateral negotiations, would be the 
possibility of abuses of dominant position by strong members of the four-party 
payment system, which would use their position of dominance in order to 
superimpose fees on other members. This risk is to some extent related to the second 
main reason pro collective determination of MIFs, namely the incentive of issuing 
banks to exploit their “monopsony position” in order to demand higher than optimal 
interchange fees
517
.  
It has been also maintained by economists that merchants would not be in the 
position to contest individual issuer requests for excessively high fees, since they do 
not possess advanced electronic processing, and therefore are not capable of 
discriminating against specific card issuers without incurring a dramatic increment in 
transaction costs
518
. Moreover, discrimination against card issuers would inevitably 
undermine the entire “utility of the systems to all participants together with the 
system’s viability in competition with other payment systems”519.  
MIFs have even been even theorised as potentially capable of promoting 
social welfare. Due to the existence of two joint parties within the framework of card 
payment systems, the argument would be that the use of MIFs represents a useful 
tool for the redistribution of costs capable of changing the prices charged against 
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consumers and potentially of improving welfare
520
. This would be linked to the fact 
that within a payment system actions of an individual participant are capable of 
affecting the other participants and this effect is not considered when the individual 
participants take decisions
521
.  
Centralised interchange fees would therefore act as a potential catalyst 
element  capable of neutralising a possible negative impact of negative impact of the 
individual actions of the participants in a payment system on the other members.  
MIFs could be therefore ultimately capable of maximising their benefit, passing it on 
to the society as a whole. 
 
7.12 More Economic analysis: Arguments contra MIFs 
 
The main argument against MIFs is that such agreements would constitute blatant 
price fixing practices highly detrimental for competition. MIFs are indeed usually 
jointly determined within payment systems by the four parties involved therein in the 
absence of any type of external scrutiny or forms of accountability to the community. 
It has been therefore submitted that MIFs restrain competition horizontally among 
issuers and acquirers of such systems
522
.  
The mechanism appears to be evident: since MIFs are set multilaterally, all card 
issuers participating in the payment system pay the same interchange fees. As a 
consequence, merchants’ fees reflect the interchange fees multilaterally agreed; 
merchants are not in the position, as a matter of fact, to lower the interchange fees 
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threatening to pass on to another financial institution in order to supply the payment 
system’s services523.  
Another anticompetitive effect of MIFs would be the reduction (if not the 
elimination) of the non card-issuing acquirers capacity to compete with proprietary 
members of card payment systems that both issue cards and sign merchants.
524
Since 
the so-called ‘on-us’ transactions (i.e. transactions in which the card-issuing bank  
and merchant-signing banks are the same) do not involve interchange fees, 
proprietary members processing ‘on-us’ transactions are in the position to reduce the 
merchant fees they charge.  All this is deemed to restrain competition from the pure 
acquirers as they are obliged to maintain their merchant fees higher than the MIFs in 
order to make profits.  
As a consequence, merchants tend not to negotiate with pure acquirers since 
they are in the position to receive a more profitable merchant fee from the 
proprietary members of a card payment system.  
This scenario can easily lead card issuing banks to determine the level of 
MIFs so as to merely prevent merchant-signing banks from being in the position to 
compete. The result would see proprietary members of a card payment system as 
nothing more but a group of competitors who agreed to sell goods to each other, and 
MIFs would turn into a blatant horizontal price fixing kind of agreements. 
In light of the aforementioned considerations, the determination of MIFs 
would not be therefore subject to normal competitive forces. As mentioned above, it 
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has been claimed that on two-sided markets such as payment systems, collusive 
practices do not necessarily have a negative impact on competition due to the 
asymmetric platform competition characterising such markets. From this perspective, 
jointly determined MIFs would represent the right tool in order to achieve an optimal 
balance capable of satisfying the demands of both sides of the market.  
It is opinion of this author that, with respect, this theory  has limits: it starts 
from the assumption that the two market sides involved in card payment systems (i.e. 
card issuers and acquiring merchants) are perfectly competitive (which it is not 
necessarily true) and that MIFs are driven by “bank’s costs in serving each side of 
the market”525.  
The rationale is therefore that merchants accept cards from consumers in 
order to lower processing costs, and that all merchants equally benefit from accepting 
cards
526
. This appears to be unrealistic as this theory arguably overestimates the 
merchant’s ability to resist increases in interchange fees,527 and underestimates the 
concrete risk that merchants would be willing to pass those fees on to clients
528
.  
For these reasons, despite the idiosyncratic nature of two-sided markets that 
they belong to, MIFs can indeed be qualified as anticompetitive practices. Starting 
from this point, the next question to be faced is the one related to the  
indispensability of MIFs for the correct functioning of card payment systems. 
As already mentioned, MIFs are considered by Visa as necessary vehicles to 
ensure the effectiveness of the cooperation between the various parties involved in 
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the card payment system, optimising the incentives in order to increase the network 
size. 
This claim could arguably be rebutted  on the basis of the argument that 
interchange fees rather than necessary components of card payment systems, are 
nothing but mechanisms to shift onto merchants (and indirectly onto consumers who 
pay by means other than payment cards) the costs of free advantages  offered to 
cardholders
529
.   
Most importantly, MIFs would not be indispensable for card payment 
schemes to function effectively, as  in practice there are perfectly functional card 
payment schemes that operate without jointly determining interchange fees
530
.  Visa 
itself, officially admitted that MIFS are not strictly necessary for the card payment 
scheme to work
531
; their real function would rather be to enhance the operation scale 
and the competitive impact of the Visa scheme.  
Without MIFs payment schemes would therefore offer a different ‘product’ to 
both classes of user in the four–party scheme; as a consequence, cardholders would 
get access to a smaller network of merchants and merchants to a smaller pool of 
cardholders
532
. In this regard, MIFs would be only necessary in order to trigger the 
so-called network effects of the payment card systems.  
                                                 
529
 See, for instance,  Commission Decision, Visa International-Multilateral Interchange Fee, above, 
at paragraph 27.  
530
 For instance, the German ec-Karte scheme operates without MIFs.  The ec-Karte scheme is defiend 
by the Commission as a “four-party domestic debit card system whose functioning depends on the 
card chosen by the merchant. Ec-Karte cards can have different functions (e.g. guaranteed or 
unguaranteed); the merchant is in the position to determine which function to use paying fees to the 
issuing bank accordingly (in case a merchant opts for an unguaranteed transaction no fee is required)”. 
Another example of card payment scheme functioning without MIFs is represented by the Australian 
EFTPOS debit card scheme, in which fees are “bilaterally negotiated and go in the reverse direction 
(i.e. from issuing bank to acquiring bank)”. A further example is the Canadian Interac scheme, “a 
domestic four-party debit card system operating with MIF set at zero”. See Commission Decision, 
Visa International-Multilateral Interchange Fee, above, at paragraph 28.  
531
 See, for instance,  Commission Decision, Visa International-Multilateral Interchange Fee, above, 
at paragraph 59.  
532
 Ibid.  
  191 
According to the Commission, the only provisions which seem “necessary for 
the functioning of a four-party card payment scheme appear to be (apart from 
technical arrangements on message formats), the obligation of the creditor bank to 
accept any payment validly processed within the system by a debtor bank and the 
prohibition on ex post pricing by one bank to another”533.  
Furthermore, MIFs rather than promoting social welfare, have been 
considered by the European Authorities  as mechanisms by virtue of which the costs 
of the advantage of using payment cards are shifted onto customers using other 
means of payments rather than payment cards
534
.  
7.13 The Concrete effects of MIFs 
 
Having considered the economic reasons pro and contra MIFs in the attempt to 
assess their real essence, the next step of the analysis seems inevitably to lead 
towards an empirical evaluation of the concrete effects of MIFs. On the basis of this 
empirical assessment, it will be possible in the following to endeavour to theorise 
possible alternatives or approaches for the regulation of interchange fees. 
7.13.1 The Impact on Merchants 
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MIFs are collectively determined by the banks which are members of card payment 
systems (e.g. Visa or MasterCard) and firstly revert against merchants as they are 
imposed on them by the banks to which merchants process credit card transactions 
for payment
535. Consequently, merchants deal with interchange fees as “higher costs 
of doing business”536.  
Indeed, when a transaction is made at a point of sale with a credit or debit 
card, it is immediately submitted by the merchants to the acquirer. The card issuer 
bank at this point “anticipate funds to the acquirer on the consumer’s behalf, less the 
interchange fee”537.  
As a result, merchants do not receive the full value of this transaction from 
the issuer banks; on the contrary, merchants receive the face value of the consumer 
transaction less the fees determined by the acquirer bank (the so-called merchant 
discount)
538
. The vast majority of the merchant discount is thus represented by the 
interchange fee paid by the merchant to the card issuer banks.  
We have already seen that since the acquiring side of the payment card 
systems is considered to be fairly competitive, the interchange fee puts “a floor under 
the merchant discount”539. The natural consequence of this assertion would be that 
the variations of merchants discounts should tend to reflect the variations of MIFs. 
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Economic studies  appear indeed to prove that in case interchange fees decrease 
within a competitive system, merchant fees should decrease accordingly.
540
 
7.13.2 Effects on Consumers 
 
The effects of MIFs on merchants just analysed indeed revert also on to 
consumers, as  ultimately consumers are the ones who provide the funds collected by 
the merchants and paid in form of interchange fees
541
. Here the interesting point lies 
in the fact that, as it will be readily appreciated in the following, MIFs can also affect 
consumers using alternative forms of payments (e.g. cash or checks) rather than 
payment cards.  
If we start from the assumption that payment card systems are perfectly 
competitive and no costs are associated with “pricing differently according to 
payment method”542, it would be possible to theorise that interchange fees have no 
economic effects
543
. In such a scenario, MIFs would produce no harm or benefits 
being completely neutral (i.e. the net position of merchants, cash consumers, and 
credit card customers is not influenced by the variations of MIFs)
544
.  
                                                 
540
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The reality is regrettably different from this ideal and frictionless scenario: 
the effects of interchange fees on customers are strictly related to the level of their 
intensity; the more interchange fees become higher, the more is likely that merchants 
would pass the additional costs on to customers
545
. Here seems to lay the key to 
understanding the essence of the anti-consumer nature of MIFs: the higher Visa or 
MasterCard determine the interchange fees, the higher the volume of money received 
by their member banks.  
In other words, it is in the interest of Visa and MasterCard to set high 
interchange fees; this increases the volume of money obtained by the members of the 
payment systems, money that can be used, for instance, in order to subsidise 
marketing efforts (e.g. reward point or airline miles) to promote the use of credit 
cards by consumers
546
. At this point the circle is closed: higher MIFs profitable for 
card issuers result in higher merchant fees that merchants inevitably pass on to 
consumers (the same consumers who ironically are invited  to use credit cards by 
promotions sponsored trough high interchange fees).  
Even more ironically, consumers using cash or checks as payment methods 
suffer the effects of MIFs. The reason for this is to be found in the fact that MIFs, as 
we have seen above, are passed firstly onto merchants by the card issuers; merchants 
tend inevitably to react to this situation and, in order to recover the cost they incur, 
they increase the price of the goods they sell or the services they provide. 
  
                                                 
545
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7.13.3 The impact on the Internal Market 
 
The recent Commission’s Interim Report on Payment Cards emphasised the current 
presence of concrete elements indicating that the establishment of MIFs at 
international level may have as object and/or effect the creation of market entry 
barriers to competition between local and foreign banks
547
. 
The Report highlights that the current EU market scenario sees local banks 
willing to set low interchange fees especially in relation to specific segments of the 
market, (e.g. food retailing or petrol stations), with very little choice: either they can 
set lower MIFs multilaterally in a local board, or they are forced to set them through 
a series of bilateral agreements between each issuer and each acquirer in a given 
country
548
. The research emphasised also that, under the network framework 
established by MasterCard and Visa, foreign banks are able to benefit from such 
preferential rates only in EU Member States where local banks “multilaterally 
determine merchant-specific rates”549. 
 In case MIFs are determined on the basis of a bundle of identical bilateral 
interchange fees arrangements, foreign banks end up paying higher fallback rates
550
. 
Furthermore, a comparison between the national interchange fees level set by Visa 
and MasterCard across the internal market appears to suggest that the high level of 
some merchants’ fees may result from the exercise of market powers by acquirers551.  
Doubts seem also to arise in relation to the inter-system competition between 
MasterCard and Visa which appears to act as a sort of “disciplining market force on 
members of the card payment systems determining the level of interchange fees 
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within these networks”552. As a matter of fact, the average MasterCard interchange 
fees for cross-border transactions increased from 2002 despite a reduction of the 
correspondent Visa fees
553
.   
This appears to suggest that inter-system competition is somehow affected 
and restrained by MIFs. In other words, market forces might not be an effective 
deterrent mechanism for card payment systems characterised by a high level of 
MIFs
554
.  
Finally, in relation to possible barriers in terms of market entry, the Report 
submits that in countries where an inter-bank association acquires transactions from 
an international card payment network, local banks members of this inter-bank 
association are in the position to offer lower fees to the association. As a result, inter-
bank associations are in the position to prevent new competitors from entering into 
the market
555
.  
Overall, the economic theories which revolve around MIFs are conflicting 
and do not appear to provide an answer to the main questions this thesis endeavours 
to answer: are MIFs really necessary? Is it possible to identify possible alternatives? 
Most of all, how should competition law approach them? In order to answer these 
questions, it is first necessary to consider the so called ‘No-Discrimination Rules’. 
 
7.14 No-Discrimination Rules 
 
                                                 
552
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Card payment systems generally use the so called no-discrimination rules in 
conjunction with MIFs. No-discrimination rules usually assume the form of the so-
called “honour all cards rules”, forcing merchants to accept all the cards issued by 
the members of a specific card payment system (e.g. Visa). In addition, no-
discrimination rules prevent merchants from surcharging cardholders using their 
payment cards, and from offering discounts or incentives to consumers for using 
alternative means of payment.  
It is rather easy to understand the possible negative impact on competition of 
no-discrimination rules; the main negative consequences of such rules are 
represented by the deprivation of the merchants’ freedom to modify prices according 
to costs, in conjunction with the impossibility for merchants to provide consumers 
with incentives for alternative payment methods. No-discrimination rules tend in this 
way to exacerbate the fact that the actual costs of different payment systems are in 
practice hidden from consumers. Merchants are prevented, as a matter of fact, from 
recommending to customers less costly payment methods
556
.  
  Furthermore, “honour all cards rules” practically leave no alternatives to 
merchants but to accept all the branded cards of a specific network, consequently 
putting card issuers of card payment networks in a strong bargaining position 
eliminating their need to compete for merchant acceptance.  
In order to counter-balance this situation merchants are invariably forced to 
pass on their costs to consumers increasing the costs of goods and services they 
provide.  As a consequence, consumers paying with payment cards end up paying 
                                                 
556
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[2000] E.C.L.R., Issue 4, at p. 224. See also, S. Chakravorti & S. Emmons, “Who Pays for Credit 
Cards”, Emerging Payments Occasional Paper Series, EPS-2001-1, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago, 2001, at p. 3. 
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more for goods and services, and even consumers using alternative payment methods 
are affected as they end up subsidizing the costs of card payment systems.  
All this inevitably leads to severe restrictions on both level of inter-system 
and intra-system competition
557
.  
7.14.1 No-discrimination rules and EU Competition Law 
 
In order to be considered lawful under EU law, no-discrimination rules need to fulfil 
the requirements of Art. 101; this does not seem the case, as no-discriminatory rules 
are indeed agreements capable of restricting and distorting competition. 
No-discriminatory rules remarkably reduce the bargaining position of  
merchants, who are obliged to accept all the cards issued within a card-payment 
network without being capable at the same time of surcharging cardholders or 
offering them incentives for alternative payment systems.   
The next step for the analysis of no-discriminatory rules is therefore to assess 
whether such rules would be in the position to benefit from an exemption under Art. 
101(3).  
No-discriminatory rules have indeed been theorised as beneficial and 
essential for the functioning of card-payment systems, as they would reduce the 
transactions costs of payments together with risks associated to cash/cheques 
handling
558
 (fraud or theft). In addition, no-discriminatory rules would have positive 
effects also vis-à-vis consumers who, thanks to them,  would be in the position to 
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make purchases in a safer and more efficient way, without the need to plan “how 
they intend to pay”559.  
As a consequence, no-discrimination rules would increase the sales and are 
seen as the price merchants have to pay in return for their beneficial effects
560
, i.e., a 
sort of compensation vehicles for the costs and risks incurred by  acquirers and 
issuers in processing card payment transactions. A scenario without no-
discrimination rules would see merchants in an unfairly unbalanced advantageous 
position as they would be in the position to surcharge consumers in order to recover 
their costs without paying anything in return for the benefit of belonging to a card-
payment network.  
This would result in consumers bearing all the costs for card transactions with 
the risk of causing a sort of “death spiral” for card networks, as fewer cardholders 
would mean fewer merchants, with the subsequent elimination of the benefits of 
card-payment systems
561
.  
7.14.2 The judicial approach to no-discrimination rules 
 
The debate relating to no-discrimination rules started in the U.S., where they were 
first the object of antitrust scrutiny which lead to inconsistent results
562
. The current 
U.S. scenario sees the legislative intervention of several States allowing no-
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discrimination rules and consequently introducing a general prohibition on 
surcharges by merchants
563
. Other States have introduced a general ban on no-
discriminatory rules preventing merchants from surcharging consumers, or they do 
not provide any form of legislative intervention to this regard
564
.  
In Europe, no-discrimination rules have been in the past the object of antitrust 
analysis by the Commission. In 2000, the results of a survey commissioned by the 
Commission on the effects of the abolition of no-discrimination rules in Sweden and 
the Netherlands were publicly released
565
. The outcome of the research has showed 
that in absence of no-discrimination rules, only a minimum percentage of 
merchants
566
 decided to recover costs by surcharging customers. The reason for this 
is to be found in the risk for merchants to trigger a negative reaction from consumers 
and as a consequence to lose clients. No-discrimination rules appear, thus, to have a 
limited impact in practice on competition within the inter-system market
567
.  
Another interesting finding of the above survey is that the abolition of no-
discrimination rules did not have any impact on merchant fees
568
. This appears to 
suggest that, in practice, no-discrimination rules do not affect intra-system market 
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competition, as their absence did not trigger a higher level of competition between 
acquirer banks with a subsequent decrease of merchants’ fees. 
Finally, the surveys indicate that even costs transparency for consumers did 
not improve after a the abolishment of no-discrimination rules; the few merchants 
who decided to surcharge customers, as a matter of fact, did not provide clients with 
relative information, and as a result charged customers more than the merchants’ fees 
(this happened specifically in the transport sector, e.g. taxi and travel agency)
569
. 
As a consequence of the empirical evidence gathered, the Commission held 
in its 2001 Visa International Decision
570
 that no-discrimination rules do not have an 
appreciable effect on competition within the meaning of art. 101(1)
571
.  
Contrary to this approach, the relevant Authorities in the UK have abolished 
no-discrimination rules in 1990 with successful results. It needs to be specified that 
in contrast with the regulatory approaches of Sweden and Holland, the UK 
abolishment was accompanied by crucial ancillary measures. These measures in first 
place  imposed  on merchants the obligation to declare in advance possible charges 
for different types of payment.  
 Secondly, they established a cap on  merchants’ fees to be surcharged to 
customers, which cannot exceed the effective transaction costs faced by merchants.  
As a result, in UK the negotiating position of merchants improved 
remarkably in the last seventeen years together with the number of customers using 
card payment systems
572
.  
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The importance of the adoption of such ancillary measures accompanying the 
abolishment of no-discrimination rules appears to be confirmed by the Australian 
regulatory approach. Just like the UK authorities, the Reserve Bank of Australia has 
imposed disclosure requirements on merchants and caps on surcharge fees to the 
general satisfaction of both merchants and consumers.  
It appears that the Commission did not take into account these elements in 
assessing the effects of no-discrimination rules. The Swedish and Dutch approaches 
do not seem, with respect,  to be representative of the real effects on competition of 
no-discrimination rules. The consequences of the abolition of no-discrimination rules 
alone has a limited value; in order assess the real effects on competition and at the 
same time to ensure a high level of consumer protection, the introduction of ancillary 
obligations such as disclosure requirements and limitation on surcharge fees appear 
to be necessary. From this perspective, the UK and Australian approaches are 
arguably more indicative of the real impact of no-discrimination rules on the market, 
and seem interestingly to suggest the possibility of disentangling no-discrimination 
rules from MIFs.  
Thus far, the Commission has not considered this option. The starting point 
of its analysis is that no-discrimination rules do not have an appreciable effect on 
competition. Nevertheless, as we have just seen, the platform for the rationale of the 
Commission’s assessment of no-discrimination rules is represented by empirical 
evidence gathered in relation to two markets (the Swedish and Dutch card payment 
markets) in which the regulatory intervention was confined to the elimination of no-
discrimination rules without considering possible ancillary issues relating to  
consumer protection. 
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If, on the contrary, the starting point of the analysis of the Commission was 
the consideration of the UK and Australian markets (i.e. the acknowledgment of the 
negative effects on competition of no-discrimination rules), the next question to 
address would be that of the relationship between no-discrimination rules and MIFs. 
In other words, are no-discrimination rules essential for the functioning of MIFs? 
Theoretically, the answer is no, they are not. No-discrimination rules impose 
ancillary restraints on merchants, limiting their bargaining position and their 
possibility to offer incentives to consumers in order to choosing between different 
payment methods.  
From this perspective, no-discrimination rules appear only to render more 
effective MIFs and card payment networks in the sense that they oblige merchants to 
accept all cards issued by the members of a specific network, depriving them the 
possibility to suggest alternatives to clients. These observations are arguably 
endorsed by empirical evidence suggesting the possibility to disentangle no-
discrimination rules from MIFs. If we refer, for instance, to the surveys relating to 
the Swedish and Dutch markets, these examples are indeed emblematic as the 
abolition of no-discrimination rules was not accompanied by the abolition of MIFs. 
These considerations are of paramount importance and will carefully be 
weighed in the following in order to identify possible alternative regulatory 
approaches to MIFs. 
7.15 Current state of play and possible alternative scenarios 
 
Since MIFs  can be defined as  forms of horizontal co-operation between banking 
undertakings, they  have been in the past considered detrimental for competition 
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between banks providing services to cardholders and to merchants, by courts and 
regulators both in Europe and in the United States.  
7.15.1 The European position 
 
In Europe, as established above, Visa’s and MasterCard’s MIFs  have been in recent 
years object of scrutiny by the Commission. In the former case, the Commission 
allowed only after Visa committed itself to “(i) determine the level of  the 
interchange fees on the basis  of objective costs incurred by the issuers in providing 
concrete services to merchants and (ii) allow member banks to disclose the MIFs to 
merchants”573. 
Abiding by the same rationale of the Commission’s Decision in Visa, the UK 
Office of Fair Trading, the Spanish Tribunal for the Defence of Competition and the 
Italian Central Bank, after having concluded that MIFs indeed represent an 
infringement of competition law, decided to allow them only insofar as they are 
determined on the basis of the effective costs incurred by issuing banks for 
processing card-related transactions
574
. 
With its recent decision in MasterCard, the Commission reiterated the 
approach adopted in the Visa Decision, finding the MasterCard MIF in breach of EU 
competition law as it was set on an artificially inflated level. 
The European position seems thus clear: despite a general and undisputed 
acknowledgment of the potential detrimental effect of MIFs on competition, MIFs 
are nevertheless allowed if they reflect effective costs incurred by the issuing banks.  
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  205 
Since an essential feature of such systems is that the card issuing banks 
provide specific services for the benefit of the merchants via the acquiring banks, 
MIFs are an effective and necessary vehicle for costs recovery by the issuing banks 
(given the difficulties of measuring the average marginal utility of a card payment to 
each category of user belonging to the system
575
). 
The element of the network externalities seems to play a crucial role in both 
decisions: as analysed above, any four-party card payment scheme is characterised 
by network effects, by virtue of which the more merchants are present within the 
system, the greater the utility to cardholders and vice versa
576
.  
 
 
 
7.15.2 The USA position 
 
In the US, the current regulatory approach relating to MIFs arises from the case law, 
with the NaBanco
577
 judgment as the main point of reference. In NaBanco, the court 
held that despite their potential anticompetitive nature, MIFs could be allowed for 
several following reasons. In the  first place, interchange fees were intended as 
‘transfer payments’ necessary in order to balance in an optimal way the costs and 
benefits between the merchants and card-issuing banks within a card payment 
scheme
578
. Secondly, the impact of MIFs on competition was considered minimal, as 
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the court identified the relevant market with all the possible payment systems (that is 
to say that, in case MIFs are increased to an anticompetitive level, merchants can still 
rely on a variety of alternative payment systems).  
Finally, the court found that it was not possible to identify  less restrictive 
alternatives to MIFs, as at that time card issuing banks were prevented from charging 
fees directly from customers. In particular, individual bilateral negotiations between 
merchants and card issuing banks were ruled out as an alternative to MIFs as 
impractical due to the large number of members characterising the Visa system
579
 (at 
that time there were around 15 thousand members in US).  
In the US, the NaBanco judgment still nowadays remains the point of 
reference in relation to MIFs. Nevertheless, in the subsequent First Texas 
litigation
580
, the antitrust arbitrator came very close to declaring the illegality of 
MIFs holding that “where the benefits of a competitive market can be obtained 
without a substantial impairment of efficiency, the restraint cannot be viewed as 
reasonable.”581 The line of reasoning here was that collectively determined MIFs 
may be necessary and excusable at an early stage of a payment system, but their 
justification becomes difficult once a payment card network becomes dominant in 
the market. On the basis of this sort of ‘two tiers approach’, MIFs used by well-
established and ‘dominant’ systems such as MasterCard and Visa would allegedly 
incur into sever difficulties in order to pass antitrust assessments. 
Further, if compared to the Commission decisions in Visa and MasterCard 
considered above, one may claim that the US and EU positions in reference to MIFs 
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differ quite considerably. Despite the fact that the NaBanco  judgment did question 
the compatibility of MIFs with anti-trust law, their actual impact on competition was 
considered minimal due to the alternatives in terms of different payment systems 
available in the market.  
Contrary to the US approach, the Commission did not consider this element 
at all. The considerations related to the relevant market and alternative payment 
methods enshrined in NaBanco appear, with respect, somehow disingenuous. 
Different payment systems are indeed available in the market, nevertheless it appears 
also undeniable that rather than an alternative, card payments have nowadays 
assumed their own unique dimension.  
This is especially evident if the merchants position is considered. If 
merchants decided to exit from a card payment system due to an intolerable level of 
MIFs, the only alternatives possible would be to make customers pay by cash and/or 
cheque;  either of these two alternatives do not seem to represent a viable option.    
It has been previously established that merchants represent the ultimate party 
of the sui generis two sided market system arising from card payment systems: the 
position of the merchants, in conjunction with the reaction of the ultimate users, i.e. 
customers, seems therefore to play a paramount role in order to determine the 
relevant market.  Consequently, in order to determine whether card payment systems 
represent, per se, the relevant market or concur with other payments methods, the 
question that one shall ask is the following: if deprived of card payment options, how 
would customers react? Would they be inclined to pay by cash or cheque instead? 
The answer to these questions appears to differ considerably if compared to other 
‘products’ and markets. Let us consider by way of example the market for 
computers: it appears clear that if deprived of the opportunity to buy computers 
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customers would not buy radios instead, the main consequence of this scenario being 
that the market for computers is to be considered as a distinguished market.  
The scenario is radically different when it comes to payment systems, since 
we are dealing with a service, rather than a ‘product’. Furthermore, the fact that we 
deal not only just with a service, rather with a service arguably essential complicates 
matters even further. If deprived of the opportunity to pay with cards, it appears 
indeed reasonable to claim that customers would use other payment systems instead, 
as they would need to pay in a way or another for products/services they purchase. 
Hence, prima face it is possible to claim with reasonable certainty that the relevant 
market should not be confined to card payment systems, but should comprise all 
different payment methods available to end users.  
Nevertheless, if the considerations stopped here, the outcome would be rather 
devious and misleading. The reason for this is that we are dealing with an essential 
service, rather than a product. Due to its essential nature and its consequent high 
level of interchangeability , this service needs to be (and will be) explicated in a way 
or another. Yet, the aforementioned considerations do not appear to be conclusive as 
to the  determination of the relevant market, and the answer to the above question, 
should, with respect, be re-considered in a different way focusing on the willingness 
and the reaction of customers.  
Far from being based on objective considerations, this test would attract 
undoubtedly criticism, but appear to be the only valid alternative to re-consider the 
matter object of our analysis. The question would thus be re-formulated in the 
following way:  in absence of card payments options, would customers be satisfied 
and willing to pay in an alternative way? The answer to this question would be 
clearly negative, as card payment systems represent nowadays the foremost method 
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of money transmission in the modern economy
582
. On the basis of such 
considerations, it seems reasonable to claim that card payment systems represent the 
relevant market within which the antitrust issues arising from MIFs should be 
assessed. 
Contrary to the NaBanco judgment, the Commission in both Visa and 
MasterCard considered the compatibility of MIFs with EU competition law within 
the framework of card payment systems and, as previously established, reached a 
rather different conclusion. In both decisions, MIFs were considered as the object of 
serious antitrust concerns and allowed only if not artificially inflated. Here seems to 
lie a common point of contact  between the US and EU approach; MIFs are 
considered inherently necessary for the functioning of card payment systems and 
possible alternatives are not considered as viable options.  
This sets the scene for the next level of the analysis which will be now 
devoted to the identification of possible alternatives to MIFs. 
7.16 Possible alternatives to MIFs 
Economists and lawyers have theorised several alternatives to MIFs. The first 
alternative is represented by bilateral agreements. Another alternative has been 
identified with a system of par collection setting the level of the interchange fees at 
zero. In the following, these will be considered below in turn in order to assess their 
validity. 
7.16.1 Bilateral agreements 
 
                                                 
582
 By the same token, if we were to consider the market for electricity and determine the relevant 
market solely on the basis of the concept of interchangeability the results might be equally misleading. 
If the question to be answered was what consumers would do in absence of electricity, would they use 
candles instead? The answer to that question would probably be positive.  This would lead to the 
rather misleading identification of the market for candles and electricity as the relevant product 
market.  
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The first natural alternative to multilaterally set interchange fees is represented by a 
decentralised interchange fees system based on bilateral negotiations. Under such  
scenario, each card issuer is supposed to declare in advance the fee it will charge to 
the acquirers in processing their cardholders’ transactions. Alternatively, each pair of 
banks part of the card payment scheme (i.e. issuers and acquirers) need to bilaterally 
determine the level of the fees to be paid in relation to the card payment transactions 
occurring between them
583
. 
Bilateral negotiations of interchange fees have been tamed as “a market-
based alternative to centrally set interchange fees”584. The main criticism for 
bilaterally negotiated fees lies in the inefficiencies that such schemes would cause. 
Thousands of banks that are members of a card payment system would have to enter 
into a virtually endless chain of bilateral negotiations in order for the system to 
work
585
. Nevertheless, in practice there are ways to avoid and to mitigate 
inefficiencies; one system could be implemented through a series of direct 
negotiations between a small number of banks and large members of the card 
payment system.  
For instance, in Europe the top ten acquirers account for approximately 80 
per cent of all MasterCard and Visa card transactions
586
, whereas the top ten issuers 
                                                 
583
 For a detailed analysis of bilateral fees agreements, see J. Small & J. Wright, “The Bilateral 
Negotiation of Interchange Fees in Payment Systems”, (January 2002). Document available at the 
following link: http://profile.nus.edu.sg/fass/ecsjkdw/setting_interchange_2002.pdf(accessed on 20 
July 2011). 
584
 Ibid., at p.3. As mentioned above, bilateral interchange fees have been used in the Australian 
online EFTPOS debit card system. According to the UK Office of Fair Trading, they have been also 
used by MasterCard and Visa in Sweden. 
585
 This criticism lead the Commission and the American courts to disregard bilateral negotiated fees 
as a valid alternative to MIFs. See the Commission Decision Visa, above,  and the NaBanco US 
judgment above. 
586
 See the “Commission’s Interim Report on Payment Cards”, above, at p. 88. 
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deal with approximately 78 per cent of the charge volume
587
. This means that 
individual banks not prepared to negotiate with many other banks would need only to 
negotiate a single correspondent services contract
588
.  
Another argument of censure for bilateral negotiations is related to the fact 
that through bilateral negotiations each issuer would have an enormous power on 
over each acquirer. This concern derives from the fact that within the MasterCard 
and Visa systems, a merchant accepting a branded card MasterCard or Visa, is forced 
to accept all the MasterCard/Visa cards issued by all MasterCard/Visa members
589
 
(this is the so-called honour-all-cards rule). By virtue of this rule, it has been noted 
that the power of the issuers (even the smallest ones) over the acquirer and its 
merchants is enormous (a very small issuer, for instance, could require high fees for 
signing a contract with acquirers)
590
.  
Honour-all-cards rules would therefore put the acquirers in a disadvantageous 
position in respect to negotiations with other issuing banks,  as their merchants are 
obliged to accept the other issuing banks’ cards, leaving the acquirers without any 
guarantee of payment by the car issuers.  
This criticism relating bilateral negotiations nevertheless reverts back to the 
MIFs. If it is true that a system of bilateral negotiations would put every single issuer 
in a very powerful situation, it is also true that this power is even stronger if 
exercised collectively by all card issuers as in the case of multilaterally determined 
                                                 
587
 Ibid. For the USA market, see A.S. Frankel and A. L. Shampine, “The Economic effects of 
Interchange Fees”, above, at p. 640. 
588
 For an economic analysis on this point see A.S. Frankel and A. L. Shampine, “The Economic 
effects of Interchange Fees”, above, at p. 640. 
589
 On this point see A.S. Frankel and A. L. Shampine, “The Economic effects of Interchange Fees”, 
above, at p. 640. Both Visa and MasterCards Systems adopted this rule by virtue of which when a 
merchant accept a MasterCard/Visa card, he is obliged to accept all the MasterCard/Visa cards issued 
by other members of the systems.  
590
 On this point see A.S. Frankel and A. L. Shampine, “The Economic effects of Interchange Fees”, 
above, at p. 640.  
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interchange fees. In such a system, the market power is transferred from single 
issuers to the entire network
591
.  
It is submitted by the author  that bilateral negotiations might indeed 
represent an alternative to MIFs. The hold-up problem raised by the excessive power 
conferred on single issuers could be faced by regulatory means aiming to prohibit 
honour-all-cards rules obliging merchants to accept all cards issued by the members 
of a specific card payment scheme. This would arguably  counter fight the bargaining  
power of the issuer banks, enhancing at the same time the competition within the 
system. 
 
 
7.16.2 Par collection systems 
 
The other main alternative to MIFs is represented by par collections system in which 
MIFs are set at zero
592
, (i.e. MIFs practically do not exist). The main criticism to 
such systems lies with the fact that, in the absence of MIFs, card issuers and 
merchants would be compelled to find alternative ways to recover their costs within 
the card-payment system. This could allegedly lead to an increment of consumers’ 
costs for the use of credit/debit cards.  
Yet again, this criticism appears to revert against the current MIFs regime. 
We have seen that, in practice, consumers are destined anyway to bear the cost of 
MIFs without being even aware of their existence. In the absence of MIFs, the costs 
incurred by the members of a payment-card system would be charged upfront against 
                                                 
591
 See J.C. Rochet & J. Tirole, “Cooperation Among Competitors: Some Economics of Payment Card 
Associations”, 33 RAND J. ECON. 549 (2002). On this point see also G. Guthrie & J. Wright, 
“Competiting Payment Schemes”, University of Auckland, Working Paper No. 245, 2003. Se  also 
A.S. Frankel and A. L. Shampine, “The Economic effects of Interchange Fees”, above, at p. 640. 
592
 For a detailed economic analysis of  this scenario see D.S. Evans and R. Schmalensee, “The 
economics of Interchange fees and their Regulation”, 2005, at p. 84. 
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customers. This scenario may in practice lead to a more competitive behaviour of the 
banks offering card payment services, which inevitably would be forced to offer 
discounts or competitive cost rates in order to attract new clients.  
One of the main concerns relating to an environment deprived of MIFs would 
be related to the position of the merchants. In the first place, it is highly likely that 
merchants would be the bearers of the possible discounts or promotions provided by 
issuing banks to cardholders.  
Secondly, for a ‘no-interchange fees’ system to function properly, merchants 
must be in the position to flag precise price signals to consumers. In order to do so, 
no network rule preventing these signals should be allowed (e.g. yet again there 
should be a prohibition of the so-called non-discrimination rules preventing different 
price treatments for consumers using different card-brands)
593
. 
The ultimate crucial point to be assessed is related to transactions costs; MIFs 
have been theorised as necessary vehicles for the recovery of transaction costs within 
a card payment system. If it is then possible to maintain that a card payment system 
comprising a low numbers of members could be in the position to recover transaction 
costs without the need to set MIFs, the same cannot be claimed in reference to card 
payment systems established on a large scale. It is indeed when the system develops 
and the number of members increases exponentially that the moment when  MIFs are 
considered by the doctrine as the ideal instrument of cost recovery arises
594
.  
Nevertheless, as just established, a valid alternative at that stage might be the use of 
bilateral negotiations. This scenario arguably does not seem to have a negative 
impact on the network effects proper of four party schemes, as banks would still be 
                                                 
593
 On this point see D.A. Balto, “The Problem of Interchange Fees: Costs Without Benefits?”, [2000] 
E.C.L.R., Issue 4, at p. 223.  
594
 See D.A. Balto, “The Problem of Interchange Fees: Costs Without Benefits?”, [2000] E.C.L.R., 
Issue 4, at p. 223. 
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in the position to attract new merchants, merchants new customers, all this triggering 
the enhancement of the system without the need for MIFs. 
 
7.17 The Way Forward: Possible Regulatory Approaches to MIFs 
 
Having analysed the controversial antitrust issues stemming out the use of MIFs by 
card payment systems, it is now possible to proceed to the formulation of possible 
regulatory frameworks for multilaterally agreed fees.  
Two main regulatory streams will be considered: the starting point of the first 
possible regulatory approach is the acknowledgement of the necessity of MIFs, or at 
least the lack of valid alternatives. The second main approach is, on the contrary, 
based on the introduction of a general prohibition of MIFs. Both are considered in 
turn below. 
 
7.17.1 A regulatory approach acknowledging the legality of MIFs 
 
A regulatory approach allowing the members of card-payment systems to 
collectively determine interchange fees reflects the current antitrust position in 
Europe and US. As analysed above, the ECJ and the Commission in Europe, as well 
as the American courts in US have allowed in the past, and currently still allow, the 
use of MIFs. At the same time, emphasis in both legal systems was put on the 
potential anticompetitive effects of jointly set interchange fees.  
If the starting point is the acknowledgement of the necessity of MIFs (or the 
lack of suitable alternatives), yet a regulatory intervention appears to be  necessary in 
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order to mitigate possible anticompetitive effects vis-à-vis consumers. This 
regulatory intervention can assume various forms. 
7.17.2 Full disclosure and strict regulation of costs   
 
One possible way to regulate interchange fees can be represented by the imposition 
of a full disclosure obligation on the members of a card payment system in relation to 
the nature of the costs covered and the rationale of the interchange fees
595
. Such 
approach is based on a high degree of integration between the economic and legal 
analyses of MIFs, and on the recognition of the economics of two-sided markets as 
four party card payment systems.  
As emphasised above, the starting point of the economic analysis of two-
sided markets is that each side of the market (i.e card-issuers-acquirers and 
merchants-customers) is not in the position to recover its processing costs in a 
competitive situation
596
.  
Furthermore, the possibility for MIFs to trigger the so called ‘network 
effects’ necessary for the expansion and the existence of the card-payment system 
should be taken into account, in conjunction with the elasticities of the demand on 
both sides of the market. In this regard,, MIFs should not be interpreted as strictly 
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 As analysed above, this approach has been adopted by the Commission in the Visa Decision above, 
where the Commission decided to grant an exemption under Art. 81(3) (now 101(3) , insofar Visa 
committed itself to “(i) determine the level of  the interchange fees on the basis  of objective costs 
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based on effective and legitimate costs. See  D. Cruickshank “Competition in UK Banking: A Report 
to the Chancellor of the Exchequer”, March 2000, at 3.199, 3.213. 
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 On this point see S. Semerato, “Credit Card Interchange Fees: Three Decades of Antitrust 
Uncertainty”, above, at p. 988.  
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designed to balance the costs of the two markets, as the fluctuations in terms of 
demand on both sides of the market are impossible to  foresee
597
. 
If antitrust rules are applied to the market of card-payment systems in 
conjunction with the above economic analysis, the result would lead legislators or 
regulatory bodies to allow the existence of collectively determined fees, regulating 
only the possible negative side–effects on competition. These side effects comprise 
possible abuses due to the lack of transparency relating to the real essence of MIFs 
which can, for instance be set at a very high level for no practical reason other than 
to increase profits. A requirement of transparency through public disclosure of the 
rationale of the level of MIFs seems a good regulatory means, but it is only the first 
step. Imposing an obligation of disclosure on card issuers appears to be, indeed, an 
insufficient measure as the information  can be easily manipulated.  
Regulators should devote particular attention to the existence of a genuine 
and effective linkage between effective costs and MIFs. In other words, the level of 
MIFs should always reflect the costs incurred by the members of the card-payment 
system with an additional element related to the consideration of the elasticities of 
the demand on both sides of the market.  
More specifically, the reflection of this last element seems to play a crucial 
role both in the regulation and in the judicial evaluation of MIFs. In order to assess 
the validity of MIFs, courts should pay particular attention not only to the extent to 
which MIFs reflect effective costs, but care should also be devoted to the level of 
elasticity of demand on both sides of the market.  
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Uncertainty”, above, at p. 988.  
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Unfortunately, experience seems to suggest that this is rather a difficult task: 
let us consider, by way of example, a possible increment of interchange fees, the 
effect of such an increment on each of the two sides of the market is radically 
different. If the effect on merchants is barely palpable
598
, the impact on consumers 
can be dramatic
599
. In other words, the cardholders’ use of payment cards would tend 
to be much more reactive to MIFs compared to the merchants’ reaction. Courts 
should therefore devote particular attention to the position of merchants.  Even so, 
the assessment of the legality of MIFs  would be far from over.  
The next step would be to the assessment of the level of efficiency of the 
MIFs. Economic analysis suggests that an increment of MIFs despite decreasing 
costs does not represent a decisive element in order to assess whether interchange 
fees are determined at an efficient level; here emphasis should be put on the effective 
use of the interchange fees, that is to say, whether MIFs are used by card issuers in 
order to transfer more revenue than necessary
600
.  
That being the case, it is likely that MIFs so determined entail an abuse. Yet 
again, the concrete assessment of the validity of MIFs appears to be of difficult 
application, as concepts like demand elasticity and level of efficiency tend to be, in 
practice,  very intricate.  This requires a high level of economic analysis and great 
discretion on the part of the courts when asked to assess the validity of multilaterally 
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agreed interchange fees, which will of course have to be considered on a case-by-
case basis
601
. 
This regulatory approach appears to be an interesting alternative, but not 
devoid of negative aspects. Difficulties may indeed arise from the integration of the 
economic analysis with antitrust law; allowing MIFs equals, as a matter of fact, to 
embrace their economic justification tout court. Consequently, antitrust law should 
intervene in order to tone down possible negative repercussions on competition. In 
order to do so, every possible economic aspect of MIFs needs to be carefully weigh 
by regulatory bodies as well as by courts, as partial economic analysis would lead to 
misleading conclusions relating to the validity of interchange fees.  
Lastly, a regulatory approach allowing MIFs should always allow bypass 
mechanisms of multilaterally set interchange fees. In this regard, network rules 
prohibiting bilateral negotiations and additional fees should be declared unlawful.  
 
 
 
7.17.3 Regulatory Approaches based on the introduction of a general prohibition of 
MIFs 
 
The recent Commission Report on card payment systems provides evidence of the 
fact that MIFs are not necessary elements of card payment systems
602
. Considering 
their unquestionable anticompetitive aspects, the concluding remarks of the Report 
appear thus to wipe away the theoretical foundations for possible exemptions of 
MIFs. 
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the region of 60% to VISA debit cards MIFs costs legally binding. This is in line with the reduction of  
MasterCard MIFs for debit cards announced in 2009 (see Case COMP/34579 MasterCard. See 
IP/09/515, 1.4.2009). 
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A possible regulatory scenario prohibiting MIFs needs to take into account 
the existence of alternative mechanisms and their possible regulation. As analysed 
above, one concrete alternative to MIFs is represented by bilateral negotiations. 
Bilateral negotiations would put banks and merchants belonging to a card-payment 
system in the position to freely negotiate fees. This would re-establish a more 
balanced negotiating platform by virtue of which it would be possible to counter 
balance the card issuers market power with a stronger bargaining position of 
acquirers and merchants.  
An essential condition for the effectiveness of a bilateral negotiations system 
is the abolition of any type of no-discrimination rules imposing on merchants the 
obligation to honour all cards issued within a specific card payment network. Such 
measures are of the outmost importance, as they would reinforce the bargaining 
position of merchants who would no longer be obliged to accept any branded card 
issued in a specific network.  
Most of all, the prohibition of “honour all cards” rules is indeed necessary for 
a system of bilateral negotiations to function, as only without no-discrimination rules 
would merchants be in the position to bilaterally negotiate with card issuers and 
acquirers.  
A regulatory approach introducing a general prohibition of MIFs should put 
particular emphasis on consumer protection. Bilateral negotiations would, in fact, 
reinforce the market power of acquirers and merchants who could easily surcharge 
consumer more than necessary in order to increase profits. Consequently, the first 
measure to be implemented should be to prohibit merchants from surcharging 
customers more than the effective transaction costs.  
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In addition, effective controlling mechanisms would need to be put into force 
in order to constantly monitor surcharge fees and intervene in cases of abuse. 
Consumer protection would also require complete transparency and a consequent 
obligation falling on merchants obliging them to disclose to consumers in advance 
the entity of any possible fees they would have to accept according to the payment 
method they choose.  
Another necessary measure to be enacted would be the prohibition of any 
kind of inter-network rules preventing merchants from offering incentives to 
consumers in relation to the choice of less costly payment mechanisms. Such 
measures would have a twofold effect: they would in first place reinforce the position 
of consumers by offering them different alternatives, enhancing at the same time 
intra-system competition.  
Intra-system competition would in this way act in conjunction with bilateral 
negotiations, representing the real solution to interchange fees
603
. Only where 
networks effectively compete for “both sides of the equation, card issuing banks and 
merchants  have the right and  ability to use lower cost networks to route transactions 
to card issuers, can consumer be assured that interchange fees are not just a hidden 
tax from consumers to banks”604. 
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7.18 Conclusions 
 
Card payments represent nowadays the foremost means of payment used by 
consumers
605
.  
MIFs and no-discrimination rules have since the outset been an integral part 
of any card payment network systems. The analysis of their effective impact on 
competition has led to almost three decades of antitrust uncertainty.  
If it is true, on the one hand, that both MIFs and no-discrimination rules 
represent blatant restriction on competition; on the other hand,  economists have 
emphasised the peculiar aspects of four party payment networks as two-sided 
markets and their impact on the antitrust assessment of MIFs and no-discrimination 
rules.. Within such markets, competitive forces operate in a sui generis way  so as to 
render MIFs and no-discrimination rules allegedly essential for the correct 
functioning of card payment networks. These economic arguments have undoubtedly  
had an impact on both the US courts, and the European authorities, which fully 
embraced these economic theories, and generally  tolerated (although subject to the 
imposition of certain requirements) MIFs and no-discrimination rules.  
This approach was, thus far, in part justified by the novelty and the 
progressive success of card payment networks which somehow lead to a cautiously 
‘hands off’ regulatory approach due to the risk of compromising the development of 
a new and very efficient payment system capable of beneficial effects on a large 
scale. 
Now, time is arguably mature enough for a re-assessment of the antitrust 
implications of MIFs and no-discrimination rules. Empirical evidence appears to 
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demonstrate their anti-competitiveness and, most of all, their non-essentiality for the 
functioning of card payment networks. Alternatives such as bilateral negotiations 
between the members of card payment systems could represent a feasible and more 
competition friendly way to recover transactions costs for the members of a four 
party card payment scheme.  
In years to come, competition authorities and regulatory bodies will be asked 
to re-evaluate MIFs and no-discrimination rules. There are two possible regulatory 
approaches: keep acknowledging the necessity of MIFs, or declare them unlawful. 
The former approach (currently adopted by the EU Commission and by the US 
courts) should aim to mitigate possible anticompetitive side effects through the 
imposition of disclosure requirements and a strict control on their effective 
correspondence to transactions costs. In addition, bypassing devices of MIFs (e.g 
bilateral forms of negotiations) should always be allowed.   
The latter solution would remove the possibility to use MIFs within card 
payment systems allowing bilateral negotiations instead. This approach should put 
particular emphasis on consumer protection, as consumers might suffer from the 
consequent possibility for merchants to surcharge clients in order to recover 
transaction costs. The imposition of disclosure requirements on merchants in relation 
to fees, in conjunction with a general prohibition to surcharge consumers more than 
the effective costs require, should ensure consumer protection granting at the same 
time intra-system competition. 
It is submitted that both the above approaches should be based on the 
illegality of no-discrimination rules as non-necessary for the functioning of card-
payment networks, and bearing negative consequences on competition which only 
with difficulty can  be balanced against their alleged positive effects. 
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8 Non-Price competition Issues in the Banking 
Sector 
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8.1 Introduction 
 
 
The aim of this Chapter is to critically analyse the so-called ‘non-price competition 
issues’ arising within the context of payment systems. These issues encompass any 
kind of possible rules relating to access to essential facilities, agreements relating to 
operative aspects, and membership rules (e.g. the prohibition on participants to 
adhere to other payment systems).  
Although not directly related to price matters, the above behaviours are 
indeed capable of having a negative impact on competition, and have been the object 
of scrutiny by the Commission and the European Courts in relation to their 
compatibility with Art. 101.  
  225 
This Chapter will principally focus on the EU regulatory approach of non-
price competition issues. A comparative element (the US approach) will also be 
considered in order to identify links with ‘price competition issues’ analysed in the 
last chapter, and possible alternative regulatory frameworks. 
 
8.2 Access to essential facilities 
 
From an antitrust perspective, any ideally competitive market should always allow 
access to essential facilities by new participants
606
. Under  EU competition law, the 
so called ‘essential facilities doctrine’ is dealt with in conjunction with both Articles 
101 and 102 of the Lisbon Treaty
607
.  The ‘essential facilities doctrine finds 
application to exclusionary practices, (e.g. such as refusals to supply), having a 
detrimental  effect on competition in the relevant market
608
. 
The concept of essential facility entails the existence of two markets, an 
‘upstream market’ and a ‘downstream market’, together with a dominant undertaking 
operating in both the upstream and the downstream market
609
. If the dominant 
undertaking owns an input (the essential facility) and uses that input to compete in 
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the downstream market, it is extremely difficult for a competitor to seek access to the 
downstream market. Two elements are therefore necessary: the ownership or control 
over a "facility" by a dominant undertaking and the ‘essentiality’ of a facility.  
This brings us to the next question: when can a facility be regarded as 
essential? According to the ECJ in ICI v. Commission
610
, an essential facility’ is a 
“facility or infrastructure without access to which competitors cannot provide 
services to their customers”.  
The concept of essential facility seems therefore to entail that access to the 
facility must be essential or crucial for the competitor seeking access to survive in 
that market. The refusal of access to that facility would therefore turn into a barrier to 
entry, as the facility is in practice incapable of being duplicated. 
In the banking sector, mechanisms of exclusions or access denial tend to 
assume the form of membership rules as analysed in the following. 
8.3 Card payment systems: essential facility  and membership criteria 
 
All the major payment systems (e.g. Visa, MasterCard, Diner club etc.) adopt access 
and membership criteria. Depending on their requirements, these rules can indeed 
prevent external players from having access to what can be surely defined as an 
essential facility. Further, such rules entail the co-operation between dominant 
undertakings and are therefore subject to the application of both Article 101 and 102. 
That is the reason why the Bank for International Settlements proposed as 
one of the core principles for systematically important payment systems the full 
disclosure of the criteria for participation in the system, so as to render access to key 
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payment systems open and fair
611
. The right of external players to have access to the 
network needs, nevertheless, to be balanced vis-à-vis  the investments made by the 
founders of a payment system
612
.  
Rules for access having a restrictive effect therefore need to be carefully 
scrutinised, especially in case payment systems are owned and operated by large 
banks. It is indeed likely that restrictive access criteria are driven by the desire of the 
current establishment to retain the benefits of its status quo, thus preventing 
admission to the payment system by external undertakings
613
.  
All this ignites the compelling need to seek the right balance between the 
payment system’s safety and competition. The general idea would be that access 
criteria to payment systems should ideally encourage competition amongst the 
members in order to promote low cost payment services. Restrictive access criteria 
should be then carefully assessed in order to carefully weigh any objective 
justifications for, thus, protecting the safety and the efficiency of the system
614
. 
Strictly related to access criteria, the so called ‘membership rules’ give rise to 
controversial competition issues. Payment card systems, like any other kind of 
network systems, tend to lay down specific collective rules often limiting the intra-
system membership. These rules can assume the form of  the so called ‘exclusion 
rules’ which prevent competitive financial institutions from having access to the 
system, or of the form of ‘no acquiring without issuing rules’ disallowing members 
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the possibility to participate in the card payment system with the aim of acquiring 
without issuing.   
Obviously, such rules may affect intra-system competition and have therefore 
been the object of scrutiny by competition authorities both in the US and Europe. 
 
8.4 The MountainWest Case and the US position 
 
The current US position relating to access criteria and membership rules stems out 
from the Court of Appeal decision in  MountainWest (SCFC)
615
. At the core of the 
dispute was the Visa Bylaw 2.06 laying down one of the access criteria to the US 
Visa payment system. Under Bylaw 2.06, membership was denied to any applicant 
issuing, directly or indirectly, Discover or American Express cards, or any other 
cards which did not belong to the Visa network
616
.  
This Bylaw effectively restrained access to the Visa network by members of 
the American Express or Discover systems, and was invoked by Visa in order to 
deny access to MountainWest (issuer of Discovery Cards). 
The rule in question was found by MountainWest to be anti-competitive for 
two main reasons: firstly, it was claimed that since Visa Bylaw 2.06 prevented access 
to the US Visa card network it was therefore capable of restricting intra-system 
competition. Secondly, Bylaw 2.06 was considered harmful for competition as it 
effectively restrained the creation and diffusion of other proprietary cards. 
The main Visa’s counter argument to these findings was based on the fact 
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that  Bylaw 2.06, rather than being anti-competitive, was on the contrary beneficial 
for competition, as it preserved the disjointed existence of the Discovery card system 
(one of the main Visa competitors). Furthermore, Visa maintained to have introduced 
Bylaw 2.06 in order to protect its property from inter-system competitors who 
otherwise would be capable of enjoying a free ride at the time of their entry
617
. 
In first instance before the District Court, a jury unanimously pronounced a 
verdict  in favour of MountainWest declaring Visa’s Bylaw 2.06 anti-competitive618. 
Nevertheless, the District Court’s judgment was overruled on second instance by the 
US Court of Appeal. The line of reasoning of the Court of Appeal relies on a rather 
interesting interpretation of the main US antitrust piece of legislation (the Sherman 
Act). The main aim of the Sherman Act is, according to the Court of Appeal, to 
protect competition per se.  Consequently, Visa’s Bylaw 2.06 did not amount to an 
infringement of  the US antitrust regulatory framework as it ultimately did not cause 
detriment to consumers
619
.  
Herein lays the real value of the Court of Appeal judgment in MountainWest 
(SCFC): the essence of US Antitrust law appears to be more  inclined towards 
consumer welfare/protection rather than on ensuring a level playing field of 
competition between undertakings.  
The consequences of this approach are remarkable, especially as far as non-
price competition issues such as access criteria, or membership rules are considered. 
If the ultimate aim of an antitrust regulatory framework is to safeguard consumers, it 
consequently becomes inordinately difficult to challenge or breach membership 
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Bylaws or access criteria rules.  
The only possible way to do this would be to prove the existence of a link 
between such rules and consumer welfare; a rather intricate task to perform 
considering the absence of any price issues to be assessed vis-à-vis consumers.  
 
8.5 Essential facility in the banking sector : the EU perspective, a different 
approach 
 
In contrast with the US approach, the European Commission considered the delicate 
competition issues arising from the need of undertakings to have access to essential 
facilities not only from a consumer protection perspective, but also in relation to the 
need to create a level playing field in this area of the market. 
Further, the Commission devoted serious attention to the concept of access to 
essential facilities in payment and financial systems in its 1995 Notice on the 
application of the EC Competition rules to cross-border credit transfers
620
. In this 
document, the Commission reiterating the line of reasoning expressed by the ECJ in 
ICI v. Commission
621
, considered, inter alia, a payment system as an essential facility 
when membership is “necessary for banks in order to compete in the relevant 
market”622. In other words, the lack of access to the system “amounts to a significant 
barrier to entry for a new competitor”623.   
This approach emphasises the primordial necessity to identify the essential 
facility under its relevant market dimension and gives rise to essential questions 
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relating to the extent of the impenetrability of the barriers to entry which therefore 
qualifies an essential facility. Whenever an essential facility is identified, any refusal 
of access to that facility would thus automatically constitute anticompetitive behavior 
by the undertaking concerned (in this case a bank or a group of banks).  
Such conduct would then need to be justified under objective circumstances 
and weighed against its incidence on competition
624
.  
 If the concept of essential facility is applied to the card payment sector, it has 
been correctly noted that the concept of essential facility appears, within this context, 
to refer to systems having such a predominant space in the market so as to render it a 
prohibitive task for outsiders  to create alternative networks
625
.  
The key issue here does not seems to lie  in the total impossibility of 
duplicating the existing facility, rather than in the cost effectiveness  of putting into 
place and creating an alternative system. Only if the costs of creating an alternative 
framework is considered prohibitive, can it be claimed that we are dealing with an 
essential facility. As a consequence, the undertakings running such a facility cannot 
justify mechanisms of exclusions or access denial on the basis of the possibility for 
the market to bear more than one such facility
626
. 
That is the reason why mechanisms of exclusion and membership criteria, 
according to the Commission’s Notice, need to be objectively justified, i.e. be 
“written, accessible and non-discriminatory”627. They may, for instance, “lay down 
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requirements for members concerning their financial standing, technical or 
management capacities, and compliance with a level of creditworthiness”628.  
The payment of an entry fee may also be required: however, the entry fee 
must not be set at so high a level that it becomes a barrier to entry
629
. In any event, 
the level of an entry fee must not exceed a “fair share of the real cost of past 
investments in the system”630, and the membership criteria “should not make 
membership in the system conditional upon acceptance of other unrelated 
services”631.  
Finally, according to the Notice “refusal of membership or definitive 
exclusion from a cross-border credit transfer system that constitutes an essential 
facility should be accompanied by a written justification for the reasons for the 
refusal or exclusion and should be subject to an independent review procedure”632.  
Through the Notice the Commission appears to seek find the right balance 
between the payment system’s safety and competition; this is the essence of the 
requirement of objectively justified and fully disclosed access criteria.  
8.5.1 The SWIFT Case 
 
Shortly after the release of the Notice on the application of the EC Competition rules 
to cross-border credit transfers, the Commission had the chance to apply its criteria 
to a practical situation with the SWIFT case
633
. SWIFT (Society for Worldwide 
International Financial Telecommunications), is a co-operative society comprising 
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approximately 2,000 banks throughout the world. It provides a network for the 
international processing of order transfer messages, including national and cross-
border payment messages, letters of credit etc. Full access to the system was granted 
only to banks and entities operating in the same type of business. On these grounds, 
the application of La Poste (the French Post Office) to become member of the 
SWIFT system was rejected.  
Acting on the basis of a complaint received by La Poste, the Commission 
released a statement of objections against SWIFT for anticompetitive behaviour
634
.  
The Commission argued that SWIFT held a monopolistic position in the field 
of international payment message transfers. Furthermore, the network was deemed to 
constitute an essential facility as it was the only network providing links between 
banks located anywhere around the world. Following the statement of objections 
released by the Commission, SWIFT agreed to provide access to its network and 
services on the basis of objectively justified admission criteria to be applied in a non-
discriminatory manner.  To qualify for SWIFT membership, undertakings were 
required to satisfy the criteria laid down at that time by the European Monetary 
Institute (EMI) for access to any European Payment System (e.g., recognition of 
public nature and of a consequent low risk of failure, and supervision by a recognised 
competent authority). 
The requirement of compliance with the criteria laid down by EMI was 
considered by the Commission as objectively justified and necessary for the 
avoidance of systemic risks.  
The SWIFT case is of paramount importance. Still now it enshrines the 
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paradigm for admissions criteria to an essential facility, which revolve around the 
need for finding the right balance between the protection of payment network 
systems and competition. Above all, the SWIFT case raises some interesting  
elements of reflection relating to the application of the doctrine of essential facility to 
the financial services sector.   
At an early stage of the proceedings, SWIFT maintained that even assuming 
the qualification of its network as an essential facility, the rejection of La Poste ‘s 
application did not have any appreciable effect on competition. The reason for this 
was that the SWIFT system (as many financial entities which could be qualified as 
essential facilities) is a co-operative owned by financial institutions (which are the 
clients of the system) providing services to a large number of organizations
635
.  
This consideration is extremely important as it leads us to the next level of 
analysis, and, yet again, to the question of what is the real endeavour of competition 
law: consumer protection, or rather competitors’ protection? The answer to this 
question is the key to understand the difference in the approach by competition 
authorities/courts at European level and in US. Furthermore, the consideration of this 
matter appears to be essential in order to suggest possible alternatives. 
If the starting point is that the ultimate aim of competition law is the 
neoclassical idea of consumer welfare/protection, then the SWIFT case would not 
have given rise to any antitrust issues. Given the fact that the SWIFT network 
operated through a large network of worldwide banks connected to it, the exclusion 
of one institution (La Poste) did not, in practice, have a significant impact on 
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competition on the downstream market for cross-border payment message transfers, 
and ultimately on consumers.
636
  
As previously mentioned, this approach has been endorsed by the US courts 
in the MountanWest case, and  it is now possible to draw a parallel between these 
two cases.  
Both cases deal with the need for an external undertaking to have access to 
what can be defined as an essential facility according to the essential facility doctrine 
(a card payment network system in the MountanWest case, and the market for cross-
border payment message transfers in SWIFT).  
The outcome is nevertheless radically different due to a completely different 
approach of the antitrust regulatory authorities. In Europe, competition law appears 
to be oriented not only to protect consumers, but also towards the  safeguard of 
competitors
637
. On the contrary, the US approach leans towards the idea of  shielding 
market end users.  
In light of such differences, the SWIFT case would have been arguably 
decided in favour of SWIFT if assessed by US courts, which would have considered 
the situation essentially from a consumer perspective.  
Which approach would be more suitable in order to assess competition issues 
arising from access to an essential facility in the financial services industry then? 
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The answer to that question is thornier than one may prima facie think. It is 
indeed  very difficult  to disentangle consumer protection from competitors’ 
protection, as both elements seem to be strictly related to one another. As far as card 
payment systems are concerned,  the larger the number of undertakings participating 
in the system, the more likely is that consumers would be in a  position to choose one 
that is suitable for them among the operators. All this provided that both inter-system 
and intra-system competition are ensured.  
Access to an essential facility in the financial services seems therefore to 
represent only one side of the coin. By the same token, there seems to be a need to 
ensure an adequate level of competition not only in terms of access to the system, but 
also at inter-system level.  
This element appears, with respect, to undermine the US approach. It is 
indeed questionable whether access criteria like Visa Bylaw 2.06 which prevents 
card issuers of competitive cards from obtaining Visa membership, do not harm 
consumer welfare. Indeed,  allowing other card issuers belonging to the American 
Express or the Discover networks to become part of the Visa system  (or vice-versa) 
means not only to protect competition per se’, but may also result in an enhancement 
of consumer welfare, provided that inter system competition is also adequately 
ensured.  
All this needs to be counter-balanced against the adequate need for protection 
required by an already established system, in view of not allowing new participants 
to enjoy a ‘free ride’ relying upon previous financial investments necessary for the 
construction of the system.  In this regard, the requirement of objective and non-
discriminatory justification suggested by the Commission in its Notice and in the 
SWIFT case appear to be a useful instrument in order to obtain a right balance, but 
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this may not suffice.  
If undertakings can become part of a system but are not free to compete with 
one another or to adhere to other payment systems, the enforcement of competition 
would, in fact,  remain incomplete. All this will be the object of analysis in the 
following. 
 
8.6 Exclusivity rules: the prohibition on participants to adhere to other 
payment systems 
 
The other side of exclusion rules (although not directly related to access criteria) is 
represented by the so called exclusivity rules. According to such rules, the 
membership of a card-payment network may be terminated in the event that a 
member issues payment cards belonging to other competitive systems. Contrary to 
exclusion rules, exclusivity rules do not restrict access to essential facilities and 
therefore are more likely to have a negative impact only in relation to inter-system 
competition
638
. 
In the US, exclusivity rules have been the object of scrutiny in the early 
1970s in relation to exclusivity Bylaws adopted by the National Bank Americard 
(forerunner of Visa) and MasterCharge (predecessor of MasterCard). Nevertheless, 
the issue relating to the compatibility of exclusivity rules with the Sherman Act was 
judicially assessed for the first time only in 1980 with the National Bank of Canada v 
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Interbank Card Association case
639
.  
Here controversial issues arose from the adoption by Interbank Card 
Association (MasterCard) of an exclusivity rule preventing its Canadians members 
from adhering to other card system payment networks.  The rule in question was 
deemed to be necessary in order to protect the original members’ set-up costs insofar 
as its enforcement was limited in time (that was eight years in anticipation of the 
recovery of start-up costs).  
More interestingly, the court maintained that the “underlying purpose of the 
exclusivity of the provision was to enhance the competition in the Canadian credit 
card market by introducing a new product”640. Moreover, the court declared that 
although to some extent the rule had a negative impact on intra-brand competition, it 
also had the beneficial effect of increasing inter-brand competition. 
641
  
In 1991, Visa USA introduced Bylaw 2.10(e) which provided for the 
termination of the membership in the event that a member issued competitive cards. 
Virtually identical to Bylaw 2.06 analysed above, Bylaw 2.10 (e) is completely 
different in scope, although somehow complementary. If Bylaw 2.06 lays out an 
access criterion (consequently giving rise to issues relating to the access to an 
essential facility); Bylaw 2.10 (e) is an exclusivity rule preventing undertakings 
already members of the Visa network from issuing competitive cards.  
Immediately after the introduction of Visa Bylaw 2.10 (e), MasterCard USA 
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enacted the Competitive Program Policy (CPP) containing similar exclusivity rules. 
In 2001 both Visa Bylaw 2.10 (e) and MasterCard CCP were the object of judicial 
scrutiny after the US Department of Justice initiated a legal action vis-à-vis Visa and 
MasterCard
642
.   
In open contrast with the National Bank of Canada v Interbank Card 
Association judgment, the District Court considered the exclusivity rules introduced 
by Visa US and MasterCard US anticompetitive restrictive of competition in that 
they were the issuing and network services market. Despite of the defendants’ claim 
that the exclusivity rules represented a mechanism of protection of their systems, the 
District Court contended that exclusivity rules “undeniably reduce output and harm 
consumer welfare constituting a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act”643.  
Yet again, consumer protection appears to be the main issue at stake, and the 
basis for the antitrust assessment of the court. What is not convincing, with respect,  
is the opposite outcome of this court decision compared to MountainWest. It has 
been already mentioned that Visa Bylaw 2.10 (e) is virtually identical to Visa Bylaw 
2.06, with the only difference confined to the scope of application of the rules. It is 
opinion of this author that this difference cannot in any way justify such a disparity 
of approach by the courts. This because Visa Bylaw 2.10 (e) and Visa Bylaw 2.06 
represent two faces of the same coin; and, above all, they are both capable of 
harming consumers.  
Turning to exclusivity rules, here it would possible to draw a direct 
comparison between the US and European approaches, since  Visa’s intention to 
introduce an exclusivity rule modelled on the same lines as Visa US Bylaw 2.10 (e) 
                                                 
642
 See US District Court, US v Visa USA Inc., 163 F. Supp.2d 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), p. 382. 
643
 Ibid., at paragraph. 406 (emphasis added).  
  240 
in Europe  has been in the past  object of scrutiny by the Commission.  
After receiving complaints from American Express and Dan Witter (the 
issuer of Discovery Card), the Commission initiated an investigation in January 
1996. The investigation never produced an official outcome as it was withdrawn after 
the EU Board of Visa International decided to drop the proposal for the introduction 
of an exclusivity rule in Europe
644
.   
Despite the lack of an official Commission Decision, the nature of the 
complaints and, above all, the first response of the Commission represent an 
interesting platform for discussion. The objections raised by American Express and 
Dan Witter were related to the negative impact of the proposed rule on competition 
between banks which would have been prevented from issuing the entire range of 
payment cards. More specifically, inter-system competition was deemed to be 
affected as access to the Visa distribution channels would have been impaired by the 
introduction of the contested exclusivity rule.  
The preliminary view of the Commission’s Directorate General for 
Competition endorsed the complaints formulated by American Express and Dan 
Witter. In particular, the Commission maintained that the proposed rule, if adopted, 
would have been caught by Art. 101 (1), as it would have impeded inter-system 
competition and foreclosed access to a key distribution channel
645
.  
Here the issue of inter-system competition appears to be particularly 
interesting. The link between inter-system and intra-system competition (and 
consequently between exclusion and exclusivity rules) is, in the author’s opinion, of 
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crucial importance: although they raise different antitrust concerns, inter-system and 
intra-system competition arguably complement one another. Consequently, once 
exclusion rules are considered anticompetitive, the same consideration should apply 
to exclusivity rules, and vice versa.  
In this regard, the approach of the US authorities appears to be, with respect, 
rather idiosyncratic: exclusion rules were endorsed in the Mountainwest case, and 
thereafter exclusivity rules adopted by Visa and MasterCard USA were disallowed. It 
is submitted that the linkage between exclusion rules and exclusivity rules is so 
intrinsic and deep as not to substantiate the aforementioned discrepancies.  
This contrast in the approach cannot be justified even in light of the court 
neoclassical interpretation of the Sherman Act as mainly a tool intended to aim at 
protecting and enhancing consumer welfare. Despite the line of reasoning adopted by 
the US court in the Mountainwest case, it is plausible to claim that exclusion rules 
are indeed capable of having a negative impact on consumer welfare. Excluding 
undertakings from a card payment system because they issue competing cards, 
ultimately means to deprive competition between banks by decreasing the range of 
products they could provide to customers. And this scenario consequently harms 
consumer welfare. 
The Commission’s approach is therefore arguably more coherent than the US 
approach to the extent that it considers both types of rules against EU competition 
law.  
Before considering possible alternative regulatory frameworks in relation to 
non-price competition issues and their relationship with price competition factors, the 
analysis will now  shift on to co-operation agreements between banking 
undertakings. 
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8.7 Co-operation agreements between banks 
 
It is usual practice for banks to agree standards relating to the operation of specific 
networks (e.g. settlement agreements), or in relation to security of risks management. 
Here the underlying idea is that forms of co-operation between financial 
institutions which go beyond technical support could indeed represent a threat for 
competition. Nevertheless, restrictive forms of co-operation between banks which 
enhance the efficiency of the services may be exempted under Art. 101 (3) provided 
that they are the least possible restrictive means to achieve their objective
646
.  
Examples of such agreements are found in the cases Irish Banks
647
 and 
Banque Nationale de Paris - Dresdner Bank.
648
 In Irish Banks, the Commission 
considered an agreement reached by the four foremost   Irish banks relating to their 
opening hours was not capable of distorting competition
649
.  
In Banque Nationale de Paris - Dresdner Bank, the object of dispute was an 
agreement providing a close co-operation in the area of international business 
(international finance, merchant banking and placing of securities). More 
specifically, the agreements provided for the enactment of a system for the exchange 
of information and the joint development of data-processing instruments. 
The  agreement in question was found in breach of Art. 81 EC (now Art.101);  
nevertheless, the conditions for an exemption under Art. 81 EC (3) (now Art. 101 (3) 
were considered to be met. It was held indeed that as a result of the agreement, an 
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improvement in the production of financial services provided to individuals and 
undertakings was going to consequently arise from the cooperation between the two 
banks. In particular,  the introduction of new data-processing tools in conjunction 
with the availability of new sources of financial data was considered ultimately 
beneficial for the market and thus worthy of exemption
650
.  
The cooperation was also deemed  to improve the distribution of services and 
products supplied by the other partner. Interconnection between the data-processing 
systems was also considered beneficial in order to improve banking services across 
frontiers, especially cross-frontier payments
651
.  
Consumers were considered to benefit from the qualitative and quantitative 
improvements in banking services and their reciprocal distribution via the branches 
of both and from the setting-up of new forms and means of electronic banking. The 
clauses relating to cooperation between the two banks were deemed  indispensable in 
order to attain the abovementioned objectives, and an exemption was consequently 
granted for a ten year period. 
 
8.8 The relationship between price and non-price competition issues 
 
Non price competition issues, although not directly related to price matters, are 
indeed capable of having a negative impact on competition.  
                                                 
650
 According to a report submitted to the Commission by the two banks, by transferring existing 
know-how which involved at least half their activities, the banks were deemed to be able to provide 
improved or new services to their customers (Commission Decision, Banque Nationale de Paris - 
Dresdner Bank, above, at paragraph 18). The increased efficiency of the system was deemed to be 
advantageous for customers in view of the creation of new electronic banking services and products, 
new possibilities relating to account and loan management at national and cross-border level, new 
forms of information and financial advice and new possibilities for managing capital market 
transactions, and new types of securities and derivatives. 
651
 Commission Decision, Banque Nationale de Paris - Dresdner Bank, above, at paragraph 18. 
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Exclusion rules and exclusivity rules are very controversial from a 
competition perspective. On the one hand these rules grant a form of protection to 
payment systems, as the establishment of these systems is in fact the result of huge 
investments by their founders, who consequently are not inclined to allow external 
players to have a free ride. On the other hand, important competition concerns arise 
especially when these systems can be qualified as essential facilities according to the 
essential facility doctrine.  
The need for protection of the system must be counter-balanced against the 
necessity for competition, both at an intra-system and inter-system level. It has been 
emphasised that although exclusion rules give rise to intra-system competition 
concerns (whereas exclusivity rules are instead related to inter-system competition), 
indeed these two different sets of rules represent two sides of the same coin. 
Similarly, intra-system and inter-system competition are arguably strictly inter-
related.   
Consequently, it is submitted that the regulation of these two issues should 
considered on  a pari-passu basis. The US approach aiming at ensuring an adequate 
level of competition at inter-system level alone, might in practice result in 
undermining intra-system competition in the long run. By way of comparison, the 
approach of the Commission which considers both exclusion and exclusivity rules to 
be at odds with EU competition law has the added benefit of coherency, especially if 
the linkage between price and non-price competition issues is considered.  
It is indeed submitted that price competition issues analysed in the previous 
Chapter and non-price competition issues are strictly related to one another. If MIFs 
and NDRs used by card payment systems raise issues related to intra-system 
competition, non-price competition agreements such as exclusion or exclusivity rules 
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revert both to intra and inter system competition. We are basically dealing with two 
sides of the same coin. This is the reason why it is suggested that both non price and 
price competition agreements should be subject to a similar regulatory framework. 
Nevertheless, it is of the utmost importance to determine what kind of framework: 
should they be subject to a block exemption regime on the same line as the insurance 
industry? Or should both banking and insurance industries be completely exposed   
to open competition as other industries?  
In the last Chapter of this thesis we shall endeavour to provide an answer to 
these questions. Our attention shall now turn to the regulation of forms of horizontal 
co-operation in different sectors of the economy (i.e. energy and telecommunication) 
with a view of identifying, by way of comparison, ‘outward’ tools for decoding the  
questions this thesis is designed to tackle.   
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comparative perspective with the Energy and 
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  248 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
 
In the previous parts of this thesis we identified the most complex issues arising from 
the application of Art. 101 TFEU to the financial services sector. We established that 
forms of co-operation capable of being caught by Art. 101 are extensively present 
both in the insurance industry  and in the banking sector.  
 It has been also emphasised how these forms of co-operations have  been 
traditionally justified due to the arguably sui generis nature of the banking and 
insurance services,  and consequently tolerated by way of a block exemption in the 
insurance industry, and through a relaxed application of Art. 101 in the banking 
sector.  We also critically considered the rationale and real impact of these forms of 
co-operation on the market, suggesting in each case a different regulatory regime.  
Here we shall proceed above and beyond the ‘internal’ line of reasoning 
pertaining to the financial services industry and draw a comparison between the 
application of Art. 101 in this area and different segments of the market.  
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All this in the quest for  the identification of possible rebuttals or 
confirmations of the findings of previous parts of the thesis, with a view of setting 
the scene for the last part of the conceptual journey of this “literary vessel”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.2 Setting the Scene: Art. 101 and forms of horizontal co-operation in the 
Telecommunications and Energy sectors 
 
 
More than focusing the analysis on the general application of Art. 101 TFEU by the 
Commission and the European Courts,  it is opinion of the author that for the purpose 
of this thesis it is worthwhile  to channel the attention to the telecommunications and 
energy sectors. 
 The rationale for this choice lies with the similarities which characterise these 
two sectors if compared to the financial services industry. In the first place, both the 
telecommunications and the energy industries provide, just like insurance and 
banking undertakings, services rather than ‘material goods’. 
Secondly, similarly to the provision of banking and insurance services, 
telecommunications and energy can be defined as essential facilities denoting a 
quasi-social nature which is somehow difficult to be reconciled with competition 
law.  
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 Just like with the financial services sector, the provision of 
telecommunications and energy services traditionally used to be a state prerogative, 
and the two sectors were also subject to a process of liberalisation and integration 
similar to the ones which characterised the financial services
652
.  
In economic terms, apart from circumstances which are peculiar to each of the 
markets considered and capable of distinguishing them individually, the main 
differential element between telecommunications, energy services and the banking 
and insurance seems to lie with the concept of risk.  
                                                 
652
 The EU process of liberalization and integration of the energy markets started in the early nineties 
with the adoption of Directive 90/377 (Council Directive 90/377/EEC of 29 June 1990 concerning a 
Community procedure to improve the transparency of gas and electricity prices charged to industrial 
end-users [ 1990] OJ L176/1). Directive 90/377 was followed by a first wave of liberalization for the 
electricity and gas markets  which comprised Directive 90/547 (Council Directive 90/547/EEC of 29 
October 1990 on the transit of electricity through transmission grids [1991] OJL313/30, and Directive 
91/296 (Council Directive 91/296/EEC of 31 May 1991 on the transit of natural gas through grids 
[1991] OJL147/37). The process of integration in the energy sector was subsequently integrated at the 
beginning of the new millennium through the enactment of a further series of directives which 
included Directive 2003/54 (Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity [2003] OJ176/37), and 
Directive  2003/55 (Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas [2003] OJ176/57). As for the 
telecommunication sector, the lion share of the process of integration of the European markets was 
enacted in the early 2000, with the adoption of a series of Directive whose aim was the harmonisation 
of the conditions of access, interconnection and provision of telecommunication services across the 
internal market. The most important directives are Directive 2002/19 (Directive 2002/19/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, 
electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive) [2002] OJL 108/7, 
Directive 2002/21  (Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 
2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services 
(Framework Directive)[2002] OJ L 108/33); Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users' rights relating to electronic 
communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive), [2002] OJ L 108/51; Directive 
2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of 
electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive)OJ L 108/37; Directive 
2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing 
of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on 
privacy and electronic communications) [2002]OJ L 201/35; Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of 16 
September 2002 on competition in the markets for electronic communications networks and 
services[2002]OJ L/21. Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of 16 September 2002 on competition in 
the markets for electronic communications networks and services [2002]OJ L 249/21. The current 
point of reference for the telecommunications sector is represented by Directive 2009/140/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a 
common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on 
access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, and 
2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services [2009]OJ L 
337/37. 
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 Financial products, especially insurance services, are characterised by a high 
degree of uncertainty which is almost absent in the telecommunications and energy 
industry (although any business is, per se, characterised by an element of risk of 
course).  
Nevertheless, this economic differentiation on its own arguably does not 
seem to represent a solid justification for a differential antitrust regime, as the risk 
factor could be circumvented by different means rather than a blank exemption from 
the application of Art.101
653
.   
If the argument of risk as a mitigating factor for the full application of Art. 
101 to the financial services sector can be set aside, is there any justification for a 
separate treatment for the financial services industry compared to different sectors 
such as energy or telecommunications then?  
In order to answer this question, we shall now proceed with the analysis of 
the application of Art. 101 to the energy and telecommunications industry. 
 
9.3 Art. 101 and the Energy Sector 
 
From an antitrust perspective, the application of Art. 101 to the energy sector poses 
similar questions to the ones we explored in relation to the financial services 
industry. 
 As established in the course of this thesis, the application of Art. 101 to the 
financial services sector gives rise to antitrust complexities mainly in the form of 
horizontal co-operation between undertakings. When it comes to the energy sector, a 
strong “vertical element” of co-operation between undertakings is present, inter alia, 
                                                 
653
 See Chapter 3  above. 
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in energy supply contracts containing use restrictions clauses
654
,  long term exclusive 
purchase obligations
655
 and exclusive supply clauses
656
.   
Intentionally, vertical issues shall not be taken into account for reasons of 
conceptual and teleological coherence. The analysis shall then solely focus on 
horizontal forms of co-operation such as information sharing agreements, issues 
related to the access to new infrastructures , and agreements for standardising access 
conditions on existing infrastructures, which largely characterise the energy sector.  
 
9.3.1 Information sharing agreements  
 
The high competition sensitiveness of information sharing agreements in the 
financial services sector has been already established in the course of this thesis
657
. 
On a general level, the severity of the impact on the market of such agreements is 
epitomised by the fact that the Commission Guidelines on horizontal cooperation 
agreements
658
 do not deal with horizontal exchanges of information due to their 
extremely anticompetitive nature.  
 The extreme anticompetitiveness of information share agreements was indeed 
recognised as early as in the early seventies in Papiers Peints de Belgique v 
Commission.
659
 
                                                 
654
 See, inter alia,  Commission decisions Endesa/GasNatural, IP/00/297, and DONG/DUC, 
IP/03/566. 
655
 For a detailed analysis of long terms exclusive supply agreements, see A.Arbens Lorens “Long 
Term Exclusive Supply Agreements in the Gas Sector”, 2002, Fordham International Law Journal, 
909 (915).  
656
 See, inter alia,  Commission decisions Gazprom/Eni, IP/03/1345, and OMV, IP/05/195.  
657
 See Chapters 3-6 above. 
658
 Commission “Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal 
cooperation agreements” [2001] OJ C3/2. 
659
 Case 73/74 Papiers Peints de Belgique v Commission [1975] ECR 1491, paragraph 33) 
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Subsequently, in Fiatagri UK Ltd and New Holland Ford Ltd v 
Commission,
660
 the European Court of Justice pointed out that “an agreement 
creating an information exchange system which does not concern prices and does not 
underpin any other anti-competitive arrangement is likely, on a truly competitive 
market, to lead to the intensification of competition between suppliers, since the fact 
that a trader takes into account information made available to him in order to adjust 
his conduct on the market is not likely, having regard to the atomized nature of the 
supply, to reduce or remove for the other traders any uncertainty about the 
foreseeable nature of its competitors' conduct”661.  
We have seen that information sharing agreements for the joint studies of 
statistical data are currently exempt in the insurance sector by Regulation 267/2010. 
Further, information sharing activities are invariable (to one extent or the other) 
entailed in the determination of multilateral interchange fees within the context of 
card payment systems. It is therefore worthy of interest to explore the way in which 
similar issues are dealt with in a comparable industry. 
  In the energy sector, information agreements capable of impairing 
competition were allowed by the Commission in International Energy 
Agency,
662
where an agreement designed  to face oil supply disruptions by ensuring 
the enactment of specific structural measures for emergencies was considered lawful 
despite the heavy exchange of information involved.  
Apart from the Commission decision in  International Energy Agency, forms 
of information exchange were considered legitimate in the creation of the ‘Eutilia’ 
web network. Owned by eleven leading European electricity utilities,  the Internet 
                                                 
660
 Case T-34/92 Fiatagri UK Ltd and New Holland Ford Ltd v Commission, [1994] ECR II-905. 
661
  Ibid., at paragraph 7. 
662
 Commission Decision International Energy Agency of 21 February 1994 relating to a proceeding 
under Article 85 of the EC Treaty, [1994] OJ L68/35. 
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portal Eutilia provides business to business (B2B) services in the electricity sector. 
The creation of Eutilia was cleared by the Commission. Nevertheless,  its actions 
were deemed capable  of being caught by Art. 101 in case of exchange of  market-
sensitive information between the undertakings involved in the network
663
. 
 Interestingly, the doctrine pointed out that in case of creation of network 
systems such as Eutilia, the escamotage most commonly used in practice to 
circumvent the application of Art. 101 TFEU is the  appointment of an independent 
body whose task is the management of the data flows and of the electronic market.
664
 
 It is even more interesting to note that, despite the unquestioned importance 
of information sharing agreements in the energy industry, this sector has been subject 
of intense scrutiny by competition authorities and no exemption was granted on a 
large scale.  
These considerations will ignite a further wave of comparative  analysis in 
the following. The attention shall now turn to the issues related to the access to infra 
structures. 
 
9.3.2 Access to infrastructures 
 
Just like with card payment systems, access to essential facilities such as 
infrastructures in the energy sector gives rise to serious competition concerns.  
We have already seen that the main difficulty  under these circumstances is to 
counterbalance  the investment and costs of the undertakings involved in the set-up 
of a new infrastructure vis-à-vis the need to grant access to third parties in order to 
diminish exclusivity and enhance competition.  
                                                 
663
 See Commission Press Release  IP/01/1775 
664
 On this point see Faull&Nickpay “EC Competition Law”, above at p. 1435. See also M. Albers, 
“Competition Law & the Energy Markets”, Claeys & Casteels, 2005, p.115. 
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 In the energy sector, competition concerns arise especially  in relation to the 
creation of new infrastructures for the supply of gas and electricity services. Contrary 
to the financial services sector, the regulation of  third party access to transmission 
frameworks in the energy sector is currently dealt with by legislative measures, 
namely Regulation 715/2009
665
 and Directive 2003/54.
666
  
Regulation 715/2009 regulates the conditions to access to the natural gas 
transmission networks setting up  minimum standards of access in practice 
throughout the Community, so as to ensure third party access
667
. In order to achieve 
this aim, the Directive provides for requirements of transparency of tariff and for 
requirements of non-discrimination of new entrants,
668
 allowing exchange of relevant 
information among the market participants deemed necessary in order to ensure the  
correct functioning of the system
669
. Similarly, as far as horizontal forms of co-
operation are concerned, Directive 2003/54 aimed at ensuring the possibility of 
access by third parties to electricity transmission and distribution systems through the 
imposition of transparent tariffs and the prohibition of any type of discrimination.
670
  
 Despite the introduction of the above key legislative measures, competition 
concerns are likely to arise whenever the undertakings members of a specific 
distribution/transmission networks jointly agree conditions for access or fees. This 
happened in Germany with the creation of the “Verbandevereinbarungen”  , i.e. 
association agreements between network operators encouraged by the German 
                                                 
665
 Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the natural gas 
transmission networks OJL 211/36. 
666
 Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 2003-06-26 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity OJ L 176/37. 
667
 See Regulation (EC) No 715/2009, above, Recital 10. 
668
 Ibid. Articles 13 and 14. 
669
 Ibid, Recital 24.  
670
 See Directive 2003/54, above, Art. 20. 
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government due to the technical difficulties incurred by individual undertakings in 
creating their own access system.
671
  
Similarly to the agreements which surround the membership agreements for 
credit card systems, the Verbandevereinbarungen agreements provided for common 
criteria for the calculation of fees and common access rules. More interestingly, 
despite the fact that exactly like multilateral interchange fees, the 
Verbandevereinbarungen agreements clearly contained price fixing elements , they 
were also deemed to reduce transaction costs for third parties seeking access and 
ultimately beneficial for consumers.
672
 
The issues surrounding the areas of information exchange and access and 
regulation of essential infrastructure in the energy industry, arguably comparable 
with the ones arising in the financial services sector, will ignite a detailed 
comparative scrutiny in the last part of this chapter.  
The attention shall now focus on  the telecommunications sector in order to 
identify possible further elements of analysis. 
 
9.4 Art. 101 and the Telecommunications Sector 
 
Forms of horizontal co-operation in the Telecommunications sector capable of being 
caught by Art. 101 arise mainly  in relation to the establishment and/or the 
management of communication networks. As it will be readily appreciated,  such 
forms of co-operation invariably  entail information exchange elements.  
From an antitrust perspective, just as we have seen in the financial services 
sector and in the energy sector, the assessment of network sharing agreements needs 
                                                 
671
 See M. Albers, “Competition Law & the Energy Markets”, above, p.123-124. 
672
 See Faull &Nickpay “EC Competition Law”, above at p. 1449. 
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to take into account, inter alia, the necessity and cost effectiveness of the agreement  
which needs to be counter-balanced vis-à-vis possible negative spill over effects 
against costumers.  
Network sharing agreements in the telecommunications sector are nowadays 
quite common especially in the mobile and internet services. Nevertheless, the 
jurisprudence in this area is limited due to fact that after the introduction of 
Regulation 1/2003
673
, undertakings have the possibility to self-check the 
compatibility of their agreements with Art. 101
674
.  
Prior the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003, two cases of network sharing 
raised competition concerns worth of analysis as to the identification of possible 
comparative elements to be taken into account in respect to the financial services 
sector. 
The first case is O2 UK Limited/T-Mobile UK Limited
675
.  Here the antitrust 
controversial issues revolved around an agreement between O2 and T-Mobile for 
infrastructure sharing and national roaming on the UK market for the third 
generation of mobile telecommunications networks. The Commission found the 
agreement to be competition sensitive due to the extent of co-operation between two 
leading players in a market characterised (just as the credit card services market, or 
by way of comparison the insurance sector) by a limited number of competitors and 
“high, if not absolute, barriers to entry”.676  
                                                 
673
 Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty OJ L1/1. 
674
 On this point see G.M. Borges, “Co-investment in NGAs and competitive assessment of horizontal 
cooperation agreements”, 2010, PLUG APRITEL, p. 3.  
675
 Commission Decision O2 UK Limited/T-Mobile UK Limited , of 7/8/2003Case COMP/38.370, 
OJL 200/59.  
676
 Ibid., at paragraph 81. 
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In the words of the Commission, such kind of agreements may have an 
“adverse impact on competition, in particular by reducing network competition, 
denying competitors access to necessary sites and site infrastructure, thus foreclosing 
competitors and, possibly in some cases, facilitating collusive behaviors.”677 Despite 
its clearly  potential anticompetitive effects,   the agreement obtained clearance by 
the Commission in light of the regulatory remedy provided by the Framework 
Directive. 
678
  
The Directive at issue provided for the possibility of forms of legislative 
obligations of network sharing to be superimposed by Member States on 
telecommunications undertakings. This regulatory framework was devised in order 
to offer a wide-reaching solution in case of possible anticompetitive  effects of  
network agreements in terms of access denial to specific sites and/or site 
infrastructure by potential competitors.
679
  
The rationale for the exemption of a network sharing infrastructure which 
could be to some extent compared to card payment systems in the financial services 
sector, in O2 UK Limited/T-Mobile UK Limited was linked to the existence of a 
regulatory framework (absent in the banking and insurance sectors) capable of 
mitigating potential negative effects.   
Another form of regulatory intervention regarding the application of Art. 101 
to the telecommunications sector is provided by the Commission Guidelines on the 
application of EU competition rules in the telecommunications sector.
680
 The 
                                                 
677
 See Commission Decision O2 UK Limited/T-Mobile UK Limited, above,  at paragraph 84. 
678
 Directive 2002/21/EC, above, Art.12. 
679
 See Commission Decision O2 UK Limited/T-Mobile UK Limited, above, at paragraph 104. 
680
 Commission Guidelines on the application of EEC competition rules in the telecommunications 
sector 1991/C 233/02, OJ C 233/2. 
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Guidelines allow the possibility for exemption of specific co-operation agreements
681
 
re-emphasising, nevertheless, the competition sensitivity of agreements containing 
price fixing or information exchange elements.  
More specifically, the latter  could be considered necessary for the good 
functioning of international telecommunications services, insofar as the exchange of 
information remain confined to the need for  cooperation aimed at ensuring 
interconnectivity and it is not extended to competition-sensitive information.
682
 
A further interesting case related to horizontal cooperation in the 
telecommunications is T-Mobile Deutschland/O2 Germany
683
. In this case, the 
decision of the Commission not to grant clearance to a national roaming agreement 
between T-Mobile Deutschland and O2 Germany was based upon an overall antitrust 
reprimand of infrastructure agreements. Such agreements were deemed by default to 
“restrict competition between operators in all related network markets on key 
parameters such as coverage, quality and transmission rates”684.  
Interestingly, this line of reasoning was completely disregarded by the Court 
of First Instance
685
 , which emphasised  the need to conduct an antitrust assessment 
of the agreement in question in line with the Guidelines on the application of Article 
                                                 
681
 Inter alia, agreements concerning terrestrial facilities (public switched network or leased circuits) 
or services , see Commission Guidelines on the application of EEC competition rules in the 
telecommunications sector , above, at paragraphs 38,39,40, 41.  
682
 Such as  “tariff information which constitutes business secrets, discounting, customers and 
commercial strategy, including that concerning new products”( see Commission Guidelines on the 
application of EEC competition rules in the telecommunications sector , above, at paragraph 53). 
683
 Commission Decision T-Mobile Deutschland/O2 Germany, Case COMP/38.369, 16.06.2003. OJ L 
75/32.   
684
 See the Commission Decision T-Mobile Deutschland/O2 Germany, above at paragraph 107 
(emphasis added). 
685
 O2 Germany v. Commission, Case T-328/03 [2006] ECR II-1231. 
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81(3) of the Treaty (now Art. 101 TFEU) “within the actual context in which it 
would occur in the absence of the agreement in dispute”686.  
The interference with competition, according to the Court,  may in particular 
be doubted if “the agreement seems really necessary for the penetration of a new area 
by an undertaking”.687   
Another interesting point of the judgment is where the Court emphasises the 
need for consideration of a theoretical scenario to be construed in the absence of an 
agreement, especially within the context of markets undergoing liberalisation or 
emerging markets. Under those circumstances, in absence of a network agreement, 
“effective competition may be problematic owing, for example, to the presence of a 
dominant operator, the concentrated nature of the market structure or the existence of 
significant barriers to entry.”688  
 The outcome of this sort of “reversed” analysis lead the Court to conclude 
that it could have  not be excluded that the agreement concluded by T-Mobile 
Deutschland and O2 Germany  instead of restricting competition between network 
operators, was, on the contrary, capable of “enabling, in certain circumstances, the 
smallest operator to compete with the major players.”689 
The features of a market undergoing liberalisation heavily characterise also 
the financial services sector. The considerations expressed by the Court in O2 
Germany v. Commission will be, thus, carefully considered in the following in 
conjunction with the observations made in relation to the energy sector.  
 
                                                 
686
 See O2 Germany v. Commission, Case T-328/03, above at paragraph 68. See the  Guidelines on the 
application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty of 27.4.2004, OJ C 101/ 97, paragraph 22. 
687
 Ibid. 
688
 Ibid., at paragraph 72. 
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 Ibid., at paragraph 109. 
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9.5 The Energy, Telecommunications and the Financial Services Sectors: a 
comparative perspective 
 
 
Throughout the course of this thesis, a common thread has been established between 
the insurance and banking sectors, and so far the issues related to the application of 
Art. 101 to the financial services sector have been subject to intense scrutiny from 
what may be defined as an ‘inward looking perspective.’  
As established at the outset of this chapter, the aim here was to adopt an 
‘outward looking point of view’, considering how forms of horizontal cooperation 
are faced in the energy and telecommunications sectors, i.e. two sectors with 
characteristics arguably comparable with the financial services sector. 
 We have seen that the main controversial issues arising from the application 
of Art. 101 to the energy and telecommunication sector relate to the management and 
access to network systems capable of being characterised as essential facilities.    
This is arguably the foremost similarity between the energy, telecommunications and 
the financial services sector.  
It is important to note now that points of contact which prima facie seem to 
arise not only in relation to the card payment banking, could be indeed extended far 
beyond that horizon, embracing forms of non-price competition in the banking sector 
as well as the insurance sector. The reason for this is to be found in the nature of the 
services provided by the industries considered, which are very different in substance, 
but comparable under structural aspects.  
It is opinion of this author that strong similarities arguably exist between the 
energy, telecommunications  and financial industries in the way that the creation of 
infrastructure networks is needed for the provision of services.  
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The similarities between network infrastructures in the telecommunication 
energy and banking sectors are very evident if the card payment systems are 
considered. Exactly as for the provision of gas/electricity and, for instance, telephone 
services, we have seen that the provision of card payments is the outcome of the 
creation of a network infrastructure without which the provision of the service is 
virtually impossible.  
Nevertheless, far from being confined to the banking sector, the same 
similarities may arguably be extended also to the insurance sector. As we established 
in the first part of this thesis, the provision of insurance services is based on the 
exchange of information on statistical data between large insurance associations. 
This system could indeed be defined as a network infrastructure not too dissimilar 
from the ones characterising the other industries taken into account
690
. 
 The existence of a sort of network infrastructure in the insurance industry 
appears to have been implicitly acknowledged by the Commission through the 
enactment of a block exemption for the exchange of information between insurance 
undertakings.  
We have seen that the raison d'être for the block exemption in this area is the 
acknowledgment of the need for cooperation between insurance undertakings, which 
individually could not be in the position to create or have access to large statistical 
data necessary to determine premiums and face uncertainty.
691
 This arguably creates 
a network infrastructure which gives rise to the same competition concerns as those 
arising in the banking, energy and telecommunication sectors. 
                                                 
690
 See Chapter  3 above. 
691
 See Chapter  3 above. 
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We are therefore dealing with different sectors of the market characterised by 
similar network structures, which ignite similar antitrust anxieties in relation to the 
application of Art. 101.  
Similar structures, similar competition concerns, but different regulation. It is 
now time to consider whether there are elements to be taken into account or lessons 
to be learnt by the application of Art. 101 to the energy and telecommunication 
sectors, and if the considerations made so far in this chapter weaken or reinforce the 
conclusions reached in the previous parts of this thesis in relation to the financial 
services sector.  
9.6 The application of art. 101 to the energy and Telecommunication sectors: 
Lessons to be learnt? 
 
The existence of structural similarities and comparable antitrust concerns arising 
from the Application of Art 101  have arguably been established between the 
financial services sector and the telecommunication and energy sectors. It is now 
time to draw a comparative line between the difference in terms of regulatory 
regimes for horizontal forms of co-operation in these sectors of the market. 
  The starting point is the fact that structural similarities arguably exist between 
these different industries. This does not necessary mean that the application of Art. 
101 needs to reflect them, and that forms of horizontal cooperation in the financial 
services sector should be treated in the same was as in the telecommunications and 
energy markets. Comparative elements arising from the telecommunications and 
energy scenarios will be used primarily to test the validity of the conclusions in 
relation to the application of Art. 101 to the financial services sector so far reached 
by this thesis. 
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 From a comparative perspective, the most important and evident difference 
between the financial services sector and the telecommunications and energy 
industries is the presence of a block exemption for the insurance sector, which, 
despite its recent remarkable reduction in scope, still regulates this area of law.  
This thesis has resoundingly rebutted the need for a block exemption in the 
insurance sector. Can this conclusion find additional support in the considerations 
related to the application of Art. 101 to the energy and telecommunications industries 
made above?  
The fact that, in spite of structural similarities the energy and 
telecommunication industries do not benefit from a block exemption appears prima 
facie to corroborate the observations made in relation to the insurance block 
exemption. Nevertheless, the analysis needs to be extended far beyond those 
unsophisticated considerations, embracing the essence of the rationale for an 
exemption to be applied on a large scale.  
We have established that the raison d'être for the enactment of the block 
exemption in the insurance sector lies with the absolute necessity of co-operation and 
information exchange between insurers. If we consider the case law, as far as the 
energy sector is concerned, we have seen that forms of cooperation capable of 
impairing competition were allowed by the Commission in International Energy 
Agency,
692
 by reasons of absolute necessity. The same rationale was also applied in 
the telecommunications sector in T-Mobile Deutschland/O2 Germany.
693
 
 The element of necessity of an infrastructure network was considered by the 
European Court in T-Mobile Deutschland/O2 Germany in light of the possibility of 
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 Commission Decision International Energy Agency of 21 February 1994 relating to a proceeding 
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 Commission Decision T-Mobile Deutschland/O2 Germany, Case COMP/38.369, 16.06.2003. OJ L 
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market entry by small undertakings. In other words, according to the Court in  T-
Mobile Deutschland/O2 Germany, the necessity for a ‘network system’ needs to be 
assessed not only in terms of functionality for the provision of services, but also in 
consideration of possible anticompetitive spill over effects vis-à-vis new market 
entrants.  
If we apply the same line of reasoning to the insurance and banking sector, 
the conclusions to be drawn seem to be in line with the considerations made so far in 
this thesis.  
For instance, let us consider the necessity  for cooperation in the insurance 
industry in light of the Court’s judgment in T-Mobile Deutschland/O2 Germany from 
a teleological and conceptual perspective,  going beyond the substantive differences 
between the provision of insurance and telecommunications services.  
The questions to be answered here appear to be mainly two: are forms of co-
operation between insurance undertaking necessary in order to provide insurance 
services? If so, are network elements capable of having a positive impact on new 
market entrants? We have seen that prima facie the answer to these two questions 
appear to be positive: forms of cooperation are deemed to be necessary in order to 
allow insurers to determine insurance premiums, and ultimately access to these forms 
of cooperation would be the only way for new players to enter into the market.  
Nevertheless, we have also established that, apart from peculiar scenarios 
arising from specific types of risk (e.g. nuclear, terrorism etc.) and specific lines of 
insurance (i.e. re-insurance), the entire conceptual castle built around the necessity 
for co-operation between insurers could arguably be dismantled by way of alternative 
regulatory solutions (i.e. insurance transcripts and tailor-made insurance policies). 
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Furthermore, in O2 UK Limited/T-Mobile UK Limited
694
 cooperation between 
undertakings was tolerated in view of the possibility for Member States to impose 
network sharing obligations vis-à-vis existing undertakings forming part of a an 
infrastructural network. Here a regulatory framework introduced through a Directive 
was seen as a mitigating factor for possible anticompetitive effects arising from 
network sharing agreements. In the absence of a similar regulatory solution in the 
financial services sector, the justification and relative exemption of infrastructure 
agreements is arguably more difficult. 
When it comes to the banking sector, an interesting parallel could be made 
with the situation arising from the creation of the “Verbandevereinbarungen”  in the 
energy sector. As established above, similarly to multilateral interchange fees 
agreements, the Verbandevereinbarungen agreements provided for common criteria 
for the calculation of fees and common access rules.  
More interestingly, despite the fact that exactly like multilateral interchange 
fees, the Verbandevereinbarungen agreements clearly contained price fixing 
elements, they were also deemed to ultimately reduce transaction costs for third 
parties seeking access and ultimately for consumers.  
This seems arguably to reinforce the conclusions reached in relation to the 
regulation of multilateral interchange fees, where the need for mechanisms of control 
of cost efficiency of the fees was advocated in order to avoid possible negative 
spillover effects against consumers.  
If the line of reasoning applied in relation to the assessment of the 
Verbandevereinbarungen agreements was to be considered in relation to multilateral 
interchange fees and no-discrimination rules, the key criterion for their antitrust 
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evaluation would revolve around the capability of these agreements to curb 
transaction costs and not to reverberate against third parties seeking access to the 
network or consumers.  
The outcome of such assessment would arguably lead to the need for strict 
forms of control on the effective correspondence of multilateral interchange fees to 
transactions costs. 
The same considerations are arguably valid if network agreements in the 
banking sector such as the SWIFT or the Dresdner Bank circuit analysed above
695
 
are taken into consideration.  In both cases, the possibility to reduce transaction costs 
and improve services for consumers would lead to the judicial admissibility of co-
operation agreements, with a caveat advocating for strict mechanisms of cost-
efficiency control, which are not currently enacted. 
Overall, the main lesson to be learnt by the application of Art. 101 to the 
telecommunication and energy sectors appears to be that, in absence of any block 
exemption, a careful assessment of forms of co-operation between undertakings  in 
the financial services sector would be advisable. This could be accompanied by the 
imposition of an obligation of notification of such agreements to the Commission, 
circumventing  any possibility of self-assessment procedures in relation to the 
possible compatibility of such agreements with Art. 101. 
It is opinion of this author that only through a careful and meticulous  
scrutiny of the nature of proposed agreements between insurance or banking 
undertakings stability in the market and enhancement of competition in the financial 
services sector can be attained. 
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In line with the considerations expressed in the course of this thesis in relation to 
forms of horizontal co-operation in the insurance and banking sector, particular 
emphasis should be put on the indispensability of the agreements and efficiency 
claims and cost efficiencies should be carefully counter-balanced vis-à-vis 
restrictions and impact on consumers.  
More specifically, in absence of a block exemption regime once established 
that particular forms of horizontal co-operation between undertakings in the financial 
services sector are indispensable for the current functioning of the industry (e.g. 
agreements on information exchanges between insurers or on multilateral 
interchange fees between banks), efficiency gains stemming out of such forms of co-
operation should be carefully assessed in order to prevent possible abuses.  
This would imply a particularly high burden of proof falling on the shoulders 
of insurers and banks under Art. 103(3); nevertheless, this high burden of proof 
would also act as a deterrent for collusive behaviors in the financial services 
industry. Under this scenario, insurers and banks would be obliged to carefully assess 
possible efficiency gains prior the enactment of any forms of horizontal co-operation. 
Since according to Art. 101(3) efficiency gains need to be ultimately passed on to 
consumers, the ultimate burden of proof would be to justify how that specific form of 
horizontal co-operation benefit consumers. By way of example, when it comes to 
agreements on exchange of information between insurers, the key issue would be to 
demonstrate that a specific exchange of information would help consumers in 
making their informed choices reducing their search costs. According to the 
Commission’s Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 on horizontal co-
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operation agreements
696
, this is likely to happen in case the exchange of information 
involves publicly available information. Rendering the information object of the 
exchange publicly available would be the natural evolution of the current insurance 
block exemption regime which, as established in the above, requires calculations and 
studies to be made available not only to all insurance companies, but also to 
consumer and customer organisations which request them
697
.   
By the same token, in the banking sector any agreement on multilateral 
interchange fees, apart from being justified in terms of cost effectiveness would need 
to be justified in terms of consumer gains. This is in line with what happened with 
the Mastercard interchange fee analysed above. 
It is submitted that although the burden of proof on undertakings operating in 
the financial services sector would be undoubtedly high, the scenario theorised could 
promote competition and at the same time act as deterrent for collusive behaviors.  
Further, it is submitted that information exchange agreements should be 
allowed only if and to the extent to which they are strictly necessary for the correct 
functioning of the network system. 
Taking into account the considerations arising from the “outward looking 
perspective” of this Chapter, the time has now come to close the circle and unravel 
some conclusive remarks in relation to the Application of Art. 101 to the financial 
services sector. This shall be done in the following. 
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10.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis embarked on an arduous journey in search for answers related to the 
application of Art. 101 of the Treaty of Lisbon to the financial services sector. This 
journey has been long and impervious and led to the exploration of the internal 
market as well as the US scenario.  
In the meantime, in order to answer the same questions, the Commission 
started and concluded official investigations, a new Treaty (the Treaty of Lisbon) 
entered into force, and a new Block Exemption Regulation for the insurance industry 
was enacted. 
The Commission findings during the last few years and the new Insurance 
Block Exemption regulatory framework have proven to be, at least partially, in line 
with the ideas of the author of this thesis.  
The time seems now ripe to endeavour to provide some final answers and to 
clarify the teleological stance of this thesis. 
This Chapter shall in the first place address and attempt to rebut possible 
criticisms of the structural apparatus of this research;  the first, and, arguably to 
some, de-synchronised issue lies with the original idea of taking into consideration 
the financial services sector intended  as the insurance and banking sectors.  
Secondly, we shall endeavour to defend the claim for open competition in the 
financial services sector in light of the arguments elaborated in the previous chapters 
of this thesis.   
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10.2 In defence of the conceptual status quo of this thesis: Insurance and 
Banking sectors as two faces of the same coin 
 
 
As established at the beginning of this thesis, a very strong bond appears to link 
together the banking and insurance industries.  
Banking and insurance undertakings are both financial intermediaries who 
perform very similar functions.  
Apart from similarities related to the nature and the function of the services 
provided, we have established that a closer linkage between insurance and banking 
industries emerged in the last few years, due to a wave of innovation  triggered by a 
process of liberalisation and innovation which characterised the financial services 
sector across Europe
698
.   
As a result of these phenomena, the “financial” element of insurance products 
has increased considerably during the last few years especially through the 
establishment of banking-insurance conglomerates, closing even further the already 
existent areas of overlaps between the insurance and banking sectors.
699
  
 
10.3 Competition law and the Financial Services Sector 
 
In conjunction with the establishment of deep synergic connections between 
insurance and banking undertakings, competition between the  banking and insurance 
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industries has been intensified dramatically in the course of the last few years.
700
 
This turned out to be severely at odds with the old anti-trust status quo. Traditionally, 
the financial services sector used to be a state prerogative due to the quasi-social 
nature of the services provided by undertakings operating within this industry.  Not 
so long ago, in many Member States insurance services used to be indeed solely 
provided by the state, and the banking system was heavily controlled by 
governments.
701
 
With the advent of the European Community (nowadays European Union) 
the situation changed drastically, leading to the introduction of radical reforms of the 
financial services industry in several Member States. As a result, the previous 
government monopolistic approach was left behind in favour of heavy private sector 
involvement, which increased competition inevitably igniting, at the same time, anti-
trust concerns.  
The complexities arising from the application of the EU anti-trust rules to the 
financial services industry are, as it has been established in the course of this thesis, 
many.  
In the first place, one of the main features of this industry is denoted by the fact 
that market members can seamlessly assume the form of retailers, wholesalers, 
customers and suppliers, with the wholesale market capable of affecting retail 
customers indirectly.
702
    
Secondly, the entire financial services industry appears to be characterised by 
atavistic features prima facie incompatible with anti-trust regulatory frameworks.     
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the lack of guarantees offered by  national pension  systems. 
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 See Faull and Nickpay, “The EC Law of Competition” OUP 2007, p. 636.  
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A further point of general relevance for the application of the EU competition 
rules to the financial services sector is represented by the process of financial 
integration still on-going at European level. Various banking, insurance and 
investment services  Directives have been implemented in the course of the last years 
with the aim of creating a ‘single passport’ system aiming at facilitating the 
integration process of the community financial markets through the promotion of 
cross-border activities and the increment of competition. Despite the Community 
efforts to establish a single market for all financial services, both banking and 
insurance services are still mainly provided within the domestic sphere of individual 
Member States and cross-border competition is still very limited.
703
     
In such an intricate scenario, anti-trust issues may indeed arise in relation to  
mergers and acquisitions, possible abuses of dominant positions and state aid. 
Nevertheless, we have seen that Art. 101 and the discipline of forms of co-operation 
represent the paramount and most intricate aspect of the application of the EU 
competition rules to the financial services sector. Whilst it is allegedly essential for 
banks to co-operate in order to provide payment systems, for insurance firms both 
horizontal agreements (i.e. information sharing and pooling agreements) are deemed 
to be necessary in order to spread risks and face insolvency risks. Art. 101 seems 
therefore to represent a common thread between these two industries, posing at the 
same time interesting teleological dilemmas, which this thesis has endeavoured to 
answer.  
The main dilemma is represented by the fact that the Commission has allowed 
forms of “horizontal agreements concerning a relevant cost element making up the 
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final price vis-a’-vis customers”704 through its decisions relating to interbank fees in 
payment systems and through its insurance block exemption.  
Having arguably established in the course of this thesis the existence of  a 
teleological link between the insurance and banking sectors, it is now time to draw 
some conclusive lines  in relation to a series of rather intricate  questions which this 
thesis has endeavoured to answer: ought Art. 101  to apply to the financial services 
sector at all? If so, to what extent? Is there any justification for a block exemption in 
the insurance sector? Should the banking sector benefit from a block exemption as 
well?    
10.4 Ought Art. 101 to apply to the financial services sector at all? 
 
 
Still now much debate surrounds the issue of the application of Art. 101 to the 
financial  services industry. We have seen that traditionally both banking and 
insurance undertakings vehemently rebutted the idea of being fully exposed to the 
EU Competition  rules
705
. Apart from peculiarities which characterise the insurance 
and banking sector individually, the quasi social nature of financial services 
represents the first and foremost argument against the application of Art.101.  
The eradication of public ownership in conjunction with the gradual 
establishment and enactment of the internal market has lead in the course of the years 
to a complete different scenario, whereby insurance and banking undertakings 
nowadays assume the form of private entities very much orchestrated and moved by 
entrepreneurial and corporate interests.   
The application of EU competition law to the financial services sector is 
therefore now more than ever of the utmost importance, and,  as established above,  
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among the EU competition rules it is opinion of the author that Art.101 gives rise to  
the most sensitive issues due to the allegedly naturally atavistic  need for horizontal  
co-operation claimed by both insurers and banks.  
On the one hand, it is undeniable that both insurance and banking undertakings 
provide services of a ‘different nature’ compared to other sectors of the economy. In 
this regard,  the ‘public sector imprinting’ characterising insurance and banking 
activities appears to represent  significant proof of the quasi social nature of financial 
services activities. On the other hand, one needs first to consider that other sectors of 
the economy also providing essential services such as energy and telecommunication 
have never disputed the application of antitrust rules, nor were they subject to special 
consideration beyond the process of integration at European level.  
 The rapid growth of the financial services sector in the last three decades,  in 
conjunction with the  privatisation process and the enactment of the internal market, 
render the possibility of advocating for a complete and indiscriminate exemption of 
this sector of the economy from the application of Art 101 an arduous task.  The need 
for a full application of Art. 101 to both insurance and banking sector represents 
therefore unsurprisingly the first conclusive yardstick of this thesis.  The precise 
extent of the application of Art. 101 to the insurance and banking sector shall be 
considered in the following in light of the conclusions so far reached.   
 
10.5 The extent of the application of Art 101 to the insurance industry  
 
In the course of this thesis, it has been argued that the impact of the insurance block 
exemption on the internal market represents one of the igniting causes for a high 
degree of consolidation at cross-border level not accompanied by an enhancement of 
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cross-border provision of insurance services. The outcome of this state of affairs is 
that competition among insurance undertakings appears to be restrained and 
insurance policies prices not well diversified.  
This stagnating scenario has recently led the Commission to drastically 
reduce the scope of application of the new Insurance Block Exemption Regulation. 
As from March 2010, the drawing up of standard policy conditions for direct 
insurance and common rules for approving security devices will no longer be part of 
EU block exemption regulatory framework. In line with the recent EU developments, 
in the US much debate surrounds the idea for a complete repeal of the Insurance 
block exemption; and this appears to be a concrete development on the verge to 
happen.  
It is the opinion of this author that repealing the block exemption could 
arguably have beneficial effects. Nevertheless, a complete repeal not accompanied 
by ancillary measures may not be an optimal solution and create uncertainty and 
idiosyncrasies within the internal market.  
It is, thus,  suggested that a repeal of the block exemption should go pari 
passu with the simultaneous enactment of possible alternative regulatory 
frameworks. In particular, the introduction of a system of ‘tailor made’ or 
‘individualised’ insurance policies illustrated by this thesis might represent a valid 
solution for some forms of insurance (e.g. especially liability or fault based 
insurance) in terms of consumer welfare, competition, and the economics of moral 
hazard.  
As previously established, the introduction of ‘tailor made’ insurance policies 
in conjunction with the enactment of effective competition in the insurance industry  
could indeed arguably act as a deterrent also capable of facing the so called ‘moral 
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hazard’ problem efficiently. The creation of an effective linkage between the 
behaviour of the insured and the insurance policies would entail the possibility to use 
competition law  as an implementing tool for reconciling liability rules with deterrent 
functions in order to face  moral hazard issues in an optimal way 
706
.  
Another valid suggestion which stems out the US debate might be to 
accompany the repeal of the insurance block exemption with the enactment of  safe 
harbours protecting  possible pro-competitive behaviours, such as the common 
coverage of certain types of risks (e.g. nuclear, environmental, aviation and 
terrorism). This would enable the industry to adjust to the new status quo, and to face 
the inevitable degree of uncertainty arising from the complete exposure of the 
insurance industry to the application of Art. 101 TFEU.   
Such ancillary measures would be of the foremost importance, especially 
considering the difficulties that would arise should the application of the EU current 
block exemption regulatory framework  for forms of horizontal co-operation be 
envisaged (Regulations 1217/2010
707
 and 1218/2010
708
).   
Regulation 1217/2010 will be difficult to apply due to the nature of the 
agreements that it covers, i.e. research agreements for the technological 
developments of industrial products. If the current insurance block exemption was to 
be repealed, co-operation agreements between insurers on joint compilations, tables 
and studies, or joint coverage of risks would fall short of the scope of application of 
Regulation 1217/2010. This is due to the fact that the regulation per se was designed 
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to cover technological industrial research or  intellectual property rights leading to 
the elaboration of new products
709
.  
It would be arguably very difficult to conceptually construe the nature of the 
aforementioned insurance agreements as technological industrial research, and to 
consequently force their nature into the scope of application of the Regulation.  
By the same token, serious difficulties would also emerge in the application 
of Regulation 1218/2010. This Regulation was designed in order to cover 
specialisation agreements, i.e. “unilateral specialisation agreement, a reciprocal 
specialisation agreement or a joint production agreement”710. If on the one hand one 
may categorise information exchange agreements, or insurance pools between 
insurers as specialised agreements, insurmountable obstacles would arise from the 
Regulation itself which was designed to cover situations where undertakings agree to 
“partly cease production of certain products or to refrain from producing those 
products and to purchase them from the other party, who agrees to produce and 
supply those products”711. 
If  Regulations 1017/2010 and 1018/2010 would not be of great help in case 
of repeal of the current insurance block exemption regulatory framework, nor can 
relief be found in the Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal cooperation agreements
712
 . 
Under the Guidelines, horizontal forms of co-operation between insurers would fall, 
indeed, under the category of situations to be assessed on a case-by-case basis
713
.  
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Turning to the consequences of a complete repeal of the block exemption, it 
is opinion of the author that the achievement of a fully competitive insurance market 
accompanied by the introduction of a system of individualised insurance policies 
might also arguably ignite the release of a greater variety of policies. A greater 
variety of insurance policies may lead to a higher degree of guarantee for the 
insurability of risks, and could ultimately  limit risk pools otherwise deemed to be 
necessary in order to avoid the risks of moral hazard and adverse selection.
714
  
Further, repealing the current block exemption and introducing a system of 
effective competition among insurers may also result in remarkable improvements in 
terms of efficiency and correct functioning of the entire insurance industry.
715
  
The current scenario is, indeed, characterised by the possibility of insurers to 
indulge in anticompetitive behaviours relying upon the shield offered by the block 
exemption. It is not a secret that rate service organisations and information sharing 
allow insurers to engage in price fixing practices, and consequently to limit the 
number of competitors within the market. Furthermore, in the course of this thesis it 
has been argued that the possibility to utilise a pool of shared data renders it 
superfluous for insurance companies to monitor their own costs, ultimately leading  
to “inefficiencies that would not otherwise exist.”716  
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If we consider comparative elements stemming out of other sectors of the 
economy, we have established that the most important element of differentiation 
between the financial services sector and other structurally comparable industries 
such as the telecommunications and energy industries, is the presence of a block 
exemption for the insurance sector.  
Going above and beyond these considerations, the case law further shows that 
forms of cooperation capable of impairing competition were allowed by the 
Commission in the energy sector by reasons of absolute necessity
717
, and that the 
same rationale was applied in the telecommunication sector.
718
   
Nevertheless, we have also seen that both in the energy and 
telecommunications industries the antitrust assessment of a network went beyond the 
functionality for the provision of services, considering also anticompetitive spill over 
effects vis-à-vis new market entrants.  
As previously established, if we were to  apply the same line of reasoning to 
the insurance industry  transcending the substantive differences between these two 
sectors, the questions to be answered appear to be essentially two: are forms of co-
operation between insurance undertaking necessary in order to provide insurance 
services? If so, are network elements capable of  having a positive impact on new 
market entrants?  
We have just re-emphasised that specific types of risk (e.g. nuclear, terrorism 
etc.) and specific line of insurance (i.e. re-insurance) apart, the entire conceptual 
castle built around the necessity for co-operation between insurers could arguably be 
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dismantled by way of alternative regulatory solutions (i.e. insurance transcripts and 
tailor-made insurance policies).  
Furthermore, we have established that in the telecommunications sector 
cooperation between undertakings is tolerated in view of the possibility for Member 
States to impose network sharing obligations vis-à-vis existing undertakings part of a 
an infrastructural network.  Here a regulatory framework introduced by way of 
legislation
719
 was seen as a mitigating factor for possible anticompetitive effects of 
network sharing agreements. In absence of a similar regulatory solution in the 
insurance sector, the justification and relative exemption of horizontal agreements 
arguably becomes more difficult. 
In addition to the aforementioned suggestions, further alternative regulatory 
frameworks can revolve around command and control regulation, incentive 
regulation, self-regulation, voluntary agreements. 
Command and control regulation would be based on the enactment of specific 
governmental guidelines on how to comply with mandatory requirements in the 
insurance sector. This kind of approach would need to be implemented at European 
level, as it needs to be based on a harmonised and consistent regulatory framework in 
order to be truly effective (discrepancies in the approach by different Member States 
would undermine the system). Even so, discrepancies could still arise due to the 
differences in the insurance markets across the internal market despite the attempts 
of harmonisation of the European Union. A ‘light’ command and control approach 
cold be still devised and be confined to specific aspects, e.g. the obligation of 
disclosure and transparency on insurers in relation to rates making procedures; this 
could assist consumers in making informed choices and foster competition in the 
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sector
720
. When it comes to the insurance industry, transparency is indeed an issue, 
and the identification of the appropriate form of regulation (or sometimes of de-
regulation) often starts with the notion of market failure.  
The telecommunication sector considered in the above paragraphs provides 
for an emblematic example of this paradigm. The market failure of this industry has 
been at the outset identified in its naturally monopolistic nature, and was faced 
through a gradual process of liberalisation and privatisation of the sector which, as 
we have seen in the above, nevertheless left open competition issues of access to the 
market and access to essential facilities by new entrants into the market. Similarly, 
the insurance sector - as well as the banking sector - started out (at least in 
continental Europe), as sectors dominated and monopolised by the ‘longa manus’ of 
governments of individual Member States. Forms of horizontal co-operation in this 
industry can arguably be seen as a market failure, the answer to which has thus far 
been a block exemption. 
In addition to specific alternatives which have been already identified, a 
further option would be incentive regulation, a solution adopted in the energy sector 
which has been the object of analysis in the previous Chapter. The liberalisation 
process of this sector which also used to be characterised by a monopolistic 
dimension has been accompanied by forms of incentive regulation in the form of 
price cap mechanisms, the most common form of incentive regulation. The 
introduction of price cap mechanisms in the insurance industry would be of difficult 
execution. According to economic doctrine, in order to be truly effective, forms of 
incentive regulation based on price cap mechanisms should be accompanied by other 
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incentive mechanisms in order to address issues of service quality
721
. This would 
require the implementation of “periodic accounting, auditing, capital service, and 
cost of capital measurement protocols.”722  
 A system of this kind would be of difficult application when it comes to the 
insurance sector. The reason for this lies with the high degree of uncertainty 
surrounding the nature of this business insurance; whilst in the energy sector it is 
possible to estimate provision costs with a degree of certainty, the opposite can be 
said for insurers whose costs are ultimately linked to the realisation of the risks 
insured. 
 Another possible alternative is represented by self regulation and voluntary 
arrangements. This approach is based on voluntary agreements/codes to be enacted 
by the insurance industry itself, although they could also be superimposed via 
legislative requirements (this is what happened in the Australian telecommunication 
industry where a scheme of industry codes and standards was established by the 
legislator)
723
. 
 The introduction of standards and codes by the insurance industry could 
indeed be an interesting alternative, insofar as transparency is ensured and 
consequences in case of non compliance are pre-determined and enforced. This 
scenario could even be considered for the introduction of tailor-made insurance 
policies theorised in this thesis as the most significant alternative to a block 
exemption in the form of joint statistics and studies of risks.  
                                                 
721
 See P.L. Joskow, “Incentive Regulation in theory and practice”, the MIT Centre for Energy and 
Environmental Policy Research, 2006, available at: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/ 
722
 Ibid., p. 82. 
723
 See the Australian Treasury, “Industry self regulation in consumer markets”, available at: 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/ 
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In light of these considerations and the imminent changes that the insurance 
industry is on the verge of facing due to the reduction of scope of the new block 
exemption regime, a complete repeal of the block exemption system does not seem 
to be too remote and might represent the natural way forward. 
 
10.6 The extent of the application of Art. 101 to the Banking industry  
 
The antitrust issues arising from the application of Art. 101 to the banking sector  
have been addressed in relation to price competition and non-price competition 
issues: two separate, nevertheless at the same time  strictly connected areas.  
When it comes to price competition, MIFs and no-discrimination rules have 
been analysed within the context of card payments systems which represent the 
foremost means of payment used by consumers, giving rise to serious competition 
concerns
724
.  
In the course of this thesis, it has been established that MIFs and no-
discrimination rules have been an integral part of any card payment network since 
the dawn of the creation of credit/debit card payments systems, and  that the analysis 
of their effective impact on competition has led to more than ‘three decades of 
antitrust uncertainty’725.  
On the one hand it is undeniable that both MIFs and no-discrimination rules 
represent blatant restrictions on competition; on the other hand attempts have been 
made to justify their use especially in consideration of the peculiar aspects of four 
party payment networks intended as two-sided markets. Economic theories maintain 
                                                 
724
 In Europe , card transactions cover approximately 70 per cent of the payment transactions (see the 
“Commission’s Interim Report on Payment Cards”, above, at p. 12. 
725
 See S. Semeraro, “Credit Cards Interchange Fees: Three Decades of Antitrust Uncertainty”, 
above.  
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that within such markets, competitive forces operate in a sui generis way so as to 
render MIFs and no-discrimination rules allegedly essential for the correct 
functioning of card payment networks.  
These arguments have certainly been embraced by the US courts, the 
European Courts, and the European Commission which tolerated (although with the 
imposition of certain requirements) MIFs and no-discrimination rules.  
Such an approach was in part justified by the novelty and the progressive 
success of card payment networks.  This led to a cautiously ‘hands off’ regulatory 
approach within which any idea of regulatory intervention was curtailed by the risk 
of compromising the development of new and very efficient payment systems. 
Time is arguably now ripe enough for a re-assessment of the antitrust 
implications of MIFs and no-discrimination rules. Empirical evidence appears to 
demonstrate their anti-competitiveness
726
 and, most of all, their non-essentiality for 
the correct functioning of card payment networks
727
. Alternatives such as bilateral 
negotiations between the members of card payment systems could arguably represent 
a feasible and more ‘competition friendly’ way to recover transactions costs for the 
banks members of a four party card payment scheme.  
In years to come, competition authorities and regulatory bodies will be asked 
to re-evaluate MIFs and no-discrimination rules. It is submitted by the author of this 
thesis that the possible regulatory approaches are substantially two: keep 
acknowledging the necessity of such agreements, or declare them unlawful.  
The former approach (currently adopted by the EU Commission and by the 
US courts), if confirmed,  should aim to mitigate possible anticompetitive side 
effects through the imposition of disclosure requirements and  strict control 
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mechanisms on their effective correspondence to transactions costs. In addition, 
devices designed to bypass MIFs (e.g. bilateral forms of negotiations) should always 
be allowed.   
The latter solution would remove the possibility to use MIFs within card 
payment systems allowing bilateral negotiations instead. This approach should put 
particular emphasis on consumer protection, as consumers might suffer from the 
consequent possibility for merchants to surcharge clients in order to recover 
transaction costs. The imposition of disclosure requirements on merchants in relation 
to fees, in conjunction with a general prohibition to surcharge consumers more than 
required by the need to compensate effective costs, should ensure consumer 
protection granting at the same time intra-system competition. 
Overall, it is suggested that both the above approaches should be based on the 
illegality of no-discrimination rules as non-necessary for the functioning of card-
payment networks. This research has emphasised the extremely negative 
consequences on competition of no-discrimination rules which only with extreme 
difficulty can be balanced against their alleged positive effects and qualify for an 
exemption under Art. 101 (3). 
This thesis has also considered non-price competition issues under Art. 101. 
Although not directly related to price matters, non-price competition issues are 
indeed capable of having a negative impact on competition, and have been the object 
of scrutiny by antitrust authorities both in the EU and USA.  
Exclusion rules (which prevent competitive financial institutions from having 
access to the system), and exclusivity rules (which disallow the possibility for 
members of card payment systems to issue competitive cards) are the most 
controversial non-price competition issues from an antitrust perspective. It is 
  289 
generally maintained that the rules in question represent a necessary form of 
protection for payment systems, as the establishment of such networks is the result of 
considerable investments by their founders, who consequently are not inclined to 
allow external players to have a free ride. 
Nevertheless, important competition concerns arise around exclusion rules 
and exclusivity rules especially if these systems can be theorised as essential 
facilities according to the essential facility doctrine.  
The need for protection of the system must be counter-balanced against the 
necessity for competition, both at an intra-system and inter-system level. It has been 
emphasised that, in practice, although exclusion rules give rise to intra-system 
competition concerns, whereas exclusivity rules are more related to inter-system 
competition, indeed these two different sets of rules represent two sides of the same 
coin. Similarly intra-system and inter-system competition are strictly inter-related.
 Consequently, the regulation of these two issues should consider a pari-passu 
approach. The US approach aiming at ensuring an adequate level of competition at 
inter-system level alone, might in practice result in intra-system competition being 
undermined in the long run. By way of comparison, the approach of the Commission 
which considers both exclusion and exclusivity rules to be at odds with EU 
competition law has the added benefit of coherency, especially if the linkage between 
price and non-price competition issues is considered.  
It is indeed submitted that price and non-price competition issues are strictly 
related to one another. If MIFs and non-discrimination rules used by card payment 
systems raise issues related to intra-system competition, non-price competition 
agreements such as exclusion or exclusivity rules revert both to intra and inter system 
competition. We are basically dealing with two sides of the same coin; this is the 
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reason why it is suggested that both non-price and price competition agreements 
should be subject to a similar regulatory framework.  
As with the insurance sector, yet again a comparison with other segments of 
the market arguably corroborates the above conclusions. Here an interesting parallel 
could be made with the situation arising from the creation of the 
“Verbandevereinbarungen” agreements in the energy sector, where association 
agreements between network operators were permitted due to the technical 
difficulties incurred by individual undertakings in creating their own networking  
system. Similarly to multilateral interchange fees agreements, the 
Verbandevereinbarungen agreements provide for common criteria for the calculation 
of fees and common access rules.  
More interestingly, the rationale for the compatibility of the 
Verbandevereinbarungen agreements with Art. 101 was that such agreements were 
deemed capable of  reducing transaction costs for third parties seeking access to the 
system, and of being ultimately beneficial for consumers. This seems arguably to 
reinforce the conclusions reached in relation to the regulation of multilateral 
interchange fees, where the need for mechanisms of control of cost efficiency of the 
fees was advocated in order to avoid possible negative spillover effects vis-à-vis 
consumers. If the line of reasoning for the assessment of the 
Verbandevereinbarungen agreements was to be applied to multilateral interchange 
fees and no-discrimination rules, the key criterion for their antitrust evaluation 
would, indeed, revolve around the capability of these agreements to curb transaction 
costs and not to reverberate against third parties seeking access to the network or 
consumers.  
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The outcome of such assessment would arguably lead to emphasis on the 
need for strict forms of control on the effective correspondence of multilateral 
interchange fees to transactions costs, and the abolishment or strict scrutiny of any 
type of exclusivity rules or exclusion rules capable of hindering access by third 
parties. 
The same considerations are arguably valid if applied to networking 
agreements in the banking sector such as the SWIFT or the Dresdner Bank circuits 
analysed above
728
.  In both cases, the possibility to reduce transaction costs and 
improve services for consumers would lead to the judicial admissibility of co-
operation agreements with a caveat advocating for strict mechanisms of cost-
efficiency control, which do not seem to be currently enacted. 
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PART VI - CONCLUSIONS 
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11 Art.101 and the Financial Services Sector: 
Concluding remarks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11.1 Conclusions 
 
 
This thesis has now reached its final port of destination. The long and impervious 
road it has embarked upon a few years ago has led to a complete re-assessment of the 
application of Art. 101 TFEU  to the financial services sector.   
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Since the journey started, much debate has arisen  around the issues 
addressed by this thesis proving that the choice of topic has indeed been worthwhile. 
In addition, developments such as the introduction of a new and far narrower block 
exemption regulatory framework for the insurance industry, and the advent of 
seminal Commission decisions in Visa and MasterCard need to be taken as 
indications of the dawn of a new area.  
Far from being close to the ultimate stage, the controversial issues relating to 
the application of Art. 101 to the financial services sector are yet to be resolved and 
will continue to evolve in the future.  
 This thesis claims that the time has now come for a re-consideration of the 
competition regulatory framework for the banking and insurance sector, both 
industries to be intended as two faces of the same coin.  
Despite the undeniable quasi social nature of banking and insurance services, 
the long process of privatisation which characterised this area of the market in 
conjunction with the efforts made by the Community to create an internal market for 
the provision of banking and insurance services, introduced radical changes to the 
status quo. Both the insurance and banking sectors are driven by interests of a 
corporate and entrepreneurial nature, and many insurance and banking undertakings 
are operating on a market which is becoming more and more competitive. 
Competition seems therefore to play more than ever a role of the utmost importance, 
and the time seems ripe for the eradication of old time idiosyncrasies. 
The first seminal conclusion of this thesis is that both the insurance and 
banking sectors should be fully exposed to the application of Art. 101. In light of the 
above considerations, it is indeed submitted that there is arguably no justification for 
block exemptions or extended forms of tolerance of collaborative and  collusive  
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practices in the financial services sector. It is the opinion of the author that a 
complete repeal of the insurance  block exemption could arguably have beneficial 
effects. 
Nevertheless, a complete repeal not accompanied by ancillary measures may 
not be an optimal solution and create uncertainty and idiosyncrasies within the 
internal market. It is therefore suggested that a repeal of the block exemption should 
go pari passu with the simultaneous enactment of possible alternative regulatory 
frameworks such as the enactment of a system of ‘tailor made’ or ‘individualised’ 
insurance policies.  This could lead to the diversification of insurance policies, and  
might result in beneficial effects in terms of consumer welfare, competition, and the 
economics of moral hazard.  
A similar treatment is hereby advocated for the banking industry.  MIFs and 
non-discrimination rules used by card payment systems raise serious competition 
concerns in relation to intra-system competition, and non-price competition 
agreements such as exclusion or exclusivity rules, on their part revert both to intra 
and inter system competition. This thesis arguably proved the existence of clear 
linkage between MIFs and no-discrimination rules in the first place, and secondarily 
between price and  non-price competition agreements such as exclusion or 
exclusivity rules. As established in the course of this thesis, when it comes to the 
banking sector a teleological link appears to interconnect  intra-system and inter 
system competition, giving rise to a domino effect which reverts against the entire 
competitive acquis of the banking sector.  
Past experience suggests that a regulatory framework which tolerates MIFs 
without eradicating  no-discrimination rules is likely to produce inefficient results.
729
 
                                                 
729
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The starting point would therefore  be not to tolerate the use of MIFs and no-
discrimination rules within card payment systems allowing bilateral negotiations 
instead. Exactly as it has been suggested for the removal of the insurance block 
exemption, the enactment of ancillary measures should accompany the eradication of 
MIFs and no discrimination rules.  
In this regard, it is submitted that the imposition of disclosure requirements 
on merchants in relation to fees, in conjunction with a general prohibition to 
surcharge consumers more than required by the need to compensate effective costs, 
should ensure consumer protection granting at the same time intra-system 
competition.   
Since  intra-system and inter-system competition appear to go pari-passu 
when it comes to the banking industry,  it is opinion of the author that non-price 
competition agreements such as exclusion or exclusivity rules should also be 
intended as forms of co-operation contrary to art. 101 and therefore declared void. 
This would arguably  ensure an adequate level of  competition among banking 
undertakings, whose positive effects might reverberate as far as ultimately reaching 
customers. 
These conclusions appears to be corroborated by a comparative analysis with 
other sectors of the economy (telecommunication and energy sectors) conducted at 
the end of this thesis. Overall, the main lesson to be learnt by the application of Art. 
101 to the telecommunication and energy sectors appears to be that, in absence of 
any block exemption, a careful assessment of forms of co-operation between 
undertakings  in the financial services sector would be of the utmost importance. It is 
opinion of this author, that only through a careful and meticulous  scrutiny of the 
nature of proposed agreements between insurance or banking undertakings stability 
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in the market and enhancement of competition in the financial services sector may be 
attained. 
 In line with the considerations expressed in the course of this thesis  in 
relation to forms of horizontal co-operation in the insurance and banking sector,  
particular emphasis should be put on the  indispensability of the agreements  and 
efficiency claims and cost efficiencies should be carefully counter-balanced vis-à-vis 
restrictions and impact on consumers.  
In case of network agreements,  the assessment of entry barriers and the real 
possibility for new entry on a significant scale,  should devote particular attention to 
the necessity of internal rules or bylaws  and  their potential impact on possible new 
market entrants. Further, information exchange agreements should be allowed only 
and to the extent that they are strictly necessary for the correct functioning of the 
network system. 
These are the conclusive remarks of this thesis which has finally reached its 
final port of destination. As for the issues surrounding the application of Art 101 
TFEU to the financial services sector, the journey seems to be still a long time 
coming. Or possibly not? 
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